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FOREWORD 
The papers included in these proceedings were presented at 
the workshop, "Life Cycle Theory and Management Practice," held in 
Sofia, April 2 7 - 2 9 ,  1 9 8 7 .  
The objective of this workshop was to discuss the main lines 
of the life cycle concept and its possible applications in manage- 
ment. Special emphasis was put on company level. The example of 
steel industry was used for in-depth discussions, but some con- 
clusions and illustrations from other industries (more or less 
related to steel) were also discussed. 
The continuing need to innovate and develop technologies and 
products and their diffusion usually necessitates many changes: 
in market position, both international and domestic; in produc- 
tivity and capacity utilization; in social impact and expecta- 
tions. The transition periods between different stages of this 
development are sometimes painful and difficult. How management 
succeeds in coping with change and how management itself changes 
with the dynamics of technology are important research questions. 
The workshop was designed in three main parts, which struc- 
ture is reflected in the design of the proceedings. The first 
group of papers is devoted to the life cycle concept ar.d diffusion 
patterns of different technologies. The second group of papers 
discusses different transition periods and applications of the 
life cycle concept in the steel industry, including practical 
examples of management and business strategies in different steel 
companies. The third group of papers concentrates on management 
issues and possible applications of the life cycle concept in 
management. Attempts to formulate some general issues and con- 
clusions were made. 
In order to use all the valuable contributions made during 
the workshop, the editors have permitted themselves to include 
transcripts of various discussions held during the workshop, as a 
great deal of important and interesting material was presented in 
this informal manner. Selections from the relevant discussions 
follow each group of papers. 
F .  Schmidt-Bleek 
Leader 
Technology, Economy & Society Program 
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SUMMARY 
The workshop "Life Cycle Theory and Management Practice" 
demonstrated the widespread acceptance of the life cycle concept 
in the scientific community and in management practice. 
Based on a summary of the main terms and the various stages 
of life cycles for products, processes, and industries, and an 
description of the relationships between these phases and various 
aspects of organizations, industries and products, the value of 
using different life cycle concepts and the importance of the 
managerial life cycle for a firm's strategic management was demon- 
strated and discussed. Examples were given from several different 
industries, including steel, to clarify the development, struc- 
tural change, substitution and diffusion of technology within the 
framework of the life cycle concept. As the relevant discussions 
show, the life cycle concept can explain the various trends, 
developments, time-lags, and diffusion patterns and problems in 
the steel industry and others as well. A new approach making it 
possible to determine the end of the embryonic (or childhood) 
phase was also presented. 
Critical remarks on the life cycle concept, presented both in 
papers and during discussions, have shown the need for further 
empirical tests and theoretical research. Some advantages in 
planning and realizing innovations in the steel (and other) in- 
dustries based on the concept of the integrated life cycle as a 
tool in the management of innovations with broader time horizons 
were also demonstrated. The integrated life cycle includes the 
phases of invention, innovation, and (important for senescent 
industries) restructuring or liquidation. With the help of the 
integrated life cycle concept, the future state of a company could 
be simulated (in many aspects, better than by methods in use 
currently). Special software packages for computations are cur- 
rently being developed. 
Concentrating on the steel industry, its current problems 
and future development, possible changes in production and con- 
sumption were shown. The changing character of producer-consumer 
relations in the development of a company's strategy was em- 
phasized. The improved methodology for technological forecasting 
was also found to be a contributing factor to the development of 
an appropriate strategy. 
This, together with the growing importance of management 
issues during periods of industrial crisis based on the case of 
steel, as labor and social effects of technological change in this 
industry led to the conclusion of existing possibility to general- 
ize management issues and tasks along the life cycle of products, 
processes, and industries. 
Management of technological and organizational development 
and duplication of the life cycle concept in new technologies 
show the importance of case studies in studies of process life 
cycles and clarified some relations between different phases and 
management options. Many participants stressed the importance of 
case studies on life cycles in various industries in different 
countries. 
The presentations and discussions on the deeper connections 
of time, space, innovation management, and life cycle concepts as 
well as of systems approach to create a new model of innovation 
emphasize the inter-relationships of various sciences and neces- 
sity of inter-disciplinary approach to study the problem. In the 
above context, historical methodology was also discussed as a 
good contribution to developing an adequate management model. 
Using the life cycle concept on the macro-level, the com- 
panies' behavior can be studied from the managerial and organiza- 
tional points of view. Such studies could be done, not only in 
the steel industry, but also in other branches such as textiles 
or robotics. Analysis based not only on statistical data and 
questionnaires, but on case studies and on in-depth interviews 
involving companies could give useful insights for the theory and 
management practice of life cycles. 
The role of product specialization and differentiation in 
the life cycle and in the companies' strategy was stressed by 
many participants. The problem of correct timing and the use of 
Foster's S-curve ought to be studied and developed as management 
tools. Interesting examples of how some companies prosper by 
switching from one obsolete technology to an upcoming one at the 
right time were discussed. In this connection, the timing deci- 
sion was defined as an important one. Until now, there are no 
definite criteria available to determine the appropriate time to 
switch from one technology to another. At the beginning of a new 
development, many approaches evolve simultaneously before a winn- 
ing paradigm appears. 
Comparing behavior patterns in different companies within 
the same industry, or even between industries, was accepted as 
the direction of a study which could help to clarify the possible 
generalization of the life cycle concept as a useful management 
tool. An important issue in developing the possible methodologies 
for determining the right decisions in changing technologies was 
defined to be the use and development of proper indicators. The 
definition of parameters which could describe management behavior 
during the life cycle could deliver the necessary information for 
decision-making. 
Prof. Janos Acs and 
Prof. Evka Razvigorova 
Editors 
SECTION 1: 
LIFE CYCLE CONCEPT:  
Practical Applications in 
the Steel Industry, 
Possibilities and Problems 
1.1. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN ECONOMICS: ON THEORIES OF INNOVA- 
TION AND THE LIFE CYCLE 
Prof. R. U. Ayres 
Technology, Economy & Society Program, IIASA 
Laxenburg, Austria 
With your permission, I will briefly review the life cycle 
as it applies to technological change. I apologize to those of 
you who know this already, and I hope that it might be of some 
help to the rest. 
The life cycle concept, of course, has an origin in biology. 
We talk about conception, birth, infancy, childhood, adolescence, 
maturity, senescence, and death. It has occurred to many people 
at various times that these stages also seem to have some applica- 
tion to the rise and fall of civilization, the rise of business 
enterprises and industries, and the evolution of technologies. 
So what I have done here is to try to show some possible relation- 
ships between these stages and various aspects of organizations, 
industries and products (See Figures 1 and 2). 
For example, during the "infancy" stage of a new product, im- 
mediately after its introduction, the product is unique. One 
producer is making something no one else produces. He is there- 
fore a monopolist for a time, and he can furthermore set his 
prices to maximize profits. This ability to earn extraordinary 
monopoly profits is precisely the incentive for technological 
innovation in a capitalist (free enterprise) system, as Schumpeter 
pointed out seventy-five years ago. Monopoly requires uniqueness, 
in terms of design performance or function. 
The "childhood" stage of the life cycle is usually charac- 
terized by the appearance of imitative innovators. These are 
people who, inspired by the original innovation, may want to try 
to achieve the same result in some other way, or perhaps to get a 
better result, perhaps just make it cheaper to produce. But in 
any case, there is often quite a diversity in the early stages. 
This was very evident in the early stages of the automobile in- 
dustry, where you had a large number of producers producing cars 
that were very different in configuration. In fact, at one time, 
not only were there cars using internal combustion engines, but 
also electric cars and steam cars, all competing in the market at 
the same time during the first decade of this century. 
The adolescent stage of a product would be characterized by 
an increasing degree of standardization towards one main con- 
figuration. This was certainly true in the auto industry. Stan- 
dardization was particularly emphasized by Henry Ford with his 
"Model T." 
The mature phase would be characterized by a very high degree 
of standardization of the product and markets beginning to ap- 
proach saturation. One can tell when a market is saturated in 
economic terms when its price elasticity becomes low and it be- 
haves like a commodity. 
In the senescent phase, the product is effectively a com- 
modity: something not changing, not evolving. It has its niche 
and within this niche, whatever it is, the product is now a neces- 
sity. 
Now, as for processes, the life cycle has a different set of 
implications. During the first stages of the life cycle, produc- 
tion tends to be "custom." Organization is ad hoc. For a mecha- 
nical product, one would tend to use multi-purpose machines and 
multi-purpose labor. This labor is likely to be highly skilled. 
But as the product evolves through the stages of the life cycle, 
production shifts from small batches and job shops, with manual 
operation, to medium to large-scale batches with more and more 
mechanization. Gradually the skills of the workers tend to be 
more and more embodied in the machines. In the mature phase, the 
workers need not be highly skilled. They may be highly paid, 
which is a different matter, but in a modern automobile plant, 
for example, almost no training is needed. A worker with very 
little education can be brought into the assembly line and func- 
tion adequately with two weeks or so of "on the job" training. 
This means that the skill requirements are minimal. 
As regards strategic management, the life cycle has interest- 
ing implications. For example, in the early stage, the tendency 
would be to invest in improving the product. During the "child- 
hood" stage, this makes sense because the product is being sold 
primarily on the basis of its performance. Later, however, as 
the product becomes more standardized, competition in the market 
place is more and more based on price. Both performance and 
price are involved, but the balance shifts from performance 
towards price as the life cycle moves from adolescence to matur- 
ity. And as the emphasis in competition moves from performance 
to price, similarly investment will tend to move from product R&D 
to process R&D, because when price is the critical factor, then 
the idea is to reduce costs as much as possible by improving the 
process. Finally, as a product becomes mature or an industry 
becomes mature, there seems to be a tendency -- we certainly see 
it in the steel industry -- to dis-invest, to sell technology 
assets and even physical assets to low-cost competitors. This 
tendency is very visible in the United States. 
In its early stages, an industry is usually low in capital 
intensity. Some industries are inherently more capital-intensive 
than others, of course. The steel industry from its inception was 
relatively capital-intensive, but it was not nearly as capital- 
intensive in the 1880's as it is today. It is also, as a rule, 
more "contestable" in the early stages, meaning that the cost of 
entry (and exit) is lower before the industry becomes more highly 
specialized and capital-intensive. In the mature phase, it is 
less feasible for a new competitor to enter the arena, and so the 
"risk premium" declines. I shall return to this point later. 
As regards strategic management, there are also locational 
aspects. During the infancy of a new product, typically the loca- 
tion selected (if there is some choice) is likely to be near the 
richest market. What is most essential to an entrepreneur at 
that stage is rapid, efficient feedback between the market and 
the design, engineering, and production activities. Thus, if 
something goes wrong in a marketplace, it can be fixed fast. 
There is one legendary story -- I do not know if it is true -- 
that one of the early Fords had the gearbox put in backwards so 
that when put into forward it would move in reverse! Fortunately 
the feedback between the market and the factory in those days was 
so good that only one car had that happen, and the fault was 
corrected immediately. Whether that story is true or not, it 
does illustrate the point that being near the market is important 
in the early stages of product development. 
It also is important in the early stages to be near a pool of 
technical talent. That is probably the main reason why "Silicon 
Valley" exists. It is the pool of technical talent that existed 
in that area (and which was later attracted to that area) that 
made possible the great success of the semi-conductor industry. 
It is hard to build an industry requiring very highly skilled 
people in an area where such people are not available. But this 
is a problem mainly of the early stages of the life cycle. In 
the late stages, when most of the skills have been embodied in 
the machines, location is determined by other factors such as 
labor costs. 
There is a life cycle in locational preference. This process 
was described very well by Vernon in his famous 1966 paper, from 
which Figure 3 is taken. In the early stages, production is near 
the most important markets. The successful producer becomes an 
exporter. Gradually, as the product becomes more standardized and 
more reliable, demand for it increases among more distant markets 
that may not be so wealthy. Then ultimately to meet the demands 
in those markets, the newest facilities are moved to those areas, 
because they no longer require such a high degree of technical 
skill and sophistication. Finally, those newer facilities, taking 
advantage of lower cost labor, tend to become exporters back to 
the original country. This is a process we have seen in the auto 
industry, in the steel industry, and many others. 
Once an industry becomes mature, it tends to move to that 
area where the factor costs are lowest. Now it is true that xe 
may have over-estimated the labor cost aspect of this pattern. 
Labor costs are not a really dominant factor nowadays, at least 
not in a very capital-intensive industry such as steel. But if 
all other factors are equal, then labor costs can still determine 
location. If capital equipment is the same and is marketed world- 
wide by specialized capital equipment companies -- which is true 
in this industry -- and they are willing to build a new plant in 
South Korea or in Brazil (or in Saudi Arabia for that matter) for 
the same price that you could build it in Texas, then labor costs 
still become a dominant factor in location. Of course, other 
factors are not always equal and sometimes some countries have 
cheaper capital costs, others have cheaper energy costs, and so 
on, but those are just variants of the general principle. 
From the organizational perspective, again, there are charac- 
teristic features of the life cycle in different stages. During 
the early stage, it is important to have a very flexible organiza- 
tion. The product itself is not standardized; everything is 
changing all the time. And gradually, at least if history is a 
guide, the tendency seems to be to move from a very flexible 
organization towards a bureaucratic one. In the late stages of 
the life cycle, where production is on a very large scale, the 
product itself is not changing, and even the process becomes 
standardized, then cost control tends to move into the accoun- 
tant's office. At this stage, it is very important to have an 
extremely well-controlled organization. At least, that seems to 
be the way firms have evolved in the past. 
I could talk about other factors as well. What about labor 
in the different stages of the life cycle? I already mentioned 
that in the first stages the tendency is to use multi-purpose, 
highly skilled labor because nothing is standardized, nothing is 
fixed. But as the product is standardized, gradually mechaniza- 
tion is increased and labor skill requirements are reduced. 
Skills are also divided, as time goes on, into sub-skills, often 
becoming somewhat codified, at least in union contracts, and 
ultimately the highest skills are those needed on the management 
side rather than on the production end. 
I can continue this even further. I can talk about economic 
measures, for example. In the earliest stage of a product life 
cycle, the idea of price elasticity is perhaps not even ap- 
propriate. But as the sector moves through the various stages, 
at least as I see it, the tendency is for markets to become more 
clearly defined and for price elasticity of demand to fall from a 
high initial level towards a very low level in the last stage as 
the product becomes like a commodity. 
As noted earlier, "contestability" or ease of entry and esit 
is an interesting feature of the cycle. In fact, I believe per- 
haps one of the best objective tests of the transition from the 
childhood to the adolescent phase is in terms of entry and exit. 
During the childhood stage, entry is obviously easy. All you 
need is a better idea. Also during the childhood phase, a lot of 
new entrants typically come into the industry, usually from 
"neighboring" industries with some relevant capability. And at 
some point, the number reaches a maximum and then -- after a 
"shakeout" -- begins to decline rapidly. That is a typical pat- 
tern. We are seeing it now in the personal computer industry; xe 
saw it long ago in the auto industry and the steel industry. The 
shake-out consists of rapid mergers, combinations, bankruptcies, 
and people simply leaving the business. During the mature phase 
then, the shake-outs are over, and typically the number of com- 
panies in the industry stays constant or nearly constant for a 
relatively long time. (Not absolutely constant and "a long time" 
is not forever, but it may last for decades.) And then during 
the senescent stage, there may be a renewed period of turmoil and 
more mergers, bankruptcies, and departures from the industry as 
we are beginning to see now, I think, in the steel industry. 
From a competitive point of view, one can say that in the 
very early stages there exists a natural monopoly of the innovator 
as Schumpeter described. In the mature stage, there is typically 
something like a stable oligopoly. Perhaps in the childhood and 
adolescent stages, the industry is closer to a pure competition, 
During the latest stage of senescence, again things become quite 
unstable. The boundary between "childhood" and "adolescence" 
might best be characterized as that point where the number of 
different vendors reaches its peak. I want to mention the inter- 
esting study by Prof. Rosegger on the auto industry. He did not 
use the number of vendors, but rather the number of "makes" as a 
measure. But still the pattern, I think, is quite similar. In 
any case, a pattern something like this could probably be found 
in the steel industry too. 
I think I have probably said enough for the present. Many of 
these propositions are conjectural. Some of them are subject to 
empirical tests. In fact, some of them we could probably test 
using the data base that we have assembled for this workshop. 
Others would require special studies. I am very much interested 
to know what you all think about these ideas as applied to the 
steel industry, which of them should be tested further, and how we 
should go about 
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The Product Life Cycle 
Investment Profit ptages of Product Development 
1.2. THE TECHNOLOGY LIFE CYCLE IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY: 
A FEW SKEPTICAL QUESTIONS 
Dr. Chris De Bresson 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
1. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
I have presented some methodological problems with the tech- 
nology life cycle. The first related to its inability to supply 
a specific recommendation for management of a firm concerning 
technological choices. Perhaps the direction of evolution sug- 
gested by technology life cycle models supplies a "general time 
line" describing the probable change of technological and in- 
dustrial environment. Dr. Razvigorova alluded to the unpredic- 
tability of Sofia weather; Henri Poincarre's famous unstable 
weather equations were capable of predicting that snow is less 
probable in Sofia in April than in February, but not that we 
would have snow at.the end of April here to keep us indoors at 
the IIASA workshop. In other words, the general direction of 
evolution of technology described by the technological life cycle 
is not sufficiently precise to help a manager make technological 
choices at any moment of time. 
1.1. Unit of Analysis 
At this meeting, I have heard people use the technology life 
cycle on at least three levels: 1 )  the unit, 2) the industry 
itself, and 3) the technology. What is the unit of analysis 
whose life cycle we are talking about? The unit of analysis must 
have some durability in time (if you want to perform an analysis 
of a life-cycle) and display some solidarity between its elements. 
Personally, I am not convinced these units of analysis fare 
very well. Perhaps the concept of technical system which has 
some stability could be taken as a unit of analysis. At this 
juncture, I would like to come back to something which is dear to 
this Institute. The concept of system is well elaborated (Lange, 
1965; Von Bertelanffy, 1968). The concept has been used in tech- 
nology by Thomas Hughes and Bertrand Gille, the historians of 
technology. Technological system is stable at least for a certain 
time. One can predict that all the parts will move in a similar 
direction. 
But even the concept of technical system has some limita- 
tions. A technical system is not an organic system, i.e. the 
organ does not die with the unit. One can unbundle the technical 
system and recompose it. People in industry know that basically 
by reverse engineering one can sometimes do away with the rigid- 
ities within a technical system. 
Kuznets' suggested very long-term declining returns of tech- 
nical lines. He suggested "dinosaur effects," i.e. over-special- 
ization and complexity. One of the examples he gave uas the pulp 
and paper industry. He saw it in the 1930's as witnessing declin- 
ing returns. Yet since the 19709s, it is undergoing a quiet 
revolution. There is no long-term declining in returns in pulp 
and paper. Some of the technical systems have been unbundled, 
and they have done away with the declining returns. Foudrinier 
has been replaced by twin wire paper-making, chemical pulping by 
thermo-mechanical pulping, etc. One can also abandon the techni- 
cal system and replace it by another (Figure 1). 
1.2. Discontinuities 
The second methodological problem with the technology life 
cycle is even more damning. In observing the technological be- 
havior of firms, we do not seem to have any predictable smooth 
functional relationship. In order to have a functional relation- 
ship, as Augustin Cournot, one of the first to apply mathematical 
principles to social sciences in 1838, found, one has to assume 
continuity. In Cournot's 1838 "demand curve," he specified that 
he assumed that for every intermediate price of a commodits there 
is a corresponding quantity in the function. This is not the 
case with firms' technological behaviors. These latter display 
discontinuity. In testing the Abernathy-Utterback technology 
life cycle model on a few longitudinal case histories, I have 
found marked discontinuities (See Figure 2). 
These discontinuities correspond to wrenching organizational 
changes that a firm has to make in order to move along the general 
"time line" of technology in the industry (Figure 3). The first 
implication, however, is that the firm is not obliged to move 
down the curve; it has a choice, a costly choice. The firm can 
also choose to keep producing in a batch mode. Although there 
are pressures to decrease unit price and standardize production, 
it may choose to target a higher price (and higher margin) segment 
of the market. The second implication is that different forms of 
the technology and forms of production coexist as a technology 
matures. The coexistence is not always peaceful; it encompasses 
strategic games between firms, but there is coexistence, and one 
of the things I found on the innovation data bases is that basi- 
cally there were very few cases of transition that correspond to 
the Abernathy-Utterback, but very stable forms of organization. 
The third implications is that a firm can reverse -- and often 
does -- its course (Figure 4). 
1.3. Metaphors and Analogies 
Professor Haustein made us aware that in the French edition 
of the book Capital, by Marx, there was a reference to life cycles 
in steel technology. But there were a lot of things in his manu- 
scripts that Marx decided not to publish. In general, Marx de- 
clined competence when it came to technology. In his two editions 
of the first volumes of Capital, he deleted a lot of ideas con- 
tained in the Grundrisse. One particular intriguing footnote is 
at the end of the machinery chapter, where he says one should use 
a Darwinist approach to look at the history of technology. But 
if one reads the Ethnological Notebooks where he comments on 
Maine and Morgan, he said that to look at social organizations as 
organisms is probably not very fruitful. The purpose of my re- 
marks is to instill some skepticism as to this road of research: 
Marx had few pretensions on the subject. 
I will just summarize briefly some of the pitfalls. Meta- 
phors like the life cycle are useful because we do not have a 
theory of technologies. They are very useful to communicate 
things -- vividly. If I say, "I fell in love" or "I built a 
relationship," you immediately understand what I am talking about. 
Analogies are also good heuristic devices. In the absence 
of theory, we have a set of observations in some kind of disorder 
which is troublesome and creates anxieties. So we draw an analogy 
from a number of signs and make sense out of them by putting them 
in a certain order with the help of analogy. 
A more general methodological problem with the technology 
life cycle is related to mastering analogies. Analogies are 
powerful heuristic devices to order observations in the absence 
of robust theory of technological change. But unless one can 
find isomorphism (or homeomorphism), the analogies have to be 
dropped. At the International institute of Applied Systems Ana- 
lysis, you are intellectually well situated to benefit from Lud~ig 
von Bertelanffy's advice, as he is, with Oskar Lange, one of the 
founders of systems theory. In his treatise on general systems 
theory (1968), he specified how to use analogies. If you can 
prove that there is an isomorphism or homeomorphism between the 
different causal links, then you can master your analogy. But 
even once you have done that, it is not because you have mastered 
your analogy that you can infer a similar set of causes and ori- 
gins. This is one of the useful criticisms that Stephen J. Could 
has made to E. 0. Wilson's socio-biology. You cannot infer simi- 
lar causal relationships from isomorphism. So even if we did 
find an analogy between technology and biological life cycles, we 
would still have to find rationale of causation for the phenome- 
non. 
I have used the Abernathy-Utterback model technology life 
cycle for quite some time until a point where I decided to drop 
it because I felt that one could not satisfy the above conditions. 
My tests were based on an analysis of the Science Policy Research 
Unit (SPRU) data base and my Canadian data base across all in- 
dustries from 1945 to the late 1970's. I found no empirical 
corroboration of the Abernathy-Utterback model. The model was 
not totally satisfactory, and so I tried to build an alternative. 
Today let me suggest some relevant questions about the steel 
industry relating to the technology life cycle. I will focus on 
two questions which I am curious about. These questions are 
those of someone who knows very little about the iron and steel 
industry besides what I have learnt from the specialists in this 
room. 
The first aspect concerns some of the diffusion curves about 
the basic oxygen technology that we have been presented in the 
workshop. I would like to suggest maybe a slightly different 
interpretation to explain the same facts. The second point fo- 
cuses on the following question: why has steel-making been stuck 
in a batch mode for so long? Except for continuous casting, the 
production of iron and steel is still basically in a batch mode. 
2. DIFFUSION CURVES, STEP INCREASES AND TECHNOLOGICAL THRESHOLDS 
One of the advantages of not knowing anything about an in- 
dustry is that you are encouraged to learn from those who do and 
allowed to pilfer from you colleagues. I have proceeded to do 
this by taking data from Prof. Maly's very interesting paper. 
Maly supplies us with observations about the diffusion of the 
basic oxygen process in steel-making (Table 1 and Figure 5a). 
How do we make sense out of these observations? I think there 
are a number of possible ways. As mathematically-trained social 
scientists, we are a bit arithmo-morphic and calculus-morphic 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971): we try to use the least squares to fit 
all our data points to some continuous function, and we adjust 
this with an "r" or an "s" curve of some type. In using these 
curves, we are making all kinds of assumptions as to the causality 
which would generate such a distribution. 
I was struck in Maly's data that in 1957 and 1958, and again 
in 1963 and 1966, there was a big jump in the number of adopters. 
The best fit of the data points would be to a staircase with 
slanted steps (Figure 5b). Perhaps it is not as elegant mathe- 
matically, but it is a better fit. And it also makes more sense. 
In terms of economic rationale, it makes much more sense. Thres- 
holds of performance are reached through the accumulation of 
improvements. When you adopt, you adapt, learn, modify and fit 
the new technology. Because learning is a cumulative process, 
all past improvements eventually lead to qualitative step in- 
crease. A threshold is a very convenient notion to pass from a 
quantitative change to a quality change. The new technological 
threshold will open up opportunities for adoption of the technol- 
ogy to a whole new set of actors. 
The notion of threshold has been used by development econo- 
mist, RenC Passet, to look at why there were Giffen goods in less 
developed countries. In a poor country, the price goes up for 
wheat and people rush to buy more wheat. It is the contrary to 
demand theory, and in a developed nation the reverse relationship 
is true. Passet suggests that a development threshold must be 
reached before Giffen goods disappear and the standard "law of 
demand" becomes operative. 
Paul David's work on the mechanization of reaping introduced 
the concept of threshold to diffusion research. New levels of 
performance of a technology will make it available to firms with 
a different scale of production. I think it is a very useful 
concept. 
It is not hard to find some evidence of such thresholds of 
performance in oxygen steel-making from Prof. Lynn's 1982 account. 
These two adoption spurts in 1957-58 and again in 1963-66, may be 
due to such threshold improvements. The basic oxygen process was 
known for a long time, but what made it possible was the recent 
availability of oxygen production technology. Initially, there 
were tremendous pollution problems with the basic oxygen process 
in Austria. Until 1954, all the vessels had a maximum size of 35 
tons. When the refractory problem was solved, a new scale of 
vessel was made possible. By injecting the oxygen not only by 
the top, but to the bottom and the side, another step increase in 
performance enabled a number of other adopters to access that 
technology. This might explain why, by 1961-62, some of the major 
improvements of the technology had been made and cumulatively a 
new threshold level had been reached which made the technology 
available for a number of new users, resulting with a lag in the 
spurt of adoption. 
What I am suggesting here is nothing new. Another steel 
specialist, Bela Gold, recommended (1980) in an article on short- 
comings of innovation diffusion research that we should accept 
the idea that innovation never stays the same. The innovation is 
new in each adoption. It mutates constantly. We cannot look at 
innovation as a commodity which has fixed characteristics. The 
learning process is constantly changing the technology. 
In this sense, we can use a biological metaphor. In an 
evolutionary approach, we think in terms of irreversible learning 
processes and cumulative learning (Usher), but we do not have to 
extend the metaphor to a tighter organic analogy with a life 
cycle. We have to drop the assumption that innovation stays 
identical to itself during the diffusion process. We explain 
some of the step increases in diffusion by the major thresholds 
improvements which are reached. Thus we would satisfy one of 
Donald Schon's (1967) old suggestions that one consider inno\-a- 
tions as a process of incessant change. 
Consider technological know-how as a stock which increases. 
Consider the stock of innovations in use as indication of tech- 
nological know-how. Levels of adoptions in an industry are re- 
lated to this stock level. 
Technical development is an irreversible process registered 
in ordinal time -- not cardinal time (one of the distinctions 
between the two dimensions is that, in ordinal time, you cannot 
subtract, you cannot go back). One can use the notion of thres- 
holds as Paul David (1975) does, and it should explain the new 
spurts of adoption. I think this approach would be less mechanis- 
tic and less deterministic. 
3. WHY IS STEEL-MAKING STILL IN BATCH MODE? 
My second query about the steel industry is: why does steel- 
making seem to be stuck in a batch mode? Some of the literature 
I have read seems to say that there are technical reasons for 
this. Perhaps. I would think that there are also some market 
demand reasons for this, i.e. some purely economic reasons. Let 
me just recapitulate the problem: the crucible was a batch sys- 
tem; the Bessemer is a batch process; Thomas is a batch process; 
the open hearth is a larger patch process; the basic oxygen pro- 
cess is still a batch process. With some electrolytic vacuum 
processes, there may be possibilities of a continuous line pro- 
cess. Continuous casting of ingots and lamination trains are a 
line process which is exerting up-stream pressure towards a more 
continuous production process. But all the main steel-making 
processes are batch. 
There are batches of various sizes in terms of tonnage and 
length in terms of time, in terms of minutes or hours for each of 
them. What is surprising is that there is not any set pre-deter- 
mined trajectory of evolution. With the open hearth, we get 
larger quantities, but longer batch time, than in Thomas proces- 
ses. In terms of economics of speed and economics of scale, it 
does not make that much intuitive economic sense. The importance 
of economics of scope is perhaps what explains it. Firms try to 
remain flexible and retain a capacity to produce a variety of 
different products. If economics of scale were the sole preoc- 
cupation, one would expect a transition from large batches to 
line production, but this does not happen. 
The precondition for scale is standardized homogeneous goods. 
Where is there a sufficient demand for standardized goods in 
steel? The demand for rails, nails, armor plate, roofing sheet, 
barbed wire, ingots, casts will lead toward line processes because 
these standardized goods would have fairly large demand. Mass 
standardized demand is where you might expect line processes. We 
have seen some of that in end-products. But is there a stable 
homogeneous, standardized demand in the first stage of steel- 
making which actually justifies locking oneself into a line pro- 
cess, even if it is a technical possibility to do it? 
My hunch is that scope economies are more important in the 
first segment of steel-making, where firms are supplying a semi- 
finished material to changing specifications. That would explain 
why one keeps a batch organization which is relatively more fle- 
xible. Economies of scope are realized by sharing input cost, 
the know-how, and the competence across a variety of products. 
Being able to mix different qualities of inputs in different ways 
depending on the client's requirements for different qualities of 
steel is essential for firms. You do not need always the same 
characteristics of the steel output. The user might need some- 
times higher quality, sometimes less, depending on its end use. 
Firms want to reduce the constraints and have some flexibility to 
address various market segments as demand shifts. 
There is a trade-off between economics of scope and economics 
of scale. Beyond a certain scale, you are going to have to reduce 
the scope of your products. Vice-versa, if you stretch the scope 
and variety of your products, you are going to have to keep your 
scale down. My graphics are still in a suitcase which is some- 
where between Madrid, Rome and Sofia, so I have had to reconsti- 
tute them very quickly. It is a bit complicated, but I think you 
will understand (Figure 6). Baumol, Panzar, and Willig have a 
graphic device to compare joint and separate costs: trans ray 
convexity. Let us suppose two products: Product 1 and Product 
2. Each have geometrical scale for the amount produced by unit 
of time. We are comparing individual costs, unit costs, on the 
vertical axis of each product individually to the joint unit 
costs of producing them jointly. It does not matter really what 
individual cost curves are for the purpose of this comparison as 
long as they are the same for the two products. We are only 
comparing individual costs with joint costs. Here we chose ar- 
bitrarily monotonically increasing returns to scale. 
My proposition is the following: there is a limit (which is 
different according to each industry) where you go from positive 
economics of scope to negative dis-economies of scope. Economies 
of scope would be expressed by the equation (1) that the joint 
cost cpl, cpp, and dis-economies by the reverse (equation 2). 
Economies of Scope (1) 
Dis-economies of Scope 
There is a scale limit where you lose your economies of scope 
(Figure 6) if you stretch the technical distance between your 
products (the angle). If you are further away from your technical 
field, then you risk -- there is an indeterminancy and uncertain- 
ty, which may yield punishment -- to find yourself into dis- 
economies of scope (Figure 7). If one plots the technical dis- 
tance of a firm from its established technical experience, there 
is a limit beyond which you do not know what you are going to 
get: positive economics of scope or negative diseconomies of 
scope. If you are close, you have a greater probability of eco- 
nomics of scope. For instance, producing two very close types of 
steel may yield scope economies in the same furnace. But if the 
firm goes further from its technical field of competence, there 
will eventually come a point where it will not know whether it 
still is going to have economics of scope by joint production. 
Then the probability of having economies of scope is non-zero, 
but it is indeterminate. 
Renk Thom called this a catastrophe in the sense that it is 
a functional discontinuity: you do not know which way it is 
going to go. Here functional analysis breaks down. 
So to sum it up, economics of scope at technical proximity 
and diseconomies of scope at technical distance induces firms to 
acquire flexibility in order to share their input cost. The 
batch process is the ideal flexible organization to reap economies 
of scope. 
In as much as the demand for steel grade is not homogenous, 
staying in business requires to design a furnace to adapt flexibly 
to future unknown shifts in demand. Perhaps -- just an hypothesis 
for the steel specialists -- this explains the economic induce- 
ments to produce steel in batch mode. 
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SUMMARY 
A new approach to technological life-cycle analysis is pro- 
posed here. It is based on the use of business cycle analysis to 
suggest statistical means of determining where the embryonic 
(childhood) phase of the life cycle ends and the expansion (ado- 
lescent) phase begins. 
The method appears to be applicable mainly to the introduc- 
tion of new process technologies over a fairly long period. A 
test of the proposed method for two cases, i.e. the adoption of 
the open hearth and of electrical furnaces in steel production, 
is discussed in this paper. 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
A well-known approach to the diffusion processes investiga- 
tion is based on the following scheme: there are four phases in a 
technology life cycle: (I) embryonic or childhood (tl - t2), ( 2 )  
expansion or adolescence (t2 - t4), (3) saturation or maturit~. 
(t4 - t5), and (4) declining or senescence (t5 - . . ) I .  These 
phases are illustrated schematically in Figure 1. 
The new technologies diffusion, measured by share changes, 
can be described by S-shaped curves [4, 8, 9, 14, 171. These 
curves usually represent the first three stages of a technological 
life cycle: embryonic stage, expansion, and maturity. The stage 
of a declining technology share completely depends on the dynamics 
of the next, evolving technology, which is at its embryonic or 
expansion stage. The penetration will be more complicated if a 
third technology appears on the scene before the first one is 
completely replaced. This is why the real trajectories never go 
along with a mathematical curve. The divergences depend also on 
the economic environment, parallel inventions, and the business 
cycle situation. 
It is potentially important for managers or other decision- 
makers to determine exactly when the diffusion process will pass 
'In 1121 the fifth phase (revival before decline) is detached. 
3 1 
from the embryonic to the expansion phase, because this is also 
the transition from a period of rapid technology or product e\.olu- 
tion to a period of increasing standardization and exploitation 
of the scale effect in production. Potential adopters also have 
a much lower risk once the embryonic phase has passed. 
In short, there are differences in driving forces, economic 
conditions, and dynamic features of the diffusion process in 
these two phases. For instance, a new technology in the embryonic 
phase might not yield profits to the innovator in the embryonic 
phase. It demands very high-risk investments and a stream of 
parallel inventions or improvements. The conventional technology 
is regarded to be more reliable and profitable (to users) in this 
period. The new technology has to be adapted to many new fields 
of applications and penetrate new sub-markets. This is why a new 
embryonic technology is sometimes limited at first to big com- 
panies with very strong financial positions, good marketing or- 
ganizations and R&D experience. This is an advantage associated 
with scale (scale monopoly). 
At the second stage (expansion) the new technology becomes 
more reliable compared with the conventional technology. Also, 
the number of vendors is growing moderately or stabilizes (as new 
entrants are balanced by consolidations) and barriers to entry 
rise. Thus profitability for the major firms increases. The 
diffusion growth rate depends mainly on economic parameters: 
relative profitability, relative cost (differentiated into its 
main elements - labor, capital, material, and energy), investment 
capital availability, fixed-capital vintage structure, etc. 
To summarize, there are quite different theoretical ap- 
proaches as well as analytical methods applicable to technological 
life-cycle investigations in these two phases. Thus the deter- 
mination of the boundary point tl is quite important for purposes 
of refining the analysis of life cycles, as well as for pro\-iding 
guidelines for managers. 
2. EXISTING APPROACHES 
Life-cycle analyses have been traditionally based on inves- 
tigations of product life cycles, especially for consumer dur- 
ables.2 When a new product is introduced, the number of early 
producers (measure of the degree of monopoly) is very important. 
But for a new process technology the number of early users or 
acceptors is more important than the number of producers. A 
competitive end-user market situation determines the life-cycle 
dynamics in a product case. However, for new process technologies 
2There are also investigations of a corporate life cycle, 
see, for instance [ 1 2 ] .  
the users are themselves producers who are strongly affected h>- 
the business cycle. Most past research of the technology life 
cycle has dealt with the problem of interaction between old and 
new technologies. For statistical definitions of the different 
phases or stages of diffusion processes two main approaches ha\-e 
usually been used. One can demonstrate them by means of two 
concrete examples. 
The first approach to dividing the life cycle into several 
phases is based on the scale of production. For example [ Z ] ,  
production is divided into three types or modes: custom, batch 
and continuous line. The "custom" mode is characterized by tens 
of units produced a year in a "job shop". The "batch" mode corers 
a range of hundreds of units, and the "line" mode covers a range 
of thousands of units a year. 
It is convenient (and probably not misleading) to associate 
the "custom" mode of production with the embryonic phase, the 
"batch" mode with the expansion phase and the "line" mode uith 
the mature phase (see Table 1). 
For the case of the history of Bombardier's snowmobile de 
Bresson and Lampel [ 2 ]  determined the length of the three phases 
as 1 1 ,  2 2  and more than 2 0  years, respectively. 
However, this approach seems to be most applicable for a 
consumer product where the life cycle and the life-cycle evolution 
was primarily determined by the market environment. The snou- 
mobile did not substitute for any predecessor. This is uhy the 
absolute numbers are applicable instead of penetration or dif- 
fusion rates. 
The absolute values for the definition of boundaries betueen 
different stages cannot be universal, because they are dependent 
on a product's specific features (especially on its complexit>- 
and cost), market size, etc. Some products can become mature 
without even reaching the "line" mode of production. Large 
trucks, aircraft, turbines are examples in point. 
Another approach to the determination of the phases based. on 
the number of producers has been suggested by Gort and Klepper 
1 3 1 .  They divided the life cycle into five stages, based on the 
number of vendors. The first phase begins with the commercial 
introduction of a new product by its first producer. The end of 
this stage is reached when the total number of producers is no 
more than three. 
The second stage in this scheme is the period of sharp in- 
crease in the number of producers. Stage I11 is the period in 
which the number of entrants is roughly balanced by the number of 
existing firms, and net entry equals zero. The fourth stage 
starts with the net entry becoming negative, and the fifth one is 
reached with an approximately zero net entry again, biit at a 
lower level. 
The authors investigated the specific features of the stagec 
by using information for 46 different product innovations. Thecc 
included consumer goods (like electric shavers and blanh~ts, 
shampoo, zippers, etc.), chemical inventions (like DDT, styrene, 
saccharin, nylon) and a lot of high-tech examples (computers, 
lasers, guided missiles, transistors, nuclear reactors, etc.). 
The aggregated results are shown in Table 2. 
The main distinction of this approach from the first one is 
that the former is predeterminantly based on the production side. 
But the shortcoming of the Gort-Klepper approach is that the 
number of producers does not reflect either the volume or mode of 
production, or (more important) the share of the new product in 
relation to the competing products.3 
Neither of the above approaches is applicable to the case of 
a new process technology. As noted previously, the diffusion of 
a technology among a number of acceptors or users vis A \.is con- 
ventional process technologies is the critical measure. 
That is why we are going to propose an alternative method of 
differentiation of technological life-cycle phases, based on 
analysis of relative shares of new process technologies ox-er a 
succession of business cycles. The steel production case has 
been chosen as a basis for illustration of the method due to its 
"attractive" features: 
- long-term statistical time-series are available; 
- the total production, as well as the shares of different 
technologies are measured in physical values (tons) of the 
homogeneous product (steel). 
3. THE CASE OF STEEL PRODUCTION 
The traditional approaches to the technological life-cycle 
analysis are based on the use of long-term statistical time-series 
of the new technology diffusion or penetration rate. They are 
usually smoothed or interpolated to reveal the main parameters of 
S-shaped curves (i.e. logistic curves) and do not reflect the 
cyclical fluctuations, which are usually regarded as "noise" [ l o ,  
11, 13, 14, 201. 
'The example of PC's shows that the new market was created by 
a number of small new entrants, but the dominating firm in this 
field -- IBM -- was merely waiting for its time to come. In 
fact, the entry of IBM probably defined the end of the embryonic 
phase in that case. 
However, when we investigated the substitution of major 
process technologies over long periods of time, covering sel-era1 
business cycles, we found an interesting correlation betxeen 
changes in the shares of "new" versus "old" technologies ~i:h 
respect to their maturity during periods of recession. These 
results are shown in Table 3 for the steel case in the L S A .  
Putting it another way, the new technology's behavior in 
recession periods depends on its share of total production. When 
the share is below 9-10% of total production, the value of the 
share tends to decrease during recession periods. On the other 
hand, when the new technology's share increases from the 9-10% 
level up to the end of the saturation phase (point t5) its share 
tends to rise during recessions, especially in the expansion 
phase t2 - t4. And after t5 (in the declining phase) the tech- 
nology's share decreases sharply during recessions. 
Based on this analysis, one is led to postulate that the 
open-hearth steel technology passed out of the embryonic phase in 
1887. The expansion phase lasted from 1887 up to 1940, the satu- 
ration phase from 1940 up to 1957, and the declining phase began 
in 1958. 
We can observe comparable results for the electric-furnace 
technology in steel-making. In this case the embryonic phase 
lasted from 1909 up to 1957, while the expansion phase began in 
1958 and has continued to the present. There were only 3 excep- 
tions to the rule (1931, 1932, 1975) when the share of the embry- 
onic technology did not decrease in the first two cases and the 
share of the expanding technology decreased in the last one. But 
the deviations from the rule were very small. 
Unfortunately, we could not get the same results for the 
embryonic phase of the basic-oxygen furnace (BOF) technologj- 
because it grew too fast and passed out of this phase beth-een th-o 
widely-spaced recessions (1958 and 1967). But after 1963, xhen 
the share of the BOF technology reached 12%, it behaved like an 
expanding technology. 
During the 60 years of the decline in the Bessemer process 
share, 50% of the reduction took place during 24 recession years. 
In only three years (1893, 1896, 1908) the Bessemer process share 
dropped by 18 percent points. The same situation is observed in 
the open-hearth declining phase where 1/3 of the total reduction 
(from 90% in 1957 down to 7% in 1983) took place during 4 reces- 
sion years: 1967, 1970-71, and 1975. 
The growth of electric-furnace steel-making during its embry- 
onic phase was interrupted by decreases in recession years. The 
total growth was from 0 in 1909 up to 9% in 1959 and at the same 
time there was a 3 percent point reduction of its share during 13 
recession years. 
In order to confirm these results we tried to check the 
situation in British steel-making, but we could not get the same 
results for all recession periods because of the high instabilit~ 
in steel production in Great Britain [I, 31. This is why we can 
present only the aggregated data. 
During the expansion phase the share of the open-hearth 
technology increased during 12 recession years and decreased 
slightly during only two years (1924 and 1925). In the embryonic 
phase of the electric-furnace technology (from 1914 to 1963 when 
it reached 10%) there were two stagnation periods in steel produc- 
tion: 1918-1931 and 1940-1945. The share of this embryonic 
technology decreased from 1.3% in 1917 to 1.1 in 1931 in the 
first period and from 4.4% to 4.1 in the second one. But in the 
expansion phase the share of the electric-furnace technology 
increased from 16% to 32% when the total steel production reduced 
from 27 million tons (in 1970) to 15 million tons (in 19801. 11, 
the expansion phase (reaching the 9% level in 1961) the share of 
BOF increased up to 68% in 1980 in spite of the stagnation in 
steel production. 
The main proposal we can draw from this anall-sis of the 
steel case is the determination of the boundary between the embr?-- 
onic phase and the expansion phase concerning the cyclical be- 
havior of the new technology's share. In the case of steel pro- 
duction the criterion level of the share ( Y z  in Figure 1) might 
be defined as 9-10% of the total production. 
Naturally, there are exceptions to the observed regularities 
For example, as was shown in [21], military-oriented industries 
were under non-economic pressure and during cyclical recessions 
new technologies' shares sometimes went up in these industries. 
Researching the situation in other industries, we also found 
several cases which showed tendencies similar to the ones demon- 
strated for steel production [19]. For example, Piggyback Train 
Service as a kind of new technology in transport [Ill and tic- 
machines and welding robots as elements of computer-integrated 
manufacturing behaved like embryonic technologies in the middle 
of the 1970's and at the beginning of the 198OYs, respectively. 
Their shares moved down in recession periods, and grew in economic 
growth situations. 
These effects can be explained from the economic point of 
view. In the embryonic phase the competitive position of a ner; 
technology is very low, the rate of risk in investments is too 
high. This is why firms prefer, during recessions, to rely on 
conventional technologies and the share of a new technolog:- de- 
clines. 
On the other hand, in the expansion phase the competitive 
position of a new technology becomes stronger, the firms gain the 
scale effect by using the new technology, and the rate of decrease 
in production, when the conventional technology is used, is higher 
than in the case of the new technology during recessions. More- 
over, the share of the decrease rate of the conventional technol- 
ogy is higher in recession periods than in growth periods. 
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Table 1. Bombardier's snowmobile making operations [21 
Modes 
Custom: 
1926- 
1936 
Batch : 
1937- 
1959 
Line : 
1965- 
present 
Environment 
Technological Market Production & 
Development 
Use of Hotel High1 y 
Model "T" mana%ers, skilled 
componen ts doctors, machinics 
& adaptation veterinarians, 
to snowmobiles ambulances 
application of Defence, MY 
sprocket-thread petroleum, mechamics & 
systems forest seasonal 
management, labor for 
municipalities hand assembly 
Ski-Doo simple, Unit price as Routinized 
reliable low as 6000 $; automative 
perfonnant & assembly line assembly line 
dominant design produced with 
distribution & 100,00O/year overhead 
servicing 1980: c a p  serpentine 
network turd 30% of 
North American 
market 
Capital & 
Equipment 
General 
Puv'ose 
equipnent 
Bombardier 
learns 
machine 
d i n g  some 
specialized 
vulcanizer 
for tread low 
and variable 
utilization 
1967-1972 
fixed capital 
investment 
phase 
specialized 
machinery 
Table 2. Gort d Klepper's estimates for 5-stages life cycles 
Average estimates/stages I I I 111 IV V 
tiumber of years in 
each stage 14.4 9.7 7.5 5.4 - 
Annual net entry rates 0.5 5.7 0.1 -4.8 -0.5 
Percentage change in 
output * 57.0 35.0 12.0 8.0 1.0 
Percentage change in 
real prices** -14.0 -13.0 -7.0 -9.0 -5.0 
*for 25 products 
**for 23 products 
Table 3. Changes in technology shares (percent points) versus changes in 
steel production ( % )  in the USA 
Changes in Shares of 
Technologies, p.p. 
Years of ChanBes 
decrease in in steel open 
production product ion hearth Electr. 
1903-04 -7.3 t4.7 - 
1908 -39.4 t7.1 - 
1911 -8.4 t3.0 -0.1 
1914 -24.9 t4.2 -0.0 
1919 -22.3 t0.2 -0.1 
1921 -53.1 t1. 3 -0.4 
1924 -15.4 t3.5 -0.0 
1930 -27.8 to. 4 -0.2 
1931 -35.8 t0.7 t0.2 
1932 -44.0 t0.1 to. 1 
1945-46 -25.7 t1.6 -0.9 
1949 -7.0 t0.6 -0.8 
1954 -20.9 t1.0 -0.3 
1957 -2.2 to. 9 -0.4 
B---------------------------------------------------------- B 
1958 -24.4 -1.2 t0.7 
c---------------------------------------------------------- C 
1967 -5.1 -8.0 to. 8 
1970-71 -12.0 -13.6 t3.1 
1975 -20.0 -5.4 -0.2 
1980 -18.0 -2.4 t3.0 
1982 -38.0 -3.0 t2.9 
A-A line means tl for open hearth (' 10%) 
B-B line means t2 for open hearth (' 90%) 
C-C line means tl for electric-furnace technology (' 9%) 
Sources: [7, 181. 
1.4. SESSION ONE DISCUSSION (Excerpts) 
Lynn: It strikes me that in the commentary of at least the U.S. 
sources the argument is often made that the emphasis was put 
first on product research, and then on process research. 
The comments made in terms of the loss of international 
competitive strength of the U.S. steel industry were that it 
continued to emphasize product research and became less and 
less efficient in terms of production, its processes, whereas 
the Japanese and other rising industries emphasized the 
production research and thereby gained that edge over the 
U.S. 
Ayres: I have to say that these relationships are not laws of 
nature. Probably every scholar who has looked at some in- 
dustry in depth will be able to identify places where the 
pattern did not hold, and sometimes that can be a guide to 
management. It may be that in the case you mentioned the 
U.S. industry went wrong by not following the pattern or it 
may well be in other cases (for example the auto case) per- 
haps precisely by not following the pattern that the Japanese 
industry has been so successful. Those are matters which I 
think are very debatable and which I hope to hear some debate 
on, and I am very happy that you began it with that comment. 
Anderson: During the 1950Js, the U.S. steel industry was the most 
modern in the whole world. It was highly productive. It was 
based on large open-hearth furnaces. There was no reason for 
them to introduce new technologies. 
The Japanese industry was almost non-existent. It started to 
grow. The Japanese businessmen and government had made it 
their policy to hitch future economic growth first to the 
development of the steel industry. Now that is one of the 
decisive differences. Here was a country taking off and of 
course making use of the most modern technology. They first 
had open-hearth, but then increasingly only BOF and some 
electric-arc furnaces. So a research mistake might have 
also been involved, but the incentive for innovation was 
completely different in both countries. 
That is why I believe that the management strategies we are 
going to discuss here are not only linked to the life cycle 
of processes or products, but they are very much linked also 
to development cycles, to industrialization cycles. These 
are going on in parallel. Whereas we have some countries 
that are mature themselves and have therefore a mature or 
maybe a senescent steel industry, there are others that are 
just taking off and are therefore in early childhood. So 
you have this, in German they say "miteinander," the paral- 
lel existence of all these phases. 
Rosegger: I just want to make one additional comment. A lot of 
the product innovation that quite clearly took place in the 
steel industry in the United States in the 1960's and 1970's 
had its roots first of all I believe in the fact that you 
could achieve improved product quality at much lower R&D 
costs and a lower risk than you would commit in investment 
to major process innovations. 
But the second and equally important factor is that of course 
a lot of these product improvements/innovations did not come 
on the initiative of the industry, but from a kind of tremen- 
dous pressure from the industry's major customers who simply 
insisted on improved quality, improved product characteris- 
tics. So it is to my mind also one of those cases where the 
dividing line between R&D, which I take to be something a 
firm initiates, and sales engineering, which is something 
the customer initiates, becomes very, very fuzzy and unclear, 
especially if you have a customer like the automobile in- 
dustry. 
Stepanov: What time lag did Dr. Nakicenovic get between market- 
type economies, planned economies, and developing economies? 
There were comparable curves for three types of economies and 
certain time lags. 
Nakicenovic: One of the best ways of describing these curves as 
far as dynamics are concerned is what we usually call T. 
It is the time that elapses between the period when a tech- 
nology captures a 1% market-share to the time where it cap- 
tures about a 50% market-share. Those time constants were 
roughly the same for all three regions. You' see the T is 
essentially the same for market economies and centrally 
planned economies, and it is on the order of about 100 years, 
slightly over 100 years, 110 years. The T for the newly 
industrialized countries is a little bit faster so they have 
managed a similar transition in about 70-80 years, as I 
would estimate offhand. The time lag in this similar life 
cycle for these countries is roughly about 70 years. 
Anderson: So you have not found significant differences, I mean, 
except for the newly industrializing countries? So that to 
some extent what I said this morning should also be deter- 
mined by the existing capital stock. If you have reliable 
equipment which can be run under economic conditions (this 
goes for the open hearth in both the Soviet Union and the 
United States), the introduction of new technologies such as 
the BOF could be slightly or even very much delayed. 
De Bresson: I am also an economist who in his younger age has 
tried to look at business cycles with the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis and long cycles, but I take a more skeptical look 
at it now. I want first of all to insist on and commend the 
authors for one aspect which I think is very important in 
this type of research, and that is when looking at diffusion 
curves, not to look in isolation at one product, but to look 
at it in the context of other products. I think during the 
last quarter of a century too much of applied micro-economic 
research on diffusion was done ignoring the context. 
Perhaps one could go, however, one step further and consider 
complements and not only substitutes, because the presence of 
complements in an economy, sometimes in other industries, 
will greatly influence the diffusion trajectory that you 
have. Too much of the Schumpeterian paradigm in looking at 
technological innovation has been obsessed (rightly so in a 
way) by the competition from the outside and the substitu- 
tion. But complements play a great role in either accelerat- 
ing development or holding it back. What would be the com- 
puter without the transistor? What would have been the car 
without petroleum, etc.? They are a junction of things. 
I am somewhat skeptical, though, with the second presentation 
by Ing. Criibler as to what these curves, these different cur- 
ves right next to each other, mean. At one point, you over- 
laid the different steel processes with the two major pulses 
which had been identified before. I think that if we had 
stayed a bit longer on it, we would have found that the 
second pulse originates earlier than the new technologies. 
In other words, it is when the recovery is already well 
underway that the new steel processes start up again. 
Now one can say, well, steel is no longer a major technologi- 
cal field, but that is the case also for computers, which 
started in the late 1950's in the commercial sense, or semi- 
conductors, which start after the second long economic pulse, 
if you want to call it that. So the fact that we see a 
certain similarity in time does not tell us much as to what 
the causation is. 
Nakicenovic: I think Dr. De Bresson has addressed several issues. 
Let me just try to respond to two of them. The first one 
with respect to the substitutions and complementarity of 
various technologies or innovations is, I think, a very good 
point. I would even, personally, take a more complex view 
of that situation than he seems to suggest, because not only 
is complementarity important among different technologies 
(let us say steam, railroads, coal), but furthermore there 
are certain complementarity substitution changes over the 
life cycle. 
Let me briefly just suggest one possibility. When the auto- 
mobile was introduced initially, it was certain that it was 
not substituting railways because it was not adequate for 
long-distance transport. Rather it was enhanced by the 
existence of the railways because it could match better uith 
the high performance, higher tonnage per unit of time. I 
think we see that today between aircraft and automobiles. 
Rental cars are certainly promoted by the airlines. 
So I would say that the complementarity aspect appears with 
many phases and many facets. I think the situation is very 
complex. But I think it is worth looking into. For the time 
being, we looked at the dynamics in the steel technology 
from the perspective of the substitutions of one broad class 
of technologies by the other and have not looked at this 
micro-detail at the time of the introduction of the technol- 
ogy. 
Coldberg: I have tried to put together a few of these ideas in an 
analytical way. This looks like a life cycle curve, and to 
some extent it is, to some extent it is not. It shows the 
consumption, the steel demand, GNP per capita in a country. 
This is the CNP per capita development in the world. Here 
you have the less developed countries; here you have the 
newly industrialized; then it goes down to a fairly low 
consumption in kilos, GNP per capita. I think this coincides 
very well with what you presented. I am just turning it a 
little bit around to get a new perspective. Here is produc- 
tion in the different countries plotted against roughly con- 
sumption (for example, United States, Sweden, Germany, Great 
Britain, Japan). This is about 8 years ago. 
An interesting case here is Bulgaria. The highest production 
over consumption is found in Czechoslovakia and to some 
extent the Soviet Union. Bulgaria is on the opposite. This 
may lead to some speculation since Bulgaria has a tiny, but 
highly efficient industry and a very high level of technol- 
ogy. Only about a fraction of 1% are employed in steel and 
only a fraction of 1% in the contribution of the steel in- 
dustry to the Cross National Product. 
This picture also says about the market economies that the 
steel crisis essentially is a crisis of the highly developing 
countries where one has to take into consideration two or 
three phenomena. Number one, steel here and steel there is 
absolutely not the same. It is ridiculous and misleading to 
talk about the same product. 
It is also misleading to say about the steel industry that it 
is not dynamic. It is highly dynamic as a matter of fact. 
Let's look at car steel, since the car example has been used 
repeatedly. If you look at steel plate for cars, in the big 
car industry, everybody knows that the weight has a certain 
relation to fuel consumption, and we want to reduce fuel 
consumption, so the weight of the cars must be lower. 
At the same time, the steel industry has developed txo great 
leaps forward. One is thinner, lighter steel with greater 
resilience today than it had 10 or 15 years ago which main- 
tains or improves the crash-proofness of the car despite the 
fact that the steel is thinner. Number two, today cars are 
always produced in stainless steel. It is double galvanized. 
There was once single-side galvanized steel, this technology 
had to be scrapped because the industry demanded double-side 
galvanized steel. In parallel, the welding technology had 
to develop, because it was impossible to weld galvanized 
steel some 15 years ago. 
So I want to just take this as examples that the value-added 
quality of the steel here is very different and that it is 
misleading only to talk in crude steel equivalents. It also 
shows that theoretically production caused consumption, so 
the steel crisis in the highly developed countries is natu- 
ral. Steel will be produced in those countries. There will 
be world trade mainly in quality products. 
If the United States decides to protect their steel industry 
in order to give it an opportunity to revitalize itself, 
then the world as such will not stand still. So the U.S. may 
come out after such a period with inferior capacity to meet 
the high quality demands, for example, for the Alaskan pipe- 
line. This is just as an example, but you cannot wait and 
just improve your quality. You must put a lot of research 
into it, and I would say the steel industry has a much higher 
research intensity than what usually is obvious when you 
only extend curves. Very often one says the crisis or crises 
first appeared in carbon steel or ordinary steel. This deli- 
neation between carbon and quality or alloy steel is highly 
flexible. Today many carbon products are used as substitutes 
for alloy steel, and the alloy steel has moved into other 
areas yet is still not totally capable of meeting high de- 
mands, for example, from the nuclear energy industry. Many 
of the accidents we have had in nuclear energy come from not 
being able to meet the market demand for quality. 
I would say it is no longer adequate today only to look at 
the basic integrated processes. You have other processes, 
for example galvanizing and what have you. This may have 
another consequence in the long run to the life cycle. It 
brings the steel industry a little bit closer to what the 
textile industry has been suffering through which the final 
treatment very often follows fashion waves. We seem to have 
experienced some rather short-lived fashion waves in improv- 
ing steel to meet the demand of customers or users. 
Anderson: I agree particularly with Prof. Goldberg's last com- 
ment. What we must have is researchers (some pity for these 
people, because to get the statistical information that they 
would really need to do a good job is almost impossible). 
But coming back to this curve, the International Iron and 
Steel Institute accepts full responsibility for that. That 
is the famous steel intensity curve, the one that shows the 
kilograms of steel used per GNP per capita. We have based 
two attempts of forecasting steel demand on this, by working 
with geographical and historical analysis, and both forecasts 
were terribly wrong. We have recalculated the curve, because 
the influence on (as you have GNP per capita data in there) 
exchange rates is a terrible trouble. We have taken the 
data for Japan out of that curve, and the whole thing col- 
lapsed completely. 
All we are sure of is that it is in the early stages of 
growth where you need the heavy investment, where you build 
up your industry, where you go into mining, where you build 
up your road network, and so forth. There is a very, very 
close correlation and a very steep increase in steel use, 
and it follows GNP growth. 
The second part of the curve after the peak (in fact for 
lack of data at that time, we only had the United States, 
Sweden, part of Germany and Switzerland in there), the theo- 
retical curve, was really based on a very flimsy calculation. 
So, I must say, we have abandoned this curve and have said 
in a book we have written on methodology of steel demand 
forecasting where it is all explained, that you can only 
really use the first part of the curve for forecasting. 
Then of course your remark is very important on the quality 
of steel that is used simultaneously in one part of the 
world building up infrastructure and the other part of the 
world at advanced stages of industrial development where 
they compete with high technology, with new materials, com- 
posite materials, and so on. So you have different steels 
at both ends, but again I tell you immediately, you have no 
hope to find anything better. We are also, all of us, not 
smart enough to replace the tons by values which would be 
the thing to do, because that is even more complicated. 
Uziakov: From my point of view, a very interesting question is 
the problem of connection between the possibilities of man- 
agement strategies and some technological determinations of 
life cycles which we have seen with this thesis of Prof. 
Nakicenovic and Ing. Grubler. The problem is does it have a 
meaning, that notion of optimal configuration of life cycles, 
or must we facilitate or overcome some tendencies of dynamics 
of new technologies. Can we act on these tendencies or must 
we influence only some decisions which can effect the main 
macro-economic and technological tendencies. 
Haustein: I have two comments to today's session. As you all 
know, Schumpeter was one of the major investigators of in- 
novation in the Western world, but he himself pointed to 
Ricarldo and Marx as his predecessors, and Mars himself vas 
the first to use the term "innovation" in the French version 
of the first volume of Le Capital. Therefore the figures 
presented by Ing. Grubler were very interesting to me. 
What I wanted to say is that the iron and steel industry was 
also a vehicle for innovation thinking in the past. The 
early economists did not have such excellent figures as we 
have now, but I think that they had maybe a lot more imagina- 
tion than we have, at least more fantasy, which is needed to 
find our way into the future. 
One of the major statements in the morning session was by 
Dr. Razvigorova: management is a function of the life cycle 
of a technology. This is obviously true, but not in a simple 
deterministic way. Technology is normally changing faster 
than management does. It is so in our country; I suppose it 
is the same in other countries. Fundamental approaches of 
management and organization change according to certain 
transitions in the mode of production. There exists not 
only efficiency cycles or life cycles in the micro-sphere, 
but also efficiency cycles of the whole mode of production. 
We are now at the beginning of a transition period to a neu 
mode of production which will be characterized by more fle- 
xibility, a higher degree of combination instead of the old 
principles of Charles Babbage or the principles of Taylor, 
principles of division of labor, shorter cycle times, a new 
type of automation, and so on. We can make a list of such 
features of the new mode of production which will come to 
us. 
My conviction is that a change in the paradigms of management 
will be even more important than the different requirements 
of the various innovation phases. IIASA should, in my opi- 
nion, look also at the general mechanism of the evolution of 
management and not only at this field of the technology life 
cycle. 
Ayree: I would like to ask a couple of questions about Prof. De 
Bresson's presentation. The first question concerns the 
Abernathy/Utterback model. You commented that one of the 
difficulties with using the life cycle is that there are 
managerial discontinuities, but it is not obvious to me what 
they are, and I wonder if you would expand on that a little 
bit. The second point concerns your transparency where you 
talked about what would be appropriate definitions of the 
entity which is having a life cycle. It starts with industry 
at the top, and you mention technical systems at the bottom. 
Why do you reject industry as being appropriate to talk 
about a life cycle? In fact, is there not quite a bit of 
stability about the usual way of defining an industry? 
Granted, I am thinking about the way the census defines an 
industry typically, which is to some extent based on cluster- 
ing, but it seems to me that ordinary common sense tells us 
that industries are relatively stable, especially major 
sectors. So why would you reject that as an entity? 
De Bresson: On the managerial discontinuities, I think they are 
more or less explicit in the article that was distributed to 
you, although on this basis I am an economist; I like to work 
with people in business studies and historians. So that 
work is mainly that of a Ph.D. student business strategy. 
What I have seen from observation is that there is a lot of 
difference of style (and I am talking at the level of units 
of production) whether you are in a batch shop or a line 
production. It is fairly obvious that the levels of numbers 
of hierarchies that you have in a line production is much 
greater, that it is very important to define very closely 
the areas of responsibilities of each person within a line 
production. It is hierarchical. Whereas when you are in a 
batch mode, even in a large batch mode, there are areas of 
responsibilities of different people in the firms which are 
defined, but the levels, the numbers of hierarchies within 
the organization, are not as great, and there is more flexi- 
bility. 
Actually, this results in some kind of tension between the 
levels of responsibility within the firm. There is not as 
much distance between the skills and the management deci- 
sions, and the customers, because there are a number of 
orders which initiate the production of batches. Whereas in 
a line production usually, you have to anticipate and build 
your marketing system. So that has implications in terms 
also of corporate management styles. 
In other words, you cannot have the same criteria of perfor- 
mance for a batch producer of sophisticated industrial vehi- 
cles or for that matter for sophisticated military systems 
and standardized series. There are incompatibilities between 
the different production units, and so the corporate manage- 
ment has to take into account the different ways of function- 
ing that these different units have. However, I have been 
told by market specialists that there are also marketing 
strategy discontinuities in doing one thing or the other, 
but this is not my field. 
I think that if we are going to choose a unit of analysis to 
look at a life cycle, we have to assume and look for some 
internal solidarity between the components so that the thing 
evolves as a whole for some period of time. There has to be 
some duration, and it is on that basis I felt that a techni- 
cal system (what I mean by that is a group of interconnected, 
interdependent technical components) might be a good element 
to work with. We do not have much, so why not use this anal- 
ogy? At least some of the system draws the components to 
evolve in a conversion direction. It does result in tem- 
porary rigidities of declining returns, so we do have a 
phenomenon of maturity. There are some long-term technical 
constraints that might be useful in a general time-line of 
the industry. The problem with looking at the whole industry 
is that it involves a whole mix of different technologies 
within it. I think Abernathy in his 1983 book himself refer- 
red to the rigidities of the previous model he had done with 
Utterback, saying that there can be industrial renaissance 
because you can uncouple things and reorganize things in 
different ways. Because of the mix, it is very hard. 
You would have to take an industry like Japan's where there 
is only BOF. In other words, there is this one basic techni- 
que being used. Then I guess we could make some analysis, 
but then you cannot compare it with another with this mix. 
The problem is the industry definitions have such a mix; 
this is what plagues the problems of technical coefficients 
in an input-output matrix is such a mix. So I do not know if 
this answers your questions. I am not saying that one cannot 
say some things, but what we are saying is just so opaque, 
if we reason at the level of a whole industry. 
Goldberg: We have process life cycles (the Abernathy/Utterback 
model is of this type). We have market life cycles, which 
in the extreme case become fashions. Fashion life cycles 
were discovered and brought into the literature in the 
19301s, four-year kind of life cycles. We have, and I think 
it is a very important kind of a life cycle, the managerial, 
which is not a single life cycle. It is the manager's life 
cycle, a real biological life cycle. The manager who becomes 
trapped into certain ways of understanding how the system 
works. Stability versus controllability, achieving high 
productivity, is one example. Management lives in a kind of 
world where here we have change, radical change, and here we 
have stability. Stability gives you productivity. You have 
objective data to base your decisions upon, and you have 
subjective data. Management is moving between running pro- 
duction systems, stable systems, with objective data (hope- 
fully) and at the same time, putting in another kind of or- 
ganization, a matrix where you think about the future and 
change, and where you have practically only subjective data, 
rather little objective data, to work on. 
So this is a problem. Where is the managerial life cycle 
positioned, for example, in the steel industry or in any 
other industry? We have a kind of life cycles, or let me 
say waves, when it comes to management models. Some 1 5  
years ago, diversification and divisionalization xas very, 
very much in vogue. Diversification cost industry many 
billions of any kind of currency. We have management models, 
metaphors, and cultures. We have even consulting models 
(for example, the Boston matrix, which is a kind of life 
cycle model) which makes management today a Latin square 
kind of an exercise. You shift between different Latin 
squares which means four-field tables, two-dimensional models 
which make a very simple method (and the Boston model is an 
outstanding example of this) of how to choose a strategy in 
a two-dimension system. 
I think the manager's capacity or the work of managers essen- 
tially is to provide visions of what business we are in, hox 
our corporation is functioning, the management of shared 
meanings within the firm. This is a very important thing. 
Who designs the meanings which are to be shared in the firm 
and for how long a time will those meanings be ruling the 
company? That is decisive, for example, in a company's life 
cycle. 
We have also social models, for example, the quality of 
working life. Social models come very close to political 
models, but social models have a strong impact on managerial 
models or life cycles, and social models of course also have 
an important impact on technological life cycles. 
Sweden is a very illustrative example of a political life 
cycle. Shortly after the war, the so-called Swedish model 
was invented with the vision that Sweden would not have 
enough labor to produce enough industrial products in order 
to promote a steady growth of social income. So the Swedish 
model was a way to bring people from low productivity lines 
of business (agriculture, forestry, textile industry) into 
high productivity lines of industry. 
Today, we are in a very different situation. We are looking 
at how we can keep industries at a high level of productivity 
and growth and still prevent unemployment. We have a very 
different situation. So political models go through life 
cycles. 
The regional life cycle has been very important as a politi- 
cal model having a strong impact on requirements of manage- 
ment, management as agent or firms as agents of political 
will; choosing profit-oriented firms as agents of political 
will rather than building up political bureaucracy which is 
sluggish and bureaucratic. 
We have environmental requirements, which certainly have had 
a strong impact on the steel industry and are also a kind of 
a life cycle. Some 20 years ago when the environmental 
movement came about, to many managers this was the last 
coffin nail to be put into the firm's future existence. But 
some managers said this is our own future, let's grow on 
this. We have ideological political models of course, for 
example, the steel ideology. 
Let's take the example of France. Steel means strength; 
France has to be strong; France has to have steel. This is 
a kind of a steel ideology. So this is also a kind of life 
cycle which rules our understanding of what kind of business 
we are in and what we require our industries to do. 
So to sum up, there is systemic interaction between different 
kinds of life cycles. You not only have technology life 
cycle. The technology life cycle is not the only ruling 
one. Incidentally, we have also a science life cycle. 
Director Price was a professor of the history of science and 
one of the proponents of scientometrics. He proposed a 
model saying that science grows at a very steady grouth 
rate, irrespective of what politically is being done. It is 
very difficult to push science, but very easy to push tech- 
nology. So science is predictable; technology is not predic- 
table. It was easy to put a man on the moon because the 
scientific problems were solved. It was a technical achieve- 
ment. The transfer of will to put a man on the moon was 
essentially a technological problem. The scientific problems 
had been solved at large; there were only some marginal pro- 
blems still to be solved. So there is systemic interaction 
between the cycles; there is not a science, a strict scien- 
ce/technology relationship, which means technology is not 
controlled by science. Technology is very much controlled 
by political, social, and managerial will. There is not a 
technological developmental law which the life cycle might 
give. Most, if not all, the cycles are human artifacts. 
They are hindsight phenomenon. They may be of limited use- 
fulness for forecasting. 
Those are a few points which I think we should have in mind. 
I do not have a ready-made answer to what kind of a metaphor 
would be the most useful one to approach technological change 
for all those purposes, to help us move forward to better 
times, and to solve labor, regional or environmental pro- 
blems. But I think this is one of the tasks we should look 
into and one of the extremely difficult tasks which are 
being put into IIASA's basket. 
SECTION 2: 
World Trends, Strategic 
Options, and National Differences 
in the Steel Industry 
2.1. THE FUTURE OF STEEL: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK 
Prof. Gerhard Rosegger 
Case Western University 
Cleveland, Ohio, USA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a classic paper entitled, 'Retardation of Industrial Growth' [ I ] ,  
Simon Kuznets adduced three major causes for what, i n  the language of 
today, would be called the maturinq of industries: 
1. Technical progress slackens, changes in methods of production being 
more numerous in  the early period. 
2. Slower growing industries exercise a retarding influence upon faster 
growing complementary branches. 
3. One nation's industry may be retarded by the competitive influence of 
a branch of the same industry emerging later i n  another country. 
Although this was wri t ten i n  1929, we would not be surprised i f  we 
found a similar l i s t  i n  some of our contempomy diagnoses of industrial 
stagnation. At the same time, however, the paper should make us properly 
skeptical of our ability to make long-run projections of the outlook for 
individual industries: one of the branches examined by Kuznets, because he 
considered i t  representative of 'retardation,' was iron and steel. 
With this caveat i n  mind, I want to speculate f i rs t  about the outlook 
for the industry on the basis of some reasonably clear-cut, recent evidence 
on global developments. In keeping wi th the theme of this workshop, I shall 
turn next to an examination of the symptoms of a l i f e  cycle, using the U.S. 
as an example. what I hope to show i s  that these two perspectives -- one 
international, the other one national -- yield entirely different pictures. I 
conclude from this that i n  the case of iron and steel, the third of Kuznets's 
causes for stagnation i s  the most important one in  explaining the 
difficulties of the old industrial economies. This is, of course, a conclusion 
entirely i n  keeping w i th  the international life-cycle model of Vernon 121. 
I I. THE GLOBAL PICTURE 
In the last two decades, the contours of a worldwide shi f t  in  steel 
production have emerged quite clearly. I ts  future dimensions are diff icult 
to predict, depending as they do on national industrial policies as much as 
on developments i n  demand and technology. 
II. 1 &aregate ~roduction. 
I f  we look at the long-term output trend, we find no evidence of 
stagnation or decline. As Figure 1 shows, raw-steel production has grown 
exponentially since the turn of the century. Whether the apparent slowdown 
of the last f ive or six years signals a break i n  this trend or whether i t  i s  
due to  cyclical factors, surely must remain an open question. 
What i s  remarkable about this growth i n  tonnages produced i s  the fact 
that i t  has taken place against a background of technological changes which 
have (a) increased the yield of semi-finished products from a ton of raw 
steel, (b) steadily improved the performance-to-weight rat io of the 
material, and (c) more generally caused a blurring of the boundaries 
between commercial-grade and specialty steels. As a result, many 
characteristics that used to command premium prices (such as workabili ty 
for dif f icul t  applications, corrosion resistance, and cryogenic resist once) 
have become available i n  the mom common product ranges. To put the 
matter differently: i n  terms of service-units, which can be defined i n  a 
vanety of ways, depending on specific appiications, a ton of raw steel i n  
1967 i s  l ikely to represent a mult iple of a ton of steel f i f t y  years ago. 
There are no simple dimensions along which to  account for  th is aspect of 
the growth i n  global steel output. 
To these considerations one can add that the specific energy 
requirements f o r  the production of steel are lower than those for  al l  other 
basic materials except concrete; that i t s  price per unit of tensile strength 
i s  roughly one-quarter that of aluminum alloys, and one-tenth of glass 
fiber-reinforced plastics [31; and that, even i f  this were not the case, there 
are many applications i n  which technological advance has not yet resulted 
i n  feasible substitutes fo r  steel. 
On the basis of such observations, one may safely conclude that steel 
w i l l  continue t o  be one of crucially important materials for  economic 
development, even i f  i t s  production i n  the old industrial economies drops 
of f  further, as i t  i s  very 'likely to  do. 
11.2 Shi f ts  i n  the location of ~roduct ion.  
The steady growth of aggregate, global output obscures the remarkable 
sh i f ts  i n  the geographic distr ibution of production that began i n  the 1960s 
and have accelerated since then. Among the many reasons fo r  th is shift ,  
developments i n  process technology play a major role. Quite i n  keeping w i t h  
the li fe-cycle hypothesis, these developments have amounted to  a reduction 
i n  the know-how component of  steel production and thus have contributed 
to  the rapid di f fusion o f  steel-making, f rom the tradit ional members of the 
'steel club' t o  many newcomers. 
It i s  we l l  t o  recal l  that, only a quarter-century ago, many experts 
regarded the establishment of steel f ac i l i t i es  in  the second and th i rd  wor ld  
as mot ivated by no more than a desire t o  bui ld pol i t ica l  monuments to  the 
idol  of 'modernization' (41. Meanwhile, many newly industr ial izing 
countr ies quite r i gh t l y  regarded steel production as an optimal launching 
pad f o r  the take-off i n to  development, se t t ing  aside a l l  issues of s ta t i c  
eff iciency. I n  these efforts, they were no doubt aided by technological 
advances as w e l l  as scale increases i n  bu'lk ocean transportation, whose 
e f fec t  was spectacularly t o  reduce raw-mater ia ls assembly costs [5]. 
Whatever the specif ic motives and mechanisms f o r  the rapid t ransfer  
o f  steelmaking technology, the resu l ts  are entirely i n  keeping w i t h  
Vernon's hypothesis. There are many ways i n  which one could document the 
transfonnation, each of them beset by some conceptual o r  s ta t is t ica l  
problems. One i s  t o  look at  countries' raw-steel production per capita and 
t o  re la te  th i s  t o  the i r  respective GNP per capita. The results are shown i n  
Figure 2. If we take a per capita GNP of  $5,000 ( in 1982 dollars) as an 
arbi tary threshold and a per capita output o f  .3 tons o f  r a w  steel as the 
requirement f o r  membership i n  the 'high-level producers' club,' we see a 
c lus ter  o f  o ld members i n  the upper right-hand comer. Only the United 
Kingdom, one of the  club's founders, has already fa l len below the .3-ton 
l i m i t .  Others w i l l  no doubt fol low. 
Meanwhile, such notable newcomers as North Korea, South Korea, and 
Taiwan have already crossed that  l im i t ,  w i t h  several other new producers 
approaching it. I have t o  point out, however, tha t  the diagram includes only 
countr ies tha t  produced more than 1 m i l l i o n  short tons i n  1965. Had I drawn 
the same p ic ture  i n  1965, 1 would have omitted, f o r  example, South Korea 
(which then produced 143,000 tons) and Taiwan (w i th  275,000 tons). 
Twenty years later, these countnes produced 14.9 and 5.6 mi l l ion tons, 
respectively. There i s  no need to  belabor the special cases of China and 
India, where absolute output levels are quite high, but where low levels of 
per-capi ta production and of GNP imply great potential for  further growth. 
Only a country-by-country analysis would enable us to  assess the 
future implications of these developments for  the distr ibution of 
production across the globe. In l ieu of such an analysis, which would exceed 
the scope of my presentation, Table 1 simply shows the difference between 
1975 and 1985 raw-steel output fo r  a l l  countries that produced more than 
1 mi l l ion tons i n  the la t te r  year. The rankings clearly suggest who are the 
rapid-growth producers and who are the potential 'drop-outs' f rom the 
club. 
At th is  time, and unt i l  the national industries at  the tail-end undergo 
further shrinkage, there i s  global excess capacity, w i t h  a l l  th is implies f o r  
a demoralization of markets and for, actual or  potential, pol i t ical  
pressures toward protectionism. The outlook i s  complicated by the fact  
that many of the most rapidly growing producers are also among the largest 
international debtors. Debt-service requirements may force them to  push 
steel i n to  the world market even a t  prices that do not cover nominal 
production costs, i n  the interest of earning hard currencies. At  the same 
t ime the creditor countries, whose steel industries are threatened by th is 
cut-throat competition, could erect protectionist barriers only at  the r isk  
of pushing the new producers fur ther toward total  default. 
A fur ther consequence of depressed prices i s  to  dampen incentives fo r  
investment i n  the modernization of steel-making capacity i n  the old 
industrial countries. The result ing realignment i n  the regional structure of 
steel production i s  i l lustrated i n  Table 2: the United States plus Canada 
experienced a dramatic decline, the European Community a lesser one, and 
both lost  share i n  global output. The Eastern European producers held their  
own, while Latin America and the Far East managed to  increase their  shares 
substantially. 
One has to  be careful i n  projecting these trends. For the global outlook 
i t  clearly matters whether, i n  the medium term, total output w i l l  fol low 
roughly the path shown i n  Figure 1, or whether the often-predicted 
worldwide stagnation w i l l  eventuate. In the former case, loss of share 
would not have to  accompanied by a concomi tent absolute drop i n  output for  
those traditional industries that manage to  remain in  the business. In the 
la t te r  case, what amounts to  straightforward displacement corr~petition i s  
very l ikely to force al l  old, high-cost producers to drop out of the game. 
So-called 'industrial policies,' may retard the process, but they are not 
l ikely to  stop i t .  
Ill. The U.S. Steel lndustru -- Li fe  Cucle P r o t o t y w  
The United States provides what i s  probably the most dramatic example 
of stagnation and decline i n  the i ron and steel industry. The case i s  
instructive, because i t  i l lustrates how changes i n  markets, i n  competitive 
forces, and i n  technologies interact t o  bring about the kind of drastic 
shrinkage we can observe. 
I I I. 1 Steel and aaareqate economic arowth. 
Looked at  from the market side, an industry can be said t o  have reached 
matur i ty (or stagnation) when i t s  output no longer keeps pace w i t h  the 
aggregate economic growth of a country. Figure 3 shows the relationship 
between GNP growth and apparent steel supply (domestic production plus 
imports, minus exports). It i s  apparent that th is  relationship was positive 
and reasonably stable unt i l  the middle 1970s. From then on, we see steel 
supply fol lowing a cyclical path that appears to  have l i t t l e  connection w i t h  
continuing aggregate economic expansion. 
Although the steel data series i s  conventionally labelled 'apparent 
supply,' each observation reflects, of course, the interaction of demand and 
supply conditions i n  a given year and thus shows the relat ive decline of 
steel's ro le i n  the national economy. This point hardly would be worth 
making, were i t  not fo r  the fact that domestic producers i n  the United 
States as wel l  as i n  other old industrial economies frequently blame their 
d i f f icul t ies entirely on import competition. To be sure, imports have taken 
an increasing share of a declining market, but the 'temporary protection' 
frequently called fo r  w i l l  not revital ize the industry. 
Whether different strategies during the past quarter-century might 
have resulted i n  another t lme path fo r  steel's l i f e  cycle, must remain an 
open issue. However, i f  there are 'laws' governing the r ise and decline of 
industries i n  individual economies, then the eventual breaking of the 
linkage between aggregate growth and the performance of mature brar~ches 
would seem t o  be inevitable. The implication fo r  the American i ron and 
steel sector, according t o  reasonable forecasts, i s  a shrinkage of capacity 
and output t o  approximately 40 mi l l ion tons raw-steel equivalent. 
111.2 The role of technology. 
The evolution of basic technologies i s  generallg assumed t o  be the main 
determinant of  industrial l i f e  cycles. Therefore, assessments of national 
industries' competitive performance frequently focus on the rate a t  which 
they adopt and uti l ize innovations. In the case of steelmaking, the basic 
oxygen process (BOP) has served as the centerpiece of such assessments 
for some time, w i th  continuous casting added more recently as a second 
key indicator of 'progressiveness.' 
Even though i t  has formed the subject matter for an extensive body of 
research, such a concern w i th  key technologies i s  not entirely fortunate. 
First, comparative studies often ignore the specific technical and economic 
(and perhaps even political) conditions that govern investment decisions of 
firms and national industries (61 Second, they fa i l  to recognize the many 
less spectacular, and less well documented, process and product 
innovations whose combined impact may be as important as that of the key 
technologies (71. And finally, they tend to divert attention from all the 
non-technological components of industrial strategies that w i l l  also 
influence competitive success or failure i n  a significant way (81. 
Having made these cautionary remarks, I want to reflect briefly on the 
role of basic technologies i n  the American steel industry's future. In raw 
steel production, the BOP reached the highest absolute output level i n  
1973, with approximately 75 mil l ion metric tons, and the highest share of 
total output (63 per cent) i n  1976. It has been declining ever since. In 1986, 
BOP shops produced roughly 43 mil l ion tons, while they s t i l l  had a nominal 
capacity of 65 mil l ion tons. Since 1977, twelve major plants wi th an 
aggregate annual capacity of 2 4  mil l ion tons have been idled. 
Meanwhile, electric-furnace production has gained steadily, accounting 
for  over one-third of a l l  mw-steel production i n  recent years. The mpid 
expansion of the industry's mini-mil l  segment has been the development 
that mainly accounts for this change. The open-hearth process, which 
persisted i n  the United States longer than i n  most other industrialized 
countries, i s  now gone a1 together. 
According to recent estimates 191, approximately 25 mill ion tons of 
BOP capacity w i l l  survive the long-term restructuring of the industry, w i th  
plants accounting for another 9 mill ion tons of capacity hanging on unti l  
the 1990s. At that time, the BDP capacity of integrated mi l l s  w i l l  be i n  
line w i th  their continuous-casting facil i t ies. The lat ter technology is, of 
course, also widely diffused among the mini-mills. 
The point of these brief observations i s  that the ca~ac i tg  of American 
BOP shops w i l l  be largely irrelevant for the industry's future performance. 
Actual production i s  not l ikely to  come even close to capacity unti l  many 
more mi l ls  have been decommissioned. This means that the techno1 ogies 
ernbodied i n  production stages upstream and downstream from the 
steelmaking stage w i l l  have a dominant influence on who the survivors 
among the integrated plants w i l l  be. Improved blast-furnace productivity 
(through innovations i n  input preparation, equipment, and process control), 
new techniques for quality improvement (rapid analysis, argon-oxygen 
decarburization, dynamic process control), and a long 1 i s t  of innovations i n  
the mechanical and heat treatment of steel are among the factors that w i l l  
shape the technological characteristics of the new, much smaller, 
American iron and steel industry. 
111.3 Some other determinants of the outlook. 
Were one to ask industry representatives about major obstacles to 
improvement i n  competltlveness, they would surely place the problem of 
wages and labor relations at the top of their l ist .  Although output per 
man-hour has risen by more than 30 per cent i n  the last decade, hourly 
employment costs have gone up even more sharply. The average cost per 
hour (payroll plus fringe benfits) in  recent years has been approximately 
$22, more than 60 per cent above the average for all manufacturing 1101. 
Equally burdensome have been restrictive work rules, which have acted as 
brakes on further productivity advances. It i s  interesting to note that the 
three major integrated producers currently i n  bankruptcy (McLouth, LTV, 
and Wheeling-Pi ttsburgh) have been engaged i n  the renegotiation of labor 
contracts i n  order to  return to financial soundness. 
A second set of problems has to do wi th the capital market's attitudes 
vis-a-vis a declining industry. The old steel f i rms are caught i n  a vicious 
cycle: low or non-existent profitability means a lack of internally- 
generated funds for  investment i n  more competitive facilities; poor 
financial performance also means that access to the equity and credit 
marktes i s  essentially closed; and thus continued low profitabil i ty seems 
preordained. Put i n  the sirr~plest terms: investors i n  a capitalist economy 
see l i t t l e  promise of satisfactory returns i n  iron and steel. It i s  
significant, however, that firms which pursued strategies of 
diversification into other sectors have been able to obtain the necessary 
financing. With no prospects for the kind of governmental subsidies that 
have kept the old steel industries of other countries going, i f  only i n  the 
Interest of employment stability, pessimistic forecasts for the traditional, 
integrated producers of the United States i s  l ikely t o  be self-fulf i l l ing 
prophecies. This Is, of course, quite I n  contrast t o  the mini-mills, most of 
which are profitable, and whose much lower investment requirements 
appear to  have been met without diff lcul ty. 
The extent to  which governmental policies w i l l  influence the future 
performance of steel must of necessity remain an open question. The last 
two decades have seen the imposition of tightening environmental-control 
requirements; as a consequence, the industry had to  incur substantial 
investment and operating costs that i t  regards as 'non-productive.' 
Whatever the arguments pro and con existing standards, i t  seems clear that 
compliance has been essentially completed and that, furthermore, the 
abandonment of  the oldest plants has served sharply to  reduce 
environmental problems. 
Despite continuous industry pleas for  protection, the e f fec t  of past 
policies has been mixed, a t  best. This i s  most obvious f o r  the f i r s t  major 
move on the government's part, the negotiation of 'voluntary' import 
restraints i n  1966. Since quotas were expressed i n  tonnage terms, foreign 
producers, leading among them the Japanese, had an incentive t o  sh i f t  their  
exports to  higher-priced products. Thus, they gained stron#ootholds i n  
many markets that had previously s t i l l  been the domain of American f irms. 
A la ter  experiment w i t h  the so-called 'trigger price mechanism' had 
equally dubious resul ts [ I  11. The more recently negotiated quotas also have 
done l i t t l e  t o  prevent the industry's decline. The po l i t ica l  pressures f o r  
protectionist measures are as l ikely t o  continue i n  the United States as i n  
the other old, steel-producing countries. 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The 'hard' data suggest that  the American i ron and steel industry i s  
facing further decline. Indeed, one may venture the guess that Western 
Europe's old steel industries, whether private o r  nationalized, w i l l  fo l low 
the same path, especially as the f iscal  burdens of maintaining them through 
a variety of subsidies increase. In Japan, the strategic withdrawal from the 
large-scale production and export of commercial-grade steels may proceed 
i n  more orderly fashion, but the signs of such a withdrawal are, i n  any 
event, unmistakeable. Meanwhile, expansion i n  the new1 y-industrializing 
countries i s  bound t o  continue, while recent experience suggests a more 
measured pace of growth i n  the socialist economies. 
A l l  of these observations raise one other question: t o  what extent have 
managerial att i tudes and strategies contributed t o  the stagnation or 
decline of the old steel industries? Crit ics have often held managements 
responsible f o r  pursuing short-term goals and ignoring the longer-term 
health of the i r  f irms; they have also spoken of 'managerial fatigue and 
irresolution' i n  the face of competitive challenges; and they have pointed 
t o  the companies' fa i lure t o  attract outstanding new managerial and 
technical talent. 
Such contentions, even they sound convincing, are of course d i f f icu l t  to  
prove. There can be no doubt, however, that a change i n  mood and attitudes 
occurs as an i n d u s t y  evolves t o  maturity, though sort ing out the 
technological, structural, and environmental causes of th i s  change turns 
out t o  be a major task [12]. In keeping w i t h  the l i fe-cycle theme of this 
workshop, i t  seems appropriate therefore, t o  conclude th is  br ief  survey 
w i t h  two contrasting quotations that i l lustrate t h i s  change i n  outlook. The 
first comes f rom an observer of the steel i ndus ty  who, i n  1907, described 
what he called 'the American practfce:' 
The principle ... was t o  destroy anythfng from a steam engine t o  a steel 
works whenever a better piece of apparatus was t o  be had, no matter 
whether the engine o r  works was new or  old, and the def in i t ion of th is  
word 'better' was confined t o  the abi l i ty  to  get out a greater product. 
Such a course involved the expenditure of enormous sums of money, i t  
involved the constant return of prof i ts into the business, i t  involved 
mistakes, but i t  produced results, and the economies from the 
increased output soon paid fo r  the expenditure [ 131. 
The second quotation projects an entirely different image. Since i t  i s  
from an analysis of the industy 's situation i n  1948, long before stagnation 
and decline set in, i t  might even be considered prophetic of further 
develogments: 
The kaleidoscopic changes inherent to  the early years of the industy,  
when comparatively new plants and fac i l i t ies  were replaced overnight 
by better methods and equipment, contrast strangely w i t h  the more 
ordered tempo of the present. Management today i s  no less aware of the 
need fo r  progressive methods and equipment, but the inf in i te ly higher 
cost of replacement and the meager financial returns do not allow for  
the gambling sp in  t bordering on recklessness that a1 ways accompanies 
lush rewards i n  a new industy.  The law of diminishing returns grinds 
remorselessly i n  a fu l ly  matured and stabilized business, and the 
fantastic rewards that deservedly belong to  the pioneers are inevi tab1 y 
replaced by a mere and sometimes precarious l iv ing f o r  their  followers 
[ 1 41. 
I f  there exists a more picturesque and yet hard-hitting description of 
the l i f e  cycle's most crucial phase, maturity, 1' have yet to  find it. 
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PIC. 1.  WORLD STEEL PRODUCTION, 1901 - '1985 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute,  
Steel Stat is t ical  Yearbook 1986 (Brussels : 1.1. S.I .  , 1986) 
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TABLE 1. 
CHANGE IN RAW STEEL OUTPUT, 1985 COMPARED TO 1975 
1. SOUTH KOREA 641 -4 X 
2. TAIWAN 404.0 
3. T M E Y  1 90.6 
4. VE)JUUEU 187.3 
5. BRAZIL 144.1 
6. NORTH KOREA 140.4 
7. IRAN 84.4 
8. RNUND 55.9 
9. CHINA 55.7 
10. WGOSUVIA 54.1 
1 1. INDIA 39.4 
1 2 RUMANIA 37.6 
13. MMlCO 35.4 
1 4. ARG M T I  NA 329 
15. SPAIN 28.3 
16. BULGARIA 25.2 
1 7. SOUTH AFRlCA 24.3 
18. GEFIWN D R  20-6 
1 9. AUSTRIA 14.6 
40. NETHERLANOS 14.5 
2l. ITMY 9 2  
22 U.S.SR 8-8 
23. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 5.3 
24. POUND 4.6 
25. UPAN 3.3 
26. GERMAN F.R. 0 -0 
27. HUNGARY - -8 
20. CANADA - 2.3 
29. BELGIUM-LUXBG. - 9.8 
30. FRANCE - 12.6 
31. SWEDEN - 14.2 
32. AUSTRALIA - 18.6 
33. UNITE0 KINGDOM - 20.0 
34. U.SA - 27.5 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report 
(1976 and 1986 editions). 
TABLE 2 .  
CHANGE IN RAW STEEL OUTPUT, 1985 COMPARED TO 1975, 
AND SHARES IN WORLD OUTPUT, MAlOR REGIONS 
CHANGE '75 SHARE '85 SHARE 
NORTH AMERICA - 20.4% 182% 13.1 X 
EUROPEAN COMMUNllY - 3.6 192  16.8 
OTHER WESTERN EUROPE 48.7 4.6 5.3 
EASTERN EUROPE 10.8 29.7 29.7 
LATIN AMERICA 93.7 2 8  5.0 
FAR EAST 31 2 22.8 27.1 
--- 
Source: See Table 1. 
CNP [billion '82  $1 
PIG. 3. U-S. CROSS NATIOUAL PRODUCT AND APPARENT STEEL SUPPLY 
Sourcea: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statietical Report, 1986; 
Councll of Economic Advieere, Preeident's EconmicReport.1986. 
2.2. MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN INDUSTRIAL CRISIS: THE CASE OF STEEL 
Walter Coldberg 
Graduate School of Economics 
University of Goteburg, Sweden 
SUMMARY 
The crisis in integrated steel, now approaching its four- 
teenth year, is essentially confined to the highly industrialized 
countries. The crisis implies a high degree of turbulence in the 
industry because of the fierce fight for market shares, but also 
due to defending markets which are in danger of being lost to 
other materials, either because steel has been slow in responding 
to (changes in) market needs or because steel has become toc 
expensive a material or not cost-efficient enough for certain 
purposes. 
A range of strategies and measures to improve the surx-ival 
potential for steel firms are explored in brief, ranging from 
scanning for new products, market needs, production and process 
technology, over mergers (for capacity reduction), personnel 
development, as well as reduction of environmental, local, and 
regional dependencies on big steel policies to deal with those 
issues, to the needs for strengthening managerial competence. 
THE PROBLEMS 
The demand and supply of steel at large folloh- patterns as shor.-n 
in Figure 1: 
Steel Demand & Supply 
k g s  per GNP per coplto 
I USSR X : CS 
I I I I 
I I I GNP per 
3000 6000 9000 Caplto ~n 
Cansumption us s 1979 
X Production 
Figure 1: Steel supply and demand in relation to GNP/capita, 
based on Goldberg, ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  pp47f, 54. 
Several remarks need to be made: 
a) Steel is not of uniform quality. The qualities/properties of 
steel shift along the curve shown in Figure 1. The curve may, as 
a matter of fact, be depicted as a sequence of sinus curves and 
their envelope, where the sinus curves represent demand curves 
for steel with certain properties (grades). The sinus curves in 
the left and lower part of Figure 2 represent (much) lower grades 
than the curves to the right and above. 
Figure 2: Development of steel demand, quality- and quantity- 
wise as a function of growing per capita income (based on Figure 
1). Legend: a . . .  z shifting steel qualities or grades, a=lo~est 
and z=highest quality. 
b) Steel production follows steel consumption at large: steel con- 
sumption (quantity- and quality-wise) in a region tends to coin- 
cide with production. World trade in steel covers (temporary or 
structural) gaps in supply of certain grades as well as specialty 
steel supplies produced by specialists. 
C) As the standards of living, of infrastructure, and the degree of 
development/industrialization progress, the "steel spectrum" of a 
country or a region will gradually move to the right (cf Figure 
2), abandoning lower grades, adding higher ones in order to meet 
changes of market demand. One may talk about "appropriate steel 
demand/supply" according to the level of development. The border- 
line between carbon and alloy (or specialty) steel is mobile oler 
time. In a similar mode, production technology will gradually 
shift from one principle of technology to one or several other 
ones. 
d) There is also a general development in steel production technology 
as well as in steel grades, which contributes to changes in steel 
qualities as well as to changes in production technology. If 
steel production and consumption are disaggregated by region, one 
will see that steel grades and steel technologies "stay alive" in 
some plants or countries whilst they are abandoned elsewhere, 
because of shifts in standards of living and consequent shifts in 
demand, particularly in advancing regions. This means in other 
words that the most modern steel technologies will only be adopted 
by the more developed "steel spectra," whilst less developed 
regions may employ "appropriate steel technologies." 
A phenomenon depicting this development is the positively ske~ed 
curve as shown in Figure 1 above, which tells us that steel con- 
sumption per capita will grou as a function of increasing stan- 
dards of living to a certain "spectrum." Then it will lel-el off 
and later decline. This reflects shifts in demand, mol-ing from 
heavy to lighter investments, but also to higher quantities of 
steel which tend to be lighter and often at the same time e\-en 
stronger. (An illustrative example is that when the Eiffel T o ~ e r  
was erected about 100 years ago, approximately 7,000 metric tons 
of steel were used. In 1987, slightly more than 10% of steel 
weight would suffice to erect a similar construction uith similar 
properties. 1 ) 
e) The development of new qualities of steel is not evenly dis- 
tributed over time. The same is true for production technology. 
The recent steel crisis (which is confined to highly developed 
economic regions) has triggered vivid R & D activities aimed at 
counteracting the increasing tendency to replace steel where 
technically and economically feasible by other materials and at 
developing entirely new steel qualities (having new properties 
such as higher resilience and strength or corrosion resistance 
together with -- much -- lower weight per square meter, e.g. of 
plate for automobile bodies). The steel industries in the highest 
developed countries are fighting desperately to defend and regain 
market shares from substitute materials. 
f) Some of the new grades require new combinations of shaping (e.g. 
high precision thin plate or coil rolling) and finishing (like 
single or double side galvanizing). There is a tendency for 
these processes (in particular for finishing) to be subject to 
rather fast technological change. In some respects, one may 
compare this development to similar tendencies in the textile 
- 
JOral communication at the Sofia workshop from Dr. D. Anderson. 
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industries some 20-30 years ago, implying rather quick shifts 
from bottlenecks to over-capacities in finishing processes. 
g) A related tendency is the appearance and fast growth of the mini- 
mill sector, which very successfully has been able to put in- 
tegrated steel makers out of business in certain market sectors. 
Several properties of the mini-mill sector account for its succes- 
ses: 
t Utilization of highly refined, energy-intense raw material 
(scrap) with consequently lower input -- and production 
costs -- and drastically reduced needs for environment-in- 
duced investment. 
t A combination of low transportation costs and closeness to 
the market, because of its possibilities to establish plants 
near the markets with high and/or growing demand, where 
often also scrap is locally available. Within certain pro- 
duct ranges, they may be able to respond to market need 
shifts better and more quickly than larger integrated mills 
are able to do. 
h) Large steel plants put heavy burdens on the environment, in sev- 
eral respects: 
* For one ton of refined steel, between 5 and 6 tons of input 
are needed: ore, fuel, limestone, water, and several other 
kinds of materials. The remaining waste material which does 
not go into the refined steel either leaves the plant through 
chimneys and waste water pipes or goes into large heaps of 
waste to be taken care of -- or not. 
* The supplies of inputs, but also the output and the waste, 
require heavy infrastructural investments, often to be pro- 
vided by third parties: waterways, water supplies, roads, 
railroads, etc. Those infrastructural investments are par- 
ticularly done and shaped to meet the steel plants' needs. 
Thus steel works cause environmental and infrastructural costs and 
burdens of specific and tangible character. The steel producers 
have been asked during the last 15-20 years to take care of the 
cost and burden caused by the environmental and infrastructural 
aspects. This at least to some extent has contributed to the 
predicament of the industry. 
i) Despite the massive, heavy, and widely visible physical investment 
an integrated steel plant requires, it is labor- rather than 
capital-intense (although it costs a lot to build it). On the 
average, labor costs range between 35-40%, raw materials at 
about 25-30%, energy at about 30%, capital costs at about 3-5% of 
the cost per ton of solid steel. 
Steel plants thus employ much (male) labor. This has a number of 
consequences of concern to management: 
* Steel often becomes the dominant employer and uage-setter of 
the region. 
* Steel often "kills" other employment options, as independent 
businesses will find it difficult to compete for (male) 
labor in the region. 
* Steel firms will often have to provide for housing/living 
space for steel workers. 
j) For several of the mentioned reasons, steel will exert -- an often 
dominant -- influence upon local and regional public administra- 
tion, which thus may become rather dependent upon the steel cor- 
porations. 
The above comments are examples of strategic issues with 
which the management of steel producers/corporations has to cope, 
during periods of success as well as under conditions of decline. 
The difference may be that under adverse conditions many (more) 
problems at the same time require managerial attention and action 
(cf Dutton 1986, who summarizes scant research in crisis manage- 
ment by claiming that, when confronted with strategic issues 
representing crisis, management will increase the level of resour- 
ces expended on an issue, enhance control on issue relations, and 
increase the level of issue-related exploration). 
The steel industry of the highly industrialized countries, 
after its best year ever, 1974, slumped into a deep crisis, uhich 
thirteen years later is by no means overcome yet, despite hea\-y 
losses of markets, massive lay-offs and closures, desperate in- 
dividual struggles for survival, and grand scale national as uell 
as international (European Community) programmes for adjustment 
and capacity reduction. 
SOME PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 
Once symptoms of a crisis are experienced, firms tend to use 
strategies that have been used to gain past successes (cf the 
Atari-case, Sutton, 1986; NystrBm, 1984; Cyert March, 1963). 
This usually means three things: 
* The recognition of a virtual crisis situation is postponed as 
its symptoms to begin with are treated as a sign of transient 
occasional trouble. Valuable time is thus lost. 
* Reactive decisions are taken, taking stock of successful 
strategies in the past and trying them on the present crisis. 
i Slack resources, if available, are devoted to attempts to 
maintain/regain a status quo rather than to innovative stra- 
tegies (Goldberg, 1973). This is what also happened in the 
steel industry. 
i The new structural crisis was regarded as being a temporary 
business cycle decline, at least to begin with. 
i Attention rules were not changed. Essentially the same data 
sources is used as before. Since the forecasting activities 
of the International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI) has 
proven to be reliable in the past, and, if off the real 
development, so to the conservative side (below real demand), 
further capacity increases were implemented or decided upon. 
i As the first oil price increase, that of 1973, struck the 
industry in 1974, steel prices were increased, but hardly 
any steps were taken to change the energy technology used 
(except in Japan). 
i Few, if any, innovative products (lighter, stronger, more 
corrosion-resistant, etc.) were developed. 
Probably the first country to seriously take issue with the crisis 
was Sweden. There were far gone plans to build a new large steel 
plant in northern Sweden (Steel Works 80, in 1975 renamed Steel 
Works 80/85). In the spring of 1976, the government appointed a 
national steel commission. It was requested to look into the 
market, to take issue with capacities and structure as well as 
with organizational problems of the industry. The commission uas 
instructed to regard Steel Works 80/85 as a reality. Seven months 
(and a General Election implying the displacement of the Labour 
government) later, the project was taken off the agenda. The 
commission's instructions were changed thoroughly to produce a 
solution implying drastically reduced capacity for (carbon) steel 
in Sweden (cf Coldberg, 1983). 
The European Community took the initiative to reduce over- 
capacities in its member countries a few years later. The process 
was lengthy and cumbersome, as many of its member countries re- 
cently had installed large modern plants and were also enlarging 
and modernizing their capacity. Only Britain had rather drasti- 
cally reduced its capacities since the beginning of the 1970's as 
a consequence of massive financial losses. 
Japan, standing outside of economic blocks, had a highly 
modern productivity -- as well as quality-wise an outstanding 
steel industry, when towards the mid-1980's it also had to reduce 
capacities. 
The US steel industry was under shelter - -  kith short inter- 
ruptions -- since 1964. The capacity reduction came through a 
number of bankruptcies (for a full account of the steel crisis 
1975-1985, cf Goldberg, 1986). 
Whether with or without Community or government industrial 
policy support, the heaviest burden of retrenchment had (and has) 
to be carried by the firms themselves. 
Management Strategies 
Management strategies will be discussed in a sequence of 
order which roughly follows the account for PROBLEMS faced by the 
industry. 
Closeness to Customer Needs 
The most vitally needed strategy is staying close to cus- 
tomers' needs and to maintain as well as to develop credibility 
in the market. Corporations should, whene\-er possible, help the 
customers to define their needs, as this often requires a g ~ o d  
knowledge of what is technically feasible. This implies that 
qualities and grades should be developed, in many cases, in close 
cooperation with the users of steel, i.e. industries of different 
kinds, having the need of the ultimate consumer/user demands in 
mind. This is essentially a never-ending process. As an example, 
the automobile industry is used. It is one of the remaining 
large customers of steel, although it has reduced the steel con- 
tent of cars quite drastically, in particular for passenger cars, 
in response to increases in fuel prices over the last 15 years, 
as a close relationship between car weight and fuel consumption 
has been established. The almost steel-free chassis (bottom 
plate) is not very far away. Once it is operational -- most 
likely within the next five years -- the industry will lose this 
customer. If the chassis can be produced with minimum steel 
content, then most other parts can be done without steel as &ell, 
including engines. The steel industry's only strategy is to come 
up with better solutions, faster and even cheaper. 
Another large steel-using industry is the construction in- 
dustry. Even there steel has to fight hard in order to maintain 
its markets, e.g. by lighter steel having the same or even im- 
proved qualities, such as resilience, workability, stability, 
corrosion-proofness. For steel to be used for weather-exposed 
surfaces, much higher degrees of corrosion resistance are re- 
quested. To the user, this should mean reduced maintenance costs 
such as painting, but also aesthetic values, such as color and 
shape, fit with other materials, or for functional purposes. 
Exploring known and developing new uses of steel and tech- 
nologies of steel forming and manufacturing in the steel-using 
industries requires extended technical competence, quality manage- 
ment, cooperation with customers on developing and testing n p x  
steel grades, but also ultimately cooperating with customrrs on 
joint product and process development. It seems to be necessary 
in many cases to see the production and forming/shaping of steel 
and its transformation to a final product as taking place in an 
integrated system, although under differentiated ownership and - -  
often -- location. 
Cooperating with steel users in such more advanced ways, 
however, also in many cases makes necessary closer and more ad- 
vanced cooperation between steel producers and producers of steel 
technology as well as with producers of iron ore, fuel, additives, 
furnaces, furnace linings, etc. Such cooperation is necessary in 
order to not only meet new requirements, but also to offer re- 
search and development services to steel-using industries (cf 
Goldberg, 1986, p276). 
As briefly indicated above, the steel industry must adapt 
and extend its systems view, by integrating the final utilization, 
servicing and maintenance of steel in a wide variety of shapes, 
forms and products throughout the life cycle of the end products 
into its way of thinking in qualitative terms. 
Within existing uses, there seems to be a great need for 
qualitative development of steel to be used under heavy-duty 
circumstances, such as off-shore constructions, pipelines (e.g. 
subjected to severe climatic conditions) as well as nuclear power 
plants, where the majority of production stops seem to be due to 
cracks and leaks in steel vessels, tubes, and pipes. 
Scanning 
In order to support strategies aimed at better and even net. 
grades and qualities to increase the usefulness of steel, the 
steel industry management will have to scan various sources for 
information on: 
* New steel technology for steel making, finishing, shaping, 
corrosion protection,etc. 
* New iron production technology, new qualities of ore, fuel, 
additives, etc. 
* New customer-related technology and material needs. The 
steel industry at large does not serve the ultimate user/con- 
sumer of steel, but rather the steel-using, forming, shaping 
industry. Thus the steel industry has to keep in close 
touch both with the steel-using industry and also with the 
needs of those industries' customers. This implies that it 
has to explore means to meet such needs better at laxer 
costs during the entire life cycle of the user products in 
order to be capable of competing with new substitute mate- 
rials. 
* The steel industry also needs to scan into spheres which are 
or ought to be of interest to steel technology suppliers or 
producers, e.g. for new heating or melting technologies like 
plasma technology (cf Goldberg, 1986, p265ff on potential 
technology changes in steel industries, and Lynn, 1982 and 
1984, for technology change monitoring). 
* Scanning should also be extended into competitive materials' 
development and uses as well as into changes in demand of 
industrial and consumer markets. 
Productivity Issues 
The steel industry, i.e. its individual corporations, urgent- 
ly needs to improve the productivity of production processes 
whenever possible. The productivity improvement efforts in the 
first place must. meet the present productivity performance of the 
best Japanese steel plants and, beyond that, try to surpass the 
best Japanese performances (which will be very hard to achie\-e). 
Productivity targets should not only be confined to prnduc- 
tion figures for input of manpower, but also to energy inputs for 
units of output: ore, coke, oil, gas, etc. Oil prices vill in- 
crease again within a not too distant future because of the ex- 
haustion of easily tapped sources. 
Another productivity measure is process yield (and its im- 
provement). 
Already mentioned is the labor productivity, where the best 
Japanese performance (of 15 plants) is over 2,000 tons of finished 
product per worker and year. Many plants in the United States 
and Europe still produce less than 1,000 tons per worker/year. 
Several other productivity measures are in use, e.g. (the 
reduction of) capital costs per ton of capacity. 
Environmental Issues, Pollution Control 
For one of the world's largest and most integrated steel 
plants, Nippon Kokan's Ogishima Works, once devoted about 20% of 
the total physical investment budget to environmental purposes - -  
otherwise, the plant would not have been allowed to be put into 
use. 
Steel plants are not only large; they are also large pol- 
luters. They have until quite recently been permitted to pollute. 
Thus, their backlog has been substantial in this field. Many- old 
sins and their scars had to be removed, new stringent requirements 
be met. Steel will hardly be allowed to enjoy any privileges vith 
respect to the environment in the future. Thus, the causation 
principle will be employed without pardon when it comes to avoid- 
ing further pollution. 
Tighter rules have also come into use concerning costs of 
transportation facilities (investment and use), which may severely 
hit an industry dependant on heavy bulk logistics. 
Unfortunately, environment-induced investment will have to 
compete with productivity and quality-related investment on the 
one hand and with profitability target investment on the other. 
Labor 
Employment issues emerging from the steel crisis are also 
rather complex: 
i Management and corporate staff face many nev requirements as 
far as competence, in depth and in width, are concerned (see 
e.g. above, re: needs to think and act with a system vier; in 
mind), not to forget the many urgent R & D tasks to be taken 
care of. 
i Production management and personnel must also meet rather 
thorough qualitative changes; new technology with considerab- 
ly sharpened quality, but also timing requirements, etc. 
will be introduced. 
i A most delicate task is to manage severe layoffs, often 
affecting several thousand persons. It is of utmost impor- 
tance that necessary layoffs are managed in most responsible 
ways. The heaviest burden hits those who have to leave. 
This requires not only careful planning, cooperation with 
unions, labor market, social security offices, etc. Most of 
all, it requires thorough consideration of each individual's 
personal case. 
Regional Issues 
Regional structures grow slowly over time. Steel usuall>- 
has been a dominant employer for a century or more. Thus econo- 
mic, but also administrative and political structures have been 
shaped by steel. The dominant firm has often become the "ruler" 
of the region (even as large owner of land and housing). Thus it 
is often highly necessary to reduce the region's dependence on 
steel. If it is done in crisis, many old dependencies are abrupt- 
ly broken up, since no safety margins are available any longer. 
A differentiation of the economic structure in the region is 
often highly necessary. As a rule, it has effectively been kept 
"mono" by the steel firms in the past. Other firms will hardlj- 
find the neighborhood of steel attractive -- even if steel's 
attitudes would change. 
Steel corporations need to develop and implement strategies 
for local regional restructuring/rejuvenation together with local 
regional administrative and political organizations and offices, 
often also employing consultants of different specializations. 
* A popular mode of approach to strategic management is the 
strength -- weakness --threat -- opportunity analysis: 
Strength Weakness 
Opportunity 
Threat 
In brief, management is expected to move the corporation from the 
lower right "south-east'' to the upper left "north-west" corner of 
the square. 
The approach requires proper identification of strengths and 
weaknesses of the firm and of opportunities and threats stemming 
from the firm's environment to be recognized and defined, as well 
as ways and means to be found to move towards "north-west." 
A crucial question to ask oneself in the first place is what 
makes the difference between a threat and an opportunity. Are 
they objective realities or not? A closer look reveals some 
simple facts. 
The signals by which change -- implying either threat or 
opportunity -- announces itself are almost without exception 
identical ones. The difference between their meaning the one or 
the other lies in: 
* How early the signals are recognized and acted upon; 
* The values and attitudes of management vis-a-vis the signals 
(it is management's subjective inclinations and decisions 
which make the signals mean the one or the other); 
i The resources management disposes of for action: 
+ time 
+ human resources, creativity, proactivitl-, 
preparedness to venture and innovate 
+ if the last two sets of resources are at hand, 
financial resources only in rarest cases will 
be lacking. 
In a similar way, weaknesses and, in particular, strengths 
are subjective imaginations in the minds of management. Supposed 
strengths have often proved to be virtual weaknesses. Steel is 
full of sad cases of proof of this. 
The lesson to be learned from this is that management com- 
petence and values mean more for the fate of a corporation than 
almost anything else. Another paradox of management is that 
management's attention has to shift ever so often between issues 
concerning productivity and future business orientation. It is 
often claimed that top management should only deal with "doing 
the right things," i.e. with strategic issues, whereas the sphere 
of "doing things right" should be left to supervisory management. 
In reality, this is applicable in exceptional cases only, 
e.g. in very large firms. 
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Dealing with productivity is taking place in rather stable, 
well-defined, and predictable systems and based on data of rela- 
tively high objectivity. 
Dealing with strategic issues and change, on the other hand, 
implies high degrees of subjectivity, i.e. estimates, uncertainty 
and rather ill-defined systems conditions. 
These two species of decisions require quite different mind 
sets, which in "normal" cases may be classified as antagonistic 
personality types. Management has to combine the two "characters" 
under one hat. 
One may question if steel has had the right managers before 
and at the time the crisis came. Possibly quite a few steel 
managers rather static or imitative thinking. Moving integrated 
steel out of crisis requires a combination of the two decision 
styles mentioned above, that is, thinking in high productivity 
and in strategies to exploit new fields of business. 
To conclude, it may be restated that steel corporations in 
crisis are in desperate need of management's possessing manx very 
high competencies. 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents some of the empirical evidence for the 
common assumption that the willingness of many firms to innovate 
is definitely stronger in a crisis than in a "normal" situation 
(risk return paradox). In this respect, the majority of 20 firms 
of the steel industry behave like most other industry sectors in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. This suggests clearly that the 
classical (Schumpeterian) risk return thesis is not valid in most 
cases. 
In the absence of more empirical research, a generalization 
of this result for the steel industries in other countries is not 
justified. However, there are some signs that the steel crisis 
has had stimulative effects on the innovation willingness of some 
steel firms. Because innovation in a crisis situation generates 
very high requirements on the quality of management, and an unsuc- 
cessful innovation can jeopardize the very existence of the firm, 
the paper considers the possibility of using the concept of the 
Integrated Life Cycle (ILC) as a management tool to improve the 
timing of the decision and, hence, the probability of success in 
the steel (and other) industries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the problem of the life-cycle model is that its micro- 
economic underpinnings are not entirely convincing. In everyday 
language, it would seem that firms with a history of successful 
risk-taking (and profits to show for it) would tend to continue 
to be innovative. At least, this is a simplistic interpretation 
of Schumpeter's conceptual model of innovation behavior. One can, 
with some justice, call this kind of behavior Schumpeterian. On 
the other hand, evidence for a different pattern of managerial 
behavior is accumulating. In brief, it appears that firms tending 
to enjoy high returns on their existing businesses are less likely 
to take risks than firms enjoying lower returns.' Empirical evi- 
dence for this management behavior in U.S. firms was found by 
Bowman who called this phenomenon "Risk Return Paradox."Z' 3 This 
seems to confirm the results of previous research in Utility 
Theory by Allais, known as the "Allais Paradox."' 
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES OF THE RISK RETURN PARADOX IN VARIOUS FIRMS IN 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Perlitz and Lobler undertook a similar empirical research in 
212 firms from 10 sectors in the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
average rate of return of every firm was related to five risk 
measures : 
i average absolute change of rate of return (Risk 1); 
i average relative change of rate of return (Risk 2); 
i trend corrected (smoothed) average absolute change of rate 
of return (Risk 3); 
i trend corrected (smoothed) relative change of rate of return 
(Risk 4) ; 
i variance of rate of return (Risk 5). 
The calculated rates of return and the five risk measures of 
each firm were related to the average respective sector values; 
they were clustered into "high" and "low" groups. Figure 1 shows 
the results for the steel industry.= Note that normal or Schum- 
peterian behavior would correspond to a pattern in which the 
majority of firms would be located along the NW-SE diagonal of 
the risk-return matrix and conversely. 
The results confirm the validity of the risk return paradox 
holds for the steel industry at a significance level of 0.4. For 
risk of type 5, no definitive results were available. 
In comparison to the steel industry, the engineering, elec- 
tronics, and metal construction industries investigated by Perlitz 
and Lobler reveal even more negative correlations; the risk return 
paradox is even stronger than in the steel firms. The other 
branches have similar results. The single exception is the brew- 
ery industry for which three risk measures correlate positively 
with the rate of return. 
Another empirical test was arranged in order to demonstrate 
risk behavior in chance and crisis situations. Interviews with 
230 managers from 20 big firms show that they behave as risk- 
takers in crisis situations and as risk-averters in chance situa- 
tions, thus confirming the well known Allais-Paradox. Because of 
the fact that innovation decisions are closely connected with dif- 
ferent risks, this means that they try to innovate if the company 
faces a crisis and they tend to avoid innovations in chance situa- 
tions. 
A recent paper by Ayres & Mori6 showed that paradoxical risk 
return behavior can be explained if it is assumed that managers1 
time preference functions are dependent on medium-term prospects 
of profitability from existing business activities. In effect, 
they argue that at such times, the use of negative discount rates 
may be justified. The proper interpretation for this behavior is 
rather complex. In the context of Olson,' the behavior of dif- 
ferent groups, and their diverging interests in innovations play 
important roles. On the other hand, most planning and management 
tools have limited time horizons to such a degree that sudden 
changes in technology arising from a crisis cannot be forecasted 
early enough. Also the notorious orientation of management toward 
short-term operational items excludes risky long-term innovation 
decisions. Only a careful analysis of the quality of management 
and the planning tools used in firms with positive correlations 
compared to the other firms with risk return paradox could clarify 
this situation. Figure 2 shows the pattern of the crisis-induced 
innovation process. 
3. PROSPECTS OF AN INNOVATION STRATEGY IN THE PRESENT STEEL CRISIS 
According to the considerations described above, in the 
present situation the steel industry should be considering innova- 
tive options. Despite the fact that no precise data are avail- 
able, some information indicates the steel industry worldwide has 
tended to show the pattern of behavior hypothesized by the risk 
return paradox. With the exception of Japan, there was no strong 
interest in R&D in the prosperous years. Actually, in Japan, 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the U.S., R&D programs supported 
by state subsidies were started a few years ago. 
Regarding the operational sequence of iron-making and steel 
processing, the main driving force for innovation is the need for 
process technologies which are low in capital cost, consume less 
energy, and require less labor than conventional technologies. 
At the same time, improved product quality should be provided. 
In the future, steel products will certainly be at the same time 
very similar to and very different from those of today. The 
similarity will lie in the basic metallurgy of iron-base alloys. 
However, the products themselves will be very different in a 
number of ways. The concept of purity will evolve beyond even 
the most stringent requirements of today: by this we mean that 
the chemical composition and the metallurgical structure of steel 
as well as the nature of the minor phases scattered in it will be 
controlled to a higher accuracy. The trend today towards ultra- 
clean steels is certainly pointing in this direction. Steel will 
also very often be used in conjunction with other materials: 
this will involve surface coating, plating or ion implantation, 
as well as composite materials with steel fibers or steel matrices 
and also so-called "multi-materials."a' 0 '  1 0  
4 .  DIRECT STEEL-MAKING 
Direct steel-making is potentially attractive because if 
successful, it offers substantial savings in capital cost (the 
coke-making facilities are eliminated; iron-making and steel- 
making are combined). 
Overall energy consumption should be reduced because the 
energy requirements associated with coke-making and sintering (or 
pelletizing) would be eliminated. Furthermore, no coking coal 
would be required and the continuous nature of the process would 
allow a more efficient use of off-gases. Because of the high 
intensity of reaction, i.e. high processing rate per unit volume 
(high temperatures and molten, disperse phase contacting), the 
heat losses should be reduced and fugitive emissions much easier 
to handle. 1 1  
The Austrian VOEST-ALPINE company will have its first refer- 
ence work on the basis of COREX-process in South Africa by the 
end of this year. As we have explained, the COREX-process re- 
quires lower capital investment and makes use of coke superfluous; 
moreover, considerable electricity production is made possible. 
As a result of these facts, the new steel technology embodied in 
the KVA-process (Klockner Voest-Alpine) has remarkably good eco- 
nomic indicators. 
5 .  PLASMA STEEL-MAKING 
Plasma steel-making has been under investigation for quite a 
number of years. This process involves the generation of a stable 
arc between two electrodes. Because of the very high temperatures 
attained in this arc, the reactions between the feed materials 
supplied into the arc are thought to proceed very rapidly. 
The earlier ideas embodying plasma arc steel-making suggested 
feeding a mixture of iron ore and a reductant (natural gas or 
coal) into the plasma furnace to d L t  I , . ,  [dolten semi-stc,, , ' At 
present, this appears to be a somewhat extravagant use of electric 
power when applied to the production of ordinary, low-carbon 
steels because both the endothermic of reaction and the latent 
and sensible heat requirements would have to be supplied by elec- 
tric power. Also, it should be noted that the use of fossil 
fuels tends to become rather less attractive, even from the ther- 
modynamic standpoint, when employed to supply a latent heat re- 
quirement at high temperature levels. The threshold temperature 
is thought to be around 1400-1600'C, above which it may be more 
efficient to supply energy from electric sources. Within this 
framework, it appears that plasma technology would be inap- 
propriate for smelting reduction of iron oxides, but plasma pro- 
cesses could well be attractive for melting scrap or reduced iron 
powders. However, the combination of high temperature re- 
quirements and high product value make plasma technology an at- 
tractive possibility in the production of molybdenum, titanium, 
and perhaps aluminum and magnesium.13 
Plasma steel-making could also be attractive because it would 
eliminate a major part of the primary steel-making operations. 
Furthermore, plasma steel-making could be particularly appealing 
within the context of mini-mill systems, with production rates in 
the region of 200 to 500,000 tons/annum.l' 
6. CONTINUOUS CASTING: AN EPICENTER OF INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
The finishing end consumes some 35% of the total energy 
used, is responsible for some 75% of the labor cost and would 
require some 50% of any new capital investment in green field 
site plants. It follows that innovative schemes for finishing 
have an important potential in transforming the conventional 
iron-making and steel-processing sequence.14 The epicenter of 
innovative technologies today lies without any doubt in the field 
of continuous casting. In the conventional steel-processing 
sequence, the molten steel is cast into ingots; alternatively 
slabs or billets are produced using continuous casting. While 
this latter method offers substantial energy savings due to a 
higher product yield, in both cases a large number of additional 
forming operations are required with intervening reheating sequen- 
ces. 
The new continuous casting processes fall under four catego- 
ries: 
* the thin slab caster, for 25-40 mm thick slabs which could 
then be directly fed into the finishing stands of the 
hot strip mill; 
* the thick sheet caster, for 5-15 mm thick sheets which would 
need some limited hot rolling, probably for metallurgi- 
cal reasons; 
* the sheet caster, for sheets under 10 mm thickness that 
could go directly to the cold rolling plant; 
* the thin sheet caster that would directly produce a final 
product equivalent either to the as-rolled sheet or to 
the cold-rolled sheet, the thickness then would go down 
to tenths of a millimeter. 
Developing these new casting processes means that a number of 
common and difficult problems will need to be solved: 
* Their productivity has to be at least as large as that of 
one strand of a conventional caster producing the same width 
in order to avoid the excessive (in terms of investment) 
multiplication of casting strands. This means that the 
casting speed has to be increased in inverse proportion to 
the ratio of thickness. Stationary oscillating molds are 
certainly unable to allow for such high speeds, and the 
travelling mold that accompanies the product during its 
withdrawal is the only solution. Belts and rolls are thus 
the best candidates for these new technologies. 
* Liquid steel has to be introduced into the narrow slit that 
constitutes the cross-section of the cast slab or sheet, 
under "satisfactory" conditions. This means that steel 
should be adequately protected against re-oxidation or re- 
nitrification by air, and that the feeding should be gentle 
enough to avoid splashes and phenomena that would lead to 
poor surface quality. It should be stressed that surface 
quality ought to be irreproachable, since little conditioning 
can be envisioned on a thin slab or sheet. 
* At the exit of the caster, the enthalpy of the product should 
be kept high enough to allow subsequent hot rolling when 
necessary.. 
* The metallurgy of the whole new casting lines has to be 
evaluated: the metallurgical structures, precipitate size 
and distribution, textures, etc. New alloying elements may 
have to be introduced in the steel composition to compensate 
for the new effects. 
Three categories of technologies are candidates for one type 
or another of the new casting techniques. The belt caster is 
aiming at the larger thicknesses. The twin roll caster is meant 
for the intermediate thicknesses, whereas the very thin ones 
should be in the league of the single-roll caster. In addition 
to these are the dominant families of mold caster, which competes 
in the same class as the belt caster, and the spray deposition 
process, which should be capable of producing both thin sheets 
and bi-metallic sheets.15 ' 16 ' 1 7  
Table 1 gives an overview of published or announced inten- 
tions to develop one of these new continuous casting processes.16 
7. POWDER METALLURGY 
Powder metallurgy has been used successfully for producing 
high quality steel and super alloy components where stringent 
requirements have to be met regarding mechanical properties. 
These superior mechanical characteristics are in part attributable 
to the properties of the powder produced by rapid quenching tech- 
niques and by the absence of segregation in the finished products. 
The price of the steel powder produced from molten steel by atom- 
ization was thought to be a critical factor in determining the 
economic attractiveness of powder metallurgical operations. If 
it were possible to produce iron powder from the ore directly 
without proceeding through molten intermediates, such an operation 
could be extremely attractive from the standpoint of energy con- 
servation, reduced capital cost and hopefully fewer adverse en- 
vironmental impacts. 
It has been suggested that this powder may be directly rolled 
into high quality strip: thus, the direct production of powder, 
in conjunction with a powder metallurgical route, could offer 
rather appealing alternatives to the current iron-making steel- 
processing sequence. Finally, powder metallurgy could be a logi- 
cal route toward the manufacture of high quality steel products, 
viz low inclusion count, minimal segregation, and attractive 
mechanical properties.19 
In common with the direct casting of sheet and plasma tech- 
nology, the powder metallurgical route could be ideally suited 
for mini-mill type operations producing a limited range of pro- 
ducts at a location close to the market. 
8. INNOVATION STRATEGY AND ITS RESULTS 
Besides these and among others basic innovations not men- 
tioned in this paper, there are many other possibilities for 
piecemeal innovations which could improve the steel industry's 
productivity and the quality of its outputs. Many firms were or 
are still trying to follow this way in the steel crisis. 
As to the results of the innovation strategy in the last 
years of the steel crisis, we have a differentiated picture. 
Krupp and Mannesmann in the Federal Republic of Germany were 
successful and showed the possibilities of such innovation manage- 
ment even in crisis situations. 
On the other hand, some firms had enormous difficulties in 
realizing innovation strategies. VUEST did not have very good 
experience with diversifications of an innovation character (AMI- 
electronic project, etc.). 
The reasons why innovation strategies fail are obvious. The 
simultaneous management of crisis and innovation is of tremendous 
complexity and demands a great deal from the management of the 
firms. The problems of motivations, organization, corporate iden- 
tity, etc., in crisis situations could have a negative influence 
on innovative efforts. 
A careful study of the factors influencing the successful 
realization of innovation strategies could give useful orienta- 
tion to innovation management. Nonetheless, there is a great 
need for new effective tools which make a better orientation in 
innovation decisions possible. 
9 .  THE CONCEPT OF THE INTEGRATED LIFE CYCLE MODEL AS A TOOL IN MAN- 
AGEMENT OF INNOVATIONS 
Among the instruments of the strategic planning and manage- 
ment, the concept of the Integrated Life Cycle (ILC) seems to 
have a broader time horizon and therefore some advantages which 
could be utilized in the planning and realization of innovations 
in the steel and other industries. Besides the traditional market 
life cycle, ILC includes also the phases invention, innovation, 
and --important for senescent industries -- the reorientation (or 
liquidation) phase. Figure 3 shows the concept of ILC.20 
With the help of the ILC concept, the future state of the 
firm could be simulated earlier than by the methods used now, 
putting management in a position to meet the coming crisis with 
sufficient time reserves. This means that the firm could start 
with the innovation or other strategies earlier; management could 
act, not only react. 
In the ILC concept, the phases of invention, innovation, and 
reorientation are even more important than the traditional market 
cycle because of the possibilities of influence from the manage- 
ment side. 
The limitations of the traditional Product/Market Portfolio 
can be easily overcome. Special software packages for computing 
the Technology Portfolio are already available.21 
One of the greatest advantages of the ILC is the opportunity 
to structure the demands for information. With the concept of 
early warning systems, weak signals, and data bases, and with 
special software, the problem of information can be better managed 
than in the traditional way. 
The IIASA Step1 Data Base to~e+,h-r l'ith the Event Fi l e s  
represent valuable information with which the ILC pattern could 
be analyzed and reconstructed for the relevant steel technology. 
It would be the task of future research to fill the various gaps 
in data and software and to develop the ILC to an appropriate 
management tool. 
Modern innovation management cannot be effective without the 
instruments of risk analysis and risk management. An extension of 
the data base with some software for risk analysis and risk man- 
agement could improve the results of the efforts. Besides the 
present files in the data base, an additional risk file could be 
initiated for the main risk events including product, currency 
rate, market, foreign country and other risks which had a major 
influence on the present steel crisis. Klockner already uses some 
elements of risk management with relatively good results. The in- 
stallation of a decision support system for risk analysis in 
strategic planning could help to implement a functioning risk 
management in the steel industry.22 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
An empirical analysis of the published accounting data of 
firms in the West German steel and other industries and interviews 
with managers show that the classical risk return hypothesis is in 
most cases a false assumption. Also the announced innovation pro- 
jects in general confirm the risk return paradox in the steel 
industry. 
Innovation under the conditions of the risk return paradox 
presents an additional complexity to management which could en- 
danger the existence of the firm. New planning tools extending 
the time horizon and simulating the coming threats and dangers 
help to avoid the possible negative consequences of the innovation 
strategy in crisis situations. 
The ILC concept which has already been used to overcome the 
various shortcomings of the traditional product/market portfolio 
seems to be a suitable planning and management tool for preparing 
innovation decision in the steel industry. The present IIASA data 
base - completed with further events and data sheets with proper 
software packages - could be developed into a type of decision 
support system in the context of ILC, making it possible to over- 
come the risk return paradox in the steel industry. 
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TABLE 1 : Companies Involved Worldwide 
in the Development of NCC Processes 
COUNTRY COM PANY PROCESS 
Germany, FR Kru PP Belt Caster 
United Kingdom BSC Horizontal Caster 
France IRSlD Twin-Roll Caster 
Italy Danieli 
USA US-Bethlehem Belt Caster 
Nucor 
Alleghany Ludlurn Single-roll Caster 
Arrnco 
National Steel 
Battelle 
Japan Sumitomo Metals Belt Caster 
Kawasaki 
Kobe 
NKK Twin-Roll Caster 
NSC 
Kobe 
Kawasaki 
Nippon Metals 
Taiwan 
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2 . 4 .  LABOUR AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANCES I N  
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 
D r .  O l e g  A. S t e p a n o v  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o r  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
G e n e v a ,  S w i t e e r l a n d  
M r .  Chairman, L a d i e s  and  Gentlemen, 
It g i v e s  me g r e a t  p l e a s u r e  t o  a d d r e s s  you  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  
D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Labour  O f f i c e  and t o  w i s h  t h e  m e e t i n g  
e v e r y  s u c c e s s .  
I m p o r t a n t  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e s  have  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  t h e  i r o n  a n d  s t e e l  
i n d u s t r y  w o r l d r i d e  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  two d e c a d e s  and  w i l l  mos t  l i k e l y  c o n t i n u e  
i n  t h e  1980s.  There  have  b e e n  m a j o r  s h i f t s  i n  t e c h n o l o g y  and  methods o f  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  c h a n g e s  i n  o r g a n i s a t  i o n  and s t r u c t u r e  w i t h i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  . 
The f a c t o r ;  t h a t  have  shaped t h e  development o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  can  be 
c l a s s i f i e d  under ,  t h r e e  main headings:  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r s  ( t echno logy  o f  
v a r i o u s  i ron -  and s t e e l m a k i n g  p roces ses ,  and type ,  q u a l i t y  and p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  
i n p u t s ) ;  economic f a c t o r s  (p roduc t ion ,  consumption, market  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a c c e s s  
t o  raw m a t e r i a l s  and  ene rgy ,  envi ronmenta l  problems, l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
development);  and s o c i a l  f a c t o r s  (employment, working c o n d i t i o n s ,  t r a i n i n g  o f  
manpower, o c c u p a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h ) .  
The c u r r e n t  c r i s i s  i n  t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  h a s  t o  b e  s e e n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
g e n e r a l  economic and s o c i a l  evo lu t ion .  I t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  n o t  o n l y  o f  c y c l i c a l  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  b u t  a l s o  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t r u c t u r a l  changes and p roces ses ,  which 
canno t  b e  p u t  down s imp ly  t o  a n  imbalance between s t e e l  p roduc t ion  c a p a c i t y  
and consumption. I t  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  measures t aken  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  
c o u n t r i e s  o r  g roups  o f  c o u n t r i e s  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f a c i n g  t h e  i r o n  
and s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  a r e  emergency measures o f  a n  e x c e p t i o n a l  n a t u r e .  Dealing 
w i t h  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i s  n o t  a n  e a s y  ma t t e r .  I t  r a i s e s  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic 
and s o c i a l  i s s u e s .  Approaches t o  t h e s e  problems vary  from coun t ry  t o  
c o u n t r y ,  a s  d o  f  o m s  and methods o f  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i s a t  i o n  and management. 
T h i s  i s  due  t o  a  number o f  f a c t o r s ,  such a s  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  economic p o l i c y  and 
o r i e n t a t i o n ,  sys t em o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  technology and s c a l e  o f  p roduc t ion ,  
market  c o n d i t i o n s  and volume o f  consumption, and t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  world 
market  o n  r e g i o n a l  groupings .  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t r a d i t i o n ,  volume o f  s t e e l  
p roduc t ion  and consumption, a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  c o n d i t i o n s  
a t t e n d i n g  t h e i r  s u p p l y  and d e g r e e  o f  management d e c e n t r a l i s a t  i o n  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  
i n  s t r u c t u r a l  and o r g a n i e a t i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  At t h e  same 
t ime ,  t h e  i r o n  and e t e e l  i n d u e t r y  i n  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  h a s  a  number o f  common 
s t r u c t u r a l  and o r g a n i e a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  due p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  i t s  d i s t i n c t i v e  
c h a r a c t e r  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  b a s i c  b r a n c h e s  o f  i n d u s t r y ;  t h e s e  i n c l u d e ,  among 
o t h e r s ,  i t s  t e c h n o l o g y ,  i t s  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  n a t u r e ,  l a r g e - s c a l e  o u t p u t  a n d  
i t s  dependence  o n  s u p p l i e s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  raw m a t e r i a l s .  
I n  t h e  deve lopment  o f  t h e i r  i r o n  and  s t e e l  i n d u s t r i e s  c o u n t r i e s  u s u a l l y  
p a s s  t h r o u g h  two b a s i c  s t a g e s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  
employment g rowth .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  
a c h i e v e d  by i n s t a l l i n g  logreen  f i e l d "  i r o n  a n d  s t e e l  p l a n t s  - i . e .  p l a n t s  b u i l t  
f rom t h e  ground  up i n  a  p r e v i o u s l y  n o n - i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  a r e a  - and  r e c r u i t i n g  
l a r g e  g r o u p s  o f  new workers .  The r a t e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and  employment g rowth  
a t  t h i s  s t a g e  o f  deve lopment  a r e ,  i n  most  c a s e s ,  comparab le .  
I n  t h e  s e c o n d  s t a g e  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
improvement a r e  a c h i e v e d  m o s t l y  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  new a n d  more e f f e c t i v e  
t e c h n o l o g y  f o r  t h e  o l d .  P r o d u c t i o n  d u r i n g  t h i s  phase  r i s e s  much more r a p i d l y  
t h a n  employment. T h i s  p a t t e r n  i s  r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  l o n g  
s t e e l m a k i n g  t r a d i t i o n s .  I n  some o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  
i n  s t e e l  o u t p u t  may e v e n  b e  accompanied by a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  t o t a l  
l a b o u r  f o r c e .  
The m e a s u r e s  u s e d  t o  p r o t e c t  j o b s  o r  t h e  employment l e v e l  a r e  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s ;  t h e y  i n c l u d e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  d i r e c t  wage s u b s i d i e s ,  s u b s i d i e s  
f o r  s h o r t - t  ime work programmes, a n d  s u b s i d i e s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  
b u i l d i n g  up  o f  i n v e n t o r i e s  o r  p u r c h a s e s  o f  goods .  
As r e g a r d s  d i r e c t  wage s u b s i d i e s ,  J a p a n  may b e  c i t e d  a s  a n  example ;  i n  
t h a t  c o u n t r y  t h e .  employment s u b s i d y  programme h a s  t o  b e  s e e n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  s y s t e m  o f  l i f e - l o n g  employment t o  which l a r g e  f i r m s  a r e  e x t e n s i v e l y  
committed and which i s  a l s o  p r a c t i s e d  t o  some e x t e n t  by medium and  s m a l l  f i r m s .  
Whi le  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s u b s i d y  programme was c o n c e i v e d  p r i m a r i l y  a s  a n  
a n t i - d e p r e s s i o n  scheme, r e c e n t l y  t h e  e m p h a s i s  h a s  been  more o n  a s s i s t i n g  
s t r u c t u r a l  change ,  e.g. t h e  c o n v e r s i o n  o f  b u s i n e s s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and  d u r i n g  t h a t  
p r o c e s s  e m p l o y e r s  a r e  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  k e e p  t h e i r  employees. The s u b s i d i e s  a r e  
a l s o  meant  t o  c o v e r  t h e  c o s t s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  and  t r a i n i n g ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  employees 
r e m a i n  w i t h  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  o r  a r e  s h i f t e d  t o  o t h e r  e n t e r p r i s e s .  
The g r a n t i n g  o f  t emporary  s u b s i d i e s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  s h o r t - t i m e  work i s  a  
m a j o r  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  o f  Germany, where 
a  p u b l i c  s u b s i d y  p r o v i d i n g  p a r t i a l  compensa t ion  f o r  l o s t  e a r n i n g s  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  s h o r t - t i m e  work h a s  b e e n  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  Labour Promot ion  A c t .  The 
r a t e  o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  s h o r t - t i m e  p e r i o d  i s  68 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  n e t  
wages l o s t ,  t h u s  e q u a l l i n g  t h e  unemployment b e n e f i t  r a t e .  The scheme h a s  b e e n  
a p p l i e d  i n  c y c l i c a l  downturns  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  c a s e s  o f  manpower s u r p l u s e s  
r e s u l t i n g  f rom r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  and r e s t r u c t u r i n g .  
Schemes aimed a t  e n s u r i n g  temporary  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  employment th rough  
s h o r t - t e r m  s u b s i d i e s  t o  promote h i g h e r  o u t p u t ,  i n v e n t o r y  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o r  t h e  
p u r c h a s e  o f  g o o d s  d u r i n g  p e r i o d s  o f  s l a c k  demand a r e  most  advanced  i n  Sweden, 
which h a s  p l a y e d  a  p i o n e e r i n g  r o l e  i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  Such schemes c o n s t i t u t e  
e l e m e n t s  i n  a n  a c t i v e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  p o l i c y  which ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  d e s i g n e d  t o  c o n t r o l  a g g r e g a t e  demand and  a  
" s o l i d a r i s t i c "  u n i o n  wage p o l i c y ,  compose what  h a s  become known a s  t h e  
"Swedish Model". 112 
A number o f  c r i t i c i s m s  have been launched a g a i n s t  t h e  v a r i o u s  government 
measures aimed a t  m a i n t a i n i n g  workers t e m p o r a r i l y  on t h e  p a y r o l l .  One major  
argument h a s  been t h a t  t h e  s u b s i d i e s  h a v e ,  t o  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t ,  amounted 
t o  w i n d f a l l  p r o f i t s  f o r  f i r m s  t h a t  would have k e p t  t h e  s u r p l u s  workers  on  
t h e i r  p a y r o l l  i n  any  c a s e  o r  would have b u i l t  up t h e i r  i n v e n t o r i e s  even i n  t h e  
absence o f  s u b s i d i e s .  It i s  a l s o  claimed t h a t  such s u b s i d i e s  may d i s t o r t  t h e  
r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  and c o m p e t i t i o n  p a t t e r n s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  by favour ing  t h e  
l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  f i rms .  T h i s  a l l e g e d  m i s a l l o c a t i o n ,  however, would have t o  b e  
weighed a g a i n s t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  drawback o f  l o r c a p a c i t y  u t i l i s a t i o n  and mass 
unemployment. Whatever t h e  m e r i t s  of  t h e s e  o b j e c t i o n s  and c r i t i c i s m s ,  t h e y  
would, a t  any  r a t e ,  have t o  be  balanced a g a i n s t  t h e  p o s i t i v e  impact  s f  t h e  
measures  taken. 
Some o f  t h e  problems may be t r a c e d  t o  l a c k  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  exper ience  
i n  implementing such  nove l  schemes. Another c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  employment-sustaining p o l i c i e s  i s  t h a t  o f  whether  t h e  
economic changes t a k i n g  p l a c e  a r e  c y c l i c a l  o r  s t r u c t u r a l .  For  c y c l i c a l ,  i . e .  
shor t - t e rm changes  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  economic a c t i v i t y ,  some form o f  
employment-sustaining p o l i c y  makes s e n s e  t o  t i d e  t h e  f  i n n  o r  i n d u s t r y  o v e r  
u n t i l  demand f o r  i t s  produc ts  rebounds. However, i f  t h e  changes a r e  
s t r u c t u r a l  s h o r t - t e r m  measures o n l y  postpone t h e  i n e v i t a b l e .  I t  i s  t h e  
r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  changes t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  s o  many i n d u s t r i e s  and c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
i n  f a c t  s t r u c t u r a l  o n e s  t h a t  h a s  o f t e n  tended t o  g i v e  employment maintenance 
s u b s i d i e s  a  bad name. 
Various developments i n  t h e  technology of  i r o n  and s t e e l  p r o d u c t i o n  have 
g r e a t l y  a f f e c t e d .  t h e  working environment ,  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  a c c i d e n t s  and o c c u p a t i o n a l  d i s e a s e  t y p i c a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t .  
In  many c a s e s  o p e r a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  handl ing  o f  h o t  m e t a l  o r  raw m a t e r i a l s  
a r e  no l o n g e r  c a r r i e d  o u t  d i r e c t l y  by t h e  o p e r a t i v e s .  ~ e c h a n i c a l  equipment 
handles  most o f  t h e  h e a v i e s t  jobs. Dec is ions  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  by e l e c t r o n i c  
equipment i n s t e a d  o f  human b r a i n s .  Furnaces ,  l a d l e s  and i n g o t  moulds have a  
l a r g e r  c a p a c i t y ,  p roduc t ion  c y c l e s  a r e  s h o r t e r ,  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  more r a p i d  and 
more energy  i s  used.  
The a d o p t i o n  o f  q u i c k e r  and more e f f e c t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  h a s  c e r t a i n l y  
he lped  t o  e l i m i n a t e  a c c i d e n t  h a z a r d s ,  t h e  b e s t  example be ing  t h e  replacement  
o f  manual handl ing  o f  m e t a l  i n  r o l l i n g  m i l l s  by mechanised systems. The 
obvious drawback i s  t h e  s tepped-up work pace. With s h o r t e r  c y c l e s ,  
i n d i v i d u a l  o p e r a t i o n s  have become more f r e q u e n t  and t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  
m a t e r i a l s  p rocessed  a r e  l a r g e r ,  s o  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  g r e a t e r  nervous s t r a i n  on t h e  
worker t h a n  t h e r e  was 1 0  y e a r s  ago. Another e f f e c t  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change 
h a s  been t o  make t h e  p l a n t  more complex. I n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  h i g h e r  working 
speeds ,  t h i s  means t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  more chances  o f  m i s t a k e s  i n  maintenance and 
r e p a i r  work. 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  work i n  t h e  i r o n  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  h a s  been c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by p h y s i c a l  e x e r t i o n ,  e t r e s e ,  h e a t ,  n o i s e ,  d u s t  and exposure t o  t o x i c  g a s e s .  
Technolog ica l  advances have brought a b o u t  fa r - reach ing  changes i n  t h e  
i n d u e t r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  new p l a n t s ,  i n  t h e  form of  b e t t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  
workers  and lower a c c i d e n t  r i s k s .  The l a r g e r  s c a l e  on which o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  
now c a r r i e d  o u t  and t h e i r  more r a p i d  pace have c a l l e d  f o r  a d a p t a t i o n  on t h e  
p a r t  o f  management and employees. While a c c i d e n t  r i s k s  may have been  
reduced ,  t h e  consequences o f  a c c i d e n t s  when they  d o  o c c u r ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h o s e  o f  
f a u l t y  o p e r a t i o n  and poor maintenance,  may now be  much g r e a t e r .  Advanced 
technology a l s o  r e q u i r e s  a  h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  s k i l l s .  Problems a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  working environment  a r e  o f  two main t y p e s :  t h o s e  common t o  many 
l a r g e s c a l e  heavy i n d u s t r i e s ,  such a s  a c c i d e n t  r i s k s ,  h e a t  s t r e s s ,  n o i s e  and 
v i b r a t i o n ,  and t h o s e  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  i r o n  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  such  a s  d u s t  and 
t o x i c  gases .  
The r i g h t  management a t t i t u d e  and good labour-management r e l a t i o n s  a r e  
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  i n  e n s u r i n g  e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t  i o n  of  t h e  working environment .  
I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  equipment b e  p r o p e r l y  d e s i g n e d ,  
main ta ined  and o p e r a t e d  s o  a s  t o  c a t e r  n o t  o n l y  f o r  normal s i t u a t i o n s  b u t  a l s o  
f o r  peak loads .  The p r o c e s s e s  themselves must b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  c o r r e c t l y .  
Proper  o p e r a t i o n  and maintenance c a l l  n o t  o n l y  f o r  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  management 
c w o r d i n a t i o n  and worker co-operat ion,  b u t  a l s o  a  h igh  s tandard  o f  t r a i n i n g  
and concern  w i t h  impress ing  t h e  importance o f  environmental  p r o t e c t i o n  upon 
t h e  workforce.  A l l  new workers  should  r e c e i v e  adequa te  t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h e i r  
f u n c t i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  medical  examina t ions  t o  de te rmine  t h e i r  f i t n e s s  f o r  t h e  
job,  and h e a l t h  e d u c a t i o n  concern ing  p o t e n t i a l  hazards  a t  t h e  work p lace .  
I n  view o f  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  l i f e  and well-being o f  workers ,  
improvement o f  o c c u p a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  c o n d i t i o n s  should  l i e  a t  t h e  
h e a r t  o f  any p o l i c y  t o  improve working c o n d i t i o n s  and t h e  working environment ,  
and ,  o v e r  t h e  l a s t  decade  o r  s o ,  p r e s s u r e s  t o  improve o c c u p a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  and 
h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s  t o  t h a t  end have indeed  been r i s i n g ,  i n  s t e p  w i t h  growing 
concern  o v e r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  working environment. 
Changes i n  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and methods o f  work c o n t i n u e  t o  c r e a t e  new 
h a z a r d s ,  d u e  t o  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  i n c r e a s i n g l y  complex i n d u s t r i a l  a p p a r a t u s  
and p r o c e s s e s ,  t h e  growing number and q u a n t i t i e s  o f  t o x i c  s u b s t a n c e s  used ,  
n o i s y  and p o l l u t e d  working env i ronments ,  and t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  new working 
env i ronments ,  e s p e c i a l l y  through t h e  development  o f  d a t a  p r o c e s s i n g .  
Over t h e  p a s t  2 0  y e a r s  awareness  o f  t h e  problems o f  o c c u p a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  and 
h e a l t h  h a s  deve loped  c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  Europe. T h i s  h a s  l e d  
t o  a  r e v i e w  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  frameworks f o r  p r e v e n t i o n  and  o f  t h e  methods and 
r o l e s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  p a r t n e r s  and p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  m a t t e r .  From t h i s  
r e v i e w  s e v e r a l  l i n e s  o f  approach have emerged. 
One o f  t h e s e ,  b a s e d  o n  v a r i o u s  e x p e r i m e n t s  made o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  c o n s i d e r s  
t h a t ,  i n  s o  complex and d i f f i c u l t  a  t a s k  a s  t h a t  o f  promoting 
s a f e t y - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i n  i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  a c t i v e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  concerned i s  
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  i f  p r e v e n t i v e  measures  a r e  t o  succeed .  T h i s  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  
e n t a i l  g r a d u a l  changes i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  i n s p e c t o r a t e ,  which w i l l  have t o  
depend more and more o n  t h e  p l a n t - l e v e l  co -opera t ion  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
employers  and workers .  
A second p o i n t  i s  t h a t  mach inery ,  m a t e r i a l s  and t h e  working environment  
a r e  n o t  t h e  o n l y  s o u r c e s  o f  h a z a r d s  i n  i n d u s t r y .  O t h e r s  have  a r i s e n  from 
developments  i n  s t r u c t u r e s  and working methods and i n  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  
o p e r a t i o n s .  Nervous f a t i g u e  and s t r e s s  have  l a r g e l y  t a k e n  t h e  p l a c e  o f  
p h y s i c a l  f a t i g u e .  The problem i s  t h u s  o n e  o f  s e t t i n g  o c c u p a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  and 
h e a l t h  i n  a  w i d e r  c o n t e x t  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  a  working env i ronment  t h a t  w i l l  
p r o v i d e  workers  w i t h  comple te  s a f e t y  a g a i n s t  p h y s i c a l  and m e n t a l  h a z a r d s  and  
w i t h  a  s t a n d a r d  o f  t e c h n i c a l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  o c c u p a t i o n a l  hyg iene  and w e l f a r e ,  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a t  a 1  1 t i m e s  t o  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and  s o c i a l  p r o g r e s s  o f  s o c i e t y .  
A t h i r d  p o i n t  h a s  a l s o  emerged: whereas  p r e v e n t i o n  u s e d  t o  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  
a  s e p a r a t e  f e a t u r e  added  o n  t o  t h e  d e s i g n  o f  a  mach ine ,  i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  
o p e r a t i o n  o r  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s .  More r e c e n t l y  t h e  need  f o r  t a k i n g  a c c o u n t  o f  
a l l  a s p e c t s  o f  o c c u p a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  and  h e a l t h  f rom t h e  e a r l i e s t  p l a n n i n g  s t a g e  
h a s  r e c e i v e d  g e n e r a l  r e c o g n i t i o n .  
P r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  h e a l t h  and  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  i s  a c c e p t e d  a s  a  
p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  by b o t h  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
The s h o r t e n i n g  - by s t a g e s  i f  n e c e s s a r y  - o f  no rma l  working h o u r s ,  i . e .  
t h e  number o f  h o u r s  beyond which  work i s  p a i d  a t  o v e r t i m e  r a t e s ,  u s u a l l y  h e a d s  
t h e  l i s t  o f  demands made by w o r k e r s '  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  i n  t h e  i r o n  a n d  s t e e l  
i n d u s t r y .  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Meta lworke r s '  F e d e r a t i o n ,  f o r  example ,  i n  a  
r e s o l u t i o n  o n  r e d u c t i o n  o f  working t i m e  adop ted  by i t s  World Congress ,  
s u p p o r t e d  t h e  demands f o r  f u r t h e r  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  d a i l y ,  week ly  o r  mon th ly  
working h o u r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  s h i f t  worke r s  o r  w o r k e r s  p e r f o r m i n g  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a r d u o u s  j o b s ,  a n d  s e t  a s  t a r g e t s  f o r  t h e i r  c l a i m s  t h e  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
40-hour ,  f i v e - d a y  work ing  week and t h e  e a r l y  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  35-hour 
work ing  week i n  c o u n t r i e s  where  i t  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  demanded by t r a d e  u n i o n s ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  f i v e  i n s t e a d  o f  f o u r  s h i f t s  where c o n t i n u o u s  work ing  i s  e s s e n t i a l  
f o r  t e c h n i c a l  r e a s o n s .  The s h o r t e n i n g  o f  t h e  no rma l  w o r k i n g  week i s ,  
however ,  t h e  d e v i c e  f o r  r e d u c i n g  working h o u r s  t h a t  e m p l o y e r s  oppose  most  
s t r e n u o u s l y ,  w h i l e  c o n s i d e r i n g  i t  a s  s c a r e l y  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  
p r o t e c t  j o b s .  
New forms o f  work o r g a n i s a t i o n  have been  a  s u b j e c t  o f  growing i n t e r e s t  i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s .  The many v a r i e d  e x p e r i m e n t s  made i n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  wha tever  t h e i r  
o r i g i n a l  m o t i v a t i o n ,  g e n e r a l l y  have  a  common purpose:  t o  make work more 
i n t e r e s t i n g  e i t h e r  by r e s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  t a s k s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  w o r k e r s  ( f o r  
example,  th rough  j o b  enr ichment  o r  en la rgement  schemes) o r  by p u t t i n g  more 
s t r e s s  o n  g r o u p  o r  team work. 
Improvements i n  working c o n d i t i o n s  and  t h e  working environment  a r e  
l a r g e l y  t h e  f r u i t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  .gained a t  t h e  workplace by employers ,  
s u p e r v i s o r s ,  w o r k e r s  and t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  P o l i c i e s  f o r  t h e  improvement 
o f  work ing  c o n d i t i o n s  and t h e  working env i ronment  and f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by 
employers  a n d  workers  t h u s  go  hand i n  hand.  
Where o c c u p a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  and  s a f e t y  a r e  concerned ,  t h e  s e t t i n g  up  o f  
s p e c i a l i s e d  commi t tees  w i t h  worker  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  a  s t a t u t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  
i n  most c o u n t r i e s ,  and i n  some c a s e s  h a s  b e e n  s o  f o r  a l o n g  t ime.  The p a s t  
decade  h a s  s e e n  a  f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  i n  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  
t h e s e  commit tees .  They o f f e r  a  means whereby r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  management 
and t h e  workers ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  s a f e t y  d e l e g a t e s  a n d ,  where t h e r e  i s  o n e ,  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  p h y s i c i a n ,  c a n  j o i n t l y  examine such  m a t t e r s  a s  t h e  problems 
r a i s e d  by i n d u s t r i a l  a c c i d e n t s ,  p o l l u t i o n ,  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  o c c u p a t i o n a l  
d i s e a s e s ,  s a f e t y  and t r a i n i n g .  
The i r o n  and e t e e l  i n d u s t r y  i s  i n  t h e  p r o c e e e  o f  becoming a  " q u a l i t y  
i n d u s t r y " ,  o f f e r i n g  l e s s  "a l l -purpose"  p r o d u c t s  t h a n  p r o d u c t s  o f  h i g h  v a l u e  
added. T h i s  i m p l i e s  h i g h - l e v e l  s k i l l  r equ i rements .  The c r i s i s  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  i s  t h u s  a  m a t t e r  n o t  o n l y  o f  p roduc t  q u a l i t y  b u t  o f  s k i l l s ,  b o t h  
i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e ,  e n t a i l i n g  a  need f o r  in-depth t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .  As 
a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  t o  t h e  developing c o u n t r i e s  cannot  be  
c a r r i e d  o u t  wi thout  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  most advanced i r o n  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r i e s  
o f  t h e  "North", which a r e  now a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  r a t e  o f  t h e i r  i n t e n s i v e  
modern isa t  ion. 
The many t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and o p e r a t i o n a l  improvements ach ieved  have 
t rans formed s k i l l  r equ i rements  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  Continuous p r o d u c t i o n  
p r o c e s s e s  and t h e  s h o r t e r  t ime r e q u i r e d  f o r  p rocess ing  o r e  t o  i r o n  and i r o n  t o  
s t e e l ,  and t h e  shap ing  o f  s t e e l  i n t o  i t s  marke tab le  form, have l e d  t o  a  h igh  
d e g r e e  o f  in te rdependence  between t h e  v a r i o u s  p roduc t ion  s t a g e s .  As t h e  
p l a n t  approaches o p e r a t i o n  a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y ,  automation and computer c o n t r o l s  
a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  reduce  t h e  r i s k s  o f  p roduc t ion  imbalances. G e n e r a l l y  
speak ing ,  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p l a n t  o r  p r o c e s s  and t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new 
equipment have brought a b o u t  changes i n  t h e  workforce by c r e a t i n g  new jobs  and 
e l i m i n a t i n g  o t h e r s  o r  a l t e r i n g  t h e i r  c o n t e n t s .  Although t h e  o p e r a t i o n  and 
c o n t r o l  o f  equipment have been s i m p l i f i e d  and t h e  p h y s i c a l  workload reduced ,  
key o p e r a t o r s  on a l l  s h i f t s  must unders tand  t h e  processes  and t e c h n i q u e s  
a p p l i e d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between o p e r a t i o n s .  
Technolog ica l  changes have ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  underscored t h e  dependence o f  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  on a  t r a i n e d  workforce.  The new c o n d i t i o n s  o f t e n  c a l l  f o r  menta l  
r a t h e r  than  p h y s i c a l  e f f o r t  and a  c a p a c i t y  t o  reason i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  v a r i o u s  
s i t u a t i o n s .  
The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new t e c h n o l o g i e s  h a s  caused some o f  t h e  j o b s  t o  
d i s a p p e a r  o r  t o  change and  new j o b s  t o  appear .  For  example, t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  f u l l y  a u t o m a t i c  conveyor b e l t  charg ing ,  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  g a s  p u r i f i c a t i o n  and 
c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  s t a t i o n s  f o r  g a s  and h o t  a i r  b l a s t  h a s  e l i m i n a t e d  t h e  need f o r  
c h a r g e r s ,  b l a s t  f u r n a c e  t h r o a t  s u p e r v i s o r s  and g a s  p l a n t  a t t e n d a n t s .  A s  f o r  
t h e  d u t i e s  o f  t h e  foreman and a s s i s t a n t  foreman i n  c h a r g e  o f  t h e  b l a s t  fu rnace  
s m e l t i n g  depar tment ,  t h e y  have changed r a d i c a l l y .  Whereas i n  t h e  p a s t  
c o n t r o l s  were l o c a t e d  a t  t h e  p l a n t  i t s e l f ,  t h e y  a r e  now i n  a  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  
s t a t i o n .  The number o f  i n s t r u m e n t s  used h a s  i n c r e a s e d  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  over  t h e  
years .  Data p rov ided  by ins t rument  r e a d i n g s  a r e  n o t  t a k e n  i n  i s o l a t i o n ,  b u t  
must b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  a  g e n e r a l  c o n t e x t  s o  t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  a c t i o n  can  be  
taken.  The j o b  o f  keeper  i s  a l s o  a f f e c t e d ,  a s  he  s h a r e s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  
t h e  foreman f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  o p e r a t i o n s .  Understanding t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  and 
r e a d i n g s  and t r a n s l a t i n g  them i n t o  a c t i o n  n o t  o n l y  i s  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  
p roduc t ion  b u t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  o f  personne l .  A t  t h e  same t ime ,  
t h e  p h y s i c a l  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  k e e p e r ' s  t a s k s  have been l i g h t e n e d .  For  example, 
opening and c l o s i n g  t h e  t a p p i n g  h o l e  have been made e a s i e r  by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  power a s s i s t a n c e .  The s t o v e  a t t e n d a n t ' s  j o b  h a s  a l s o  been t ransformed:  
i n s t e a d  o f  p h y s i c a l l y  check ing  on t h e  s t o v e s  themselves,  he  o p e r a t e s  from a  
c o n t r o l  s t a t i o n .  In  some c a s e s  gauges and remote push-but ton c o n t r o l s  e n a b l e  
s c a l e  c a r  d r i v e r s  t o  work i n  a  d u s t - f r e e  atmosphere. 
Work p r o c e d u r e s  and s u p e r v i s i o n  have been rep lanned .  On t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  
programme drawn up by t h e  e n g i n e e r ,  o p e r a t o r s  a r e  now r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  checking 
a l l  c o n t r o l s ,  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  t h e  programme i s  fo l lowed,  drawing a t t e n t i o n  t o  
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  and t a k i n g  emergency a c t i o n  i n  c a s e  o f  m a l f u n c t i o n i n g  o r  
breakdown. The second c h a r g e r  a s s i s t s  t h e  f i r s t ,  s u p e r v i s e s  t h e  
charge-measuring hoppers  and performs such maintenance t a s k s  a s  e l i m i n a t i n g  
d u s t  i n  t h e  bunkers  and c l e a n i n g  t h e  weighing a p p a r a t u s .  New p r o c e s s e s  and 
t e c h n i q u e s  have reduced p h y s i c a l  l a b o u r  and have l e d  t o  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
new s k i l l s  (e .g .  maintenance f i t t e r  f o r  h y d r a u l i c  and pneumatic g e a r ,  
e l e c t r o n i c  mechanic f o r  e l e c t r o n i c  c o n t r o l  equipment) and a  g e n e r a l  broadening 
o f  t h e  s k i l l s  o f  ins t rument  mechanics. 
The main c h a l l e n g e  f o r  t h e  i r o n  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  be  
t o  deve lop  a  "new" workforce i n c l u d i n g  t h e  t r a i n i n g  ( o r  r e t r a i n i n g )  o f  a  
s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  s k i 1  led  workers ,  t e c h n i c i a n s ,  s u p e r v i s o r y  and 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a f f ,  e n g i n e e r s  and managers - and,  of  c o u r s e ,  t r a i n e r s .  
The p lanning  o f  manpower and t r a i n i n g  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  key e lement  i n  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  any i n d u s t r y ,  i n c l u d i n g  i r o n  and s t e e l .  I n  
t h i s  r e g a r d ,  some o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  which have emerged o v e r  t h e  y e a r s  c a n  b e  
summarised a s  fo l lows:  
- Well conce ived  manpower p l a n s  and p o l i c i e s  a r e  necessary  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  
q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l  a r e  r e c r u i t e d  and t r a i n e d  and made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e a c h  
s t a g e  i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  equipment and ,  from a  
long-term p o i n t  o f  view, f o r  t h e  smooth and e f f i c i e n t  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
p l a n t  a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y .  
- The b e s t  clme f o r  p lanning  t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  t h a t  a t  which i n i t i a l  
p l a n s  a r e  b e i n g  drawn up f o r  t h e  s e t t i n g  up o f  a  new p l a n t  o r  t h e  
expans ion  o r  m o d e r n i s a t i o n  o f  a n  o l d  one. 
- Adequate p l a n s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  t imely  i n s e r t i o n  o f  manpower a t  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  s k i l l  a s  f r e s h  r e c r u i t s  o r  a s  exper ienced  workers .  
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- P l a n s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  workers  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  meet t h e i r  
l e g i t i m a t e  a s p i r a t i o n s  f o r  advancement and enhance t h e i r  c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s .  
- P r a c t i c a l  and long-range s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  many problems r e l a t e d  t o  
manpower and t r a i n i n g  a r e  b e s t  sough t  i n  c l o s e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  and 
between employers '  and workers '  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  manpower p l a n s  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d  
i n  e a c h  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a n t  i s  needed. S i n c e  t echno logy  is c o n s t a n t l y  
chang ing  i t  i s  n o t  enough t o  d e s c r i b e  j o b s  by t h e i r  names: t h e  t a s k s  t o  b e  
performed must a l s o  b e  s p e c i f i e d .  T h i s  f a c i l i t a t e s  r e c r u i t m e n t ,  makes f o r  a  
b e t t e r  matching o f  a v a i l a b l e  s k i l l s  t o  j o b  c o n t e n t ,  and a l s o  makes p o s s i b l e  
p r e l i m i n a r y  a s s e s s m e n t s  o f  t r a i n i n g  requ i rements .  
Rapid t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change makes i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  o r g a n i s e  c o u r s e s  f o r  t h e  
upgrad ing  of  workers  aimed a t  t e a c h i n g  them new s k i l l s  and expand ing  t h e i r  
knowledge, i n  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  v e r s a t i l i t y  and o c c u p a t i o n a l  m o b i l i t y  
and improve t h e i r  s t a n d a r d  o f  performance.  
The main a d v a n t a g e  o f  i n - p l a n t  t r a i n i n g  c e n t r e s  i s  t h a t  t h e y  e s t a b l i s h  a n  
unbroken c h a i n  between r e c r u i t m e n t ,  t r a i n i n g  and employment w i t h i n  t h e  
p l a n t .  T h i s  l e a d s  t o  a  c l o s e r  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t r a i n i n g  w i t h  work. T r a i n i n g  
o b j e c t i v e s  c a n  b e  more c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  a c t u a l  j o b  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  
and  i t  i s  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  s i m p l e  t o  a r r a n g e  on-the-job and o t h e r  t r a i n i n g  w i t h i n  
t h e  under tak ing .  
A major  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t r a i n i n g  p rov ided  i n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o r  c e n t r e s  i s  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  t e a c h i n g  s t a f f ,  who shou ld  b e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  
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t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o g r e s s  and advances  i n  t r a i n i n g  methods,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h o s e  
concerned  w i t h  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  s k i l l s .  Where t h e  c e n t r e  forms a  p a r t  o f  t h e  
i r o n  and s t e e l  complex, t r a i n i n g  s t a f f  shou ld  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and  
t r a i n i n g  o f  key  workers  who w i l l  i n  t u r n  t r a i n  o t h e r s .  
Long-term t r a i n i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  r e p l e n i s h m e n t ,  
upgrad ing  and u p d a t i n g  o f  s k i l l s  t o  s u s t a i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n ,  ma in tenance  and 
growth o f  i r o n  and  s t e e l  p l a n t s .  F u r t h e r  t r a i n i n g  i s  a l s o  needed t o  
c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e  s k i l l s  and knowledge i n t r o d u c e d  b e f o r e  and d u r i n g  s t a r t - u p  and 
runn ing- in ,  n o t a b l y  th rough  t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  o f  workers .  
F u r t h e r  t r a i n i n g  and r e t r a i n i n g  a r e  v i t a l  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  p l a n t  
m o d e r n i s a t i o n ,  t o  e n a b l e  w o r k e r s  t o  a d a p t  t h e i r  s k i l l  t o  new equipment  and 
p r o c e s s e s .  F o r  t h i s  k i n d  o f  t r a i n i n g  t h e  i n d u s t r y  must r e l y  o n  a  
combina t ion  o f  i t s  own p r o d u c t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  ( f o r  on- the- job t r a i n i n g ) ,  
t r a i n i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  c e n t r e s ,  t r a i n i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  a t  community and n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l s ,  h i r e d  s p e c i a l i s t s  and  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  and t r a i n i n g  abroad .  
T r a i n i n g  s t r a t e g y  must b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  j o i n t l y  by t h e  e d u c a t i o n  and 
t r a i n i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  governments ,  employers  ' and workers  ' 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  and o t h e r  o c c u p a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  concerned  w i t h i n  t h e  
community. Formal c o - o r d i n a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d  a t  two main l e v e l s :  t h a t  o f  
f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  p o l i c i e s  t o  deve lop  t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d  by 
t h e  i r o n  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  and t h a t  o f  implementa t ion  o f  t r a i n i n g  
programmes, i n c l u d i n g  c u r r i c u l a ,  s y l l a b i ,  e x a m i n a t i o n s  and c e r t i f i c a t i o n .  
The whole development  p r o c e s s  i s  dependent  o n  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  
p e r s o n n e l  f o r  s e t t i n g  t a r g e t s ,  managing o p e r a t i o n s ,  implementing programmes 
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and e v a l u a t i n g  performance.  Much waste  c a n  be avoided i f  development p l a n s ,  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s  and o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  managed e f f i c i e n t l y .  
Fur thermore ,  e n l i g h t e n e d  management c a n  do much t o  promote a  s a f e  and 
s a t i s f y i n g  work c l i m a t e  - a  major  o b j e c t i v e  everywhere. The t r a i n i n g  o f  
m a n a g e r i a l  s t a f f  must r e l y  o n  f a r  more than  formal  e d u c a t i o n  and t r a i n i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  under taken  e i t h e r  by i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r  by e n t e r p r i s e s .  There w i l l  
i n e v i t a b l y  be  g a p s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  r e g a r d s  a b i l i t y  t o  s o l v e  p r a c t i c a l  
problems o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  Knowledge and e x p e r t i s e  t h a t  a r e  l a c k i n g  c a n  be 
made up f o r  i n  v a r i o u s  ways: n o t a b l y  by o r g a n i s i n g  seminars  o r  v i s i t s  t o  
o t h e r  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  c a l l i n g  on t h e  s e r v i c e s  of  s p e c i a l  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  and s o  
on. Many i n s t i t u t i o n s  and o r g a n i s a t i o n s  s t i l l  s e e  t h e  management development 
p r o c e s s  a s  mere ly  a  s e r i e s  o f  o rgan ised  t r a i n i n g  e v e n t s ,  be i t  i n  t r a i n i n g  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  o r  w i t h i n  t h e  p l a n t :  i f  more were done t o  c r e a t e  and expand 
v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  self-development  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  t h a t  might reduce  t h e  h igh  
c o s t  o f  management t r a i n i n g ,  make t r a i n i n g  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  more managers and 
make i t  e a s i e r  t o  d i s c o v e r  t a l e n t  t h a t  might o t h e r w i s e  remain h idden  f o r  many 
y e a r s .  
I n  rev iewing  t h e  p o s s i b l e  development and t r e n d s  which w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  
t r a i n i n g  scene  i n  t h e  1980s,  i t  becomes e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  t a s k  ahead i s  
formidable.  T r a i n i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  schemes and programmes have t o  be  reshaped and 
redes igned  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  m i l l i o n s  o f  people ,  young and a d u l t ,  men and women 
who a r e  looking  f o r  ways and means t o  a c q u i r e  s k i l l s  and knowledge may be a b l e  
t o  r e c e i v e  t r a i n i n g  t h a t  improves and p r o t e c t s  t h e i r  e m p l o y a b i l i t y ,  i n c r e a s e s  
t h e i r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and incomes, improves t h e i r  c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s  and g e n e r a l l y  
c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  b e t t e r  c o n d i t i o n s  of  work and l i f e .  
2.5. ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND OF ITS 
MANAGEMENT: The Bulgarian Case Study on Casting with Coun- 
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Dipl.eng. G. Nachev 
"Metals Technology" Corporation 
Sofia, Bulgaria 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a part of the results obtained during the 
first stage of the study on the "Management and Technology Life 
Cycle" carried out in the "Metals Technology" Corporation, on the 
case of one particular technology -- the Bulgarian technology for 
casting with counterpressure. The study has been implemented 
jointly with the work of the "Management and Technology Life 
Cycle" activity at IIASA. It aims at revealing the regularities 
of technological development and the interactions between tech- 
nologies and the development of a system for management. 
The pilot technology selected for the first stage of the 
study was the technology for casting with counterpressure of 
aluminum alloys, one of the basic application fields of the me- 
thod. 
Elements of the technology are: the machines for casting 
with counterpressure, the die, and the technological documentation 
(know-how). The machine is a bearer of the uniqueness of the 
method, while the die and the technological documentation realize 
the product technology, and each new type of die is actually a 
product innovation. 
The main goal of the first stage of the study uas to trace 
and analyze the life cycle of the technology; to define its ad- 
vantages, significance, competitiveness; and to trace the develop- 
ment of the organizational forms of management that have been 
accompanying the technological development. The study focused on 
the questions: 
* What should management know about technological development 
in order to orient it correctly and to speed up the process? 
* In what way can the Lheory about Lhe life cycle and inno\.a- 
tion processes assist the further improvement of the system 
of technological management? 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS MANAGEMENT 
The technology for casting with counterpressure consists of 
the fact that the casting process takes place under gas pressure, 
i.e. the transportation of fluid metal, the filling of the die, 
and the crystallization of the casting take place under pressure 
provided through the compression of air or some other gas. 
The competitive technologies of the counterpressure method 
for casting light alloys are casting under high pressure, casting 
under low pressure, die casting and vacuum casting. The ad- 
vantages of casting with counterpressure over its competitors are: 
* improved mechanic characteristics of the casting: GS and Cb 
are increased by 30%; 6 is increased up to three times; 
* increased solidity of the casting; 
* more economic use of the fluid metal (saving up to 20-30%); 
* energy savings of up to 30%; 
* increased precision of the casting, which means a reduced 
need for mechanical processing; 
* some ecological advantages, as the process develops in a 
enclosed space which allows diversion of harmful gases and 
heat. 
The counterpressure method has its area of competitiveness. 
It is efficient for castings which have to fulfil high require- 
ments for density and strength. In the case of normal aluminum 
castings, other technologies, such as high pressure casting, are 
more competitive. 
The counterpressure technology has proven to be very vigor- 
ous, with possibilities for multiplication. At first it was 
applied in the casting of aluminum alloys, and later it turned 
out to be efficient in the casting of non-ferrous alloys, various 
kinds of steel, and plastic materials. It is also applied in the 
production of new materials. 
The technology is protected with patents and certificates for 
authorship in 33 countries. 
So far, the counterpressure technology has been applied in 
the electrical industry, in electronics, engine-construction, 
hydraulics, the car industry, and the aircraft industry. 
The concept for this technology emerged in 1956. In 1961, 
the idea was acknowledged as an invention and was patented. The 
first laboratory machine was constructed in 1963. In 1966, the 
first industrial machine was produced. In 1968, the first in- 
dustrial technology was developed and the large-scale application 
of the technology in branches of the Bulgarian national economy 
began. 
Different organizational forms existed during the different 
stages of the development of the technology. In the development 
stage, a specialized institute for applied research was created 
as were enterprises for the production of machines and tools. 
Organizationally, they belonged to one firm. The leading manage- 
ment functions during this stage were the management of invest- 
ments and the management of technological research. 
In the stage of large-scale production, the management func- 
tions of marketing and sales developed strongly, because of the 
need to find efficient areas for applying the technology. 
At the present moment, the "Metals Technology" Corporation 
has an Institute for Fundamental Research which is subordinated 
also to the Bulgarian Academy of Science. The Institute generates 
and develops new ideas. The institutes for applied research, 
using the results from the fundamental research, develop machines 
with new design and new product strategies. The production units 
of the corporation produce the machines and the dies for the 
practical realization of the technology as well as products with 
this technology. The technological products and the research 
products are sold by foreign trade and engineering units (See 
Figure 1). 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
In order to give management systematic knowledge, it is 
necessary to study the development of the technologies starting 
from their creation and continuing with their practical implemen- 
tation and development. The dynamics of the technology and its 
characteristics are the objective basis for determining what is 
general and what is specific in its technological development and 
what are its stages. 
For the purposes of management improvement, it is necessary 
to test empirically the popular hypothesis, often considered a 
law, that the management system and its elements change according 
to the stage of technological development. In this connection, 
the study was carried out in two directions: 
* Analysis of technology dynamics and assessment of the level 
of the technology; 
* Analysis and evaluation of the management of technologies 
from their creation until their implementation. 
The analysis of technology dynamics was based on the concept 
of the technology life cycle and the stages in its development. 
Technology assessment aimed at defining the state of the technol- 
ogy compared with its competitors, determining its significance 
and the extent and directions of its dissemination. The analysis 
and evaluation of the management of the technology covers the 
organizational forms, strategic decisions and economic environ- 
ment. 
In accordance with the general concept of the study, the 
first stage is based on a system of indicators organized into 
four main groups. These indicators are sources of qualitative 
and quantitative information about technology dynamics; assessment 
of the level, competitiveness, prospects, and potential for devel- 
opment of the technology; and identification of the present state 
and the present problems of the system for management in connec- 
tion with technology dynamics. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY 
In studying technology dynamics, the results showed that the 
technology, in terms of its development within Bulgaria, is in a 
period of transition to the saturation phases (See Figure 2 1 ,  
having about 20% of the total output of aluminum castings in the 
country. With regard to its position on the international market, 
the technology is estimated to be in the transition to the growth 
phase. This difference in the technology's position domestically 
and internationally drew the attention of the investigators to 
more detailed studies on the influence of the scale factor on the 
life cycle of the technology and its management. 
It is obvious that it is not a matter of indifference whether 
an original technology appears in a large or in a small country. 
The quantitative assessment of the scales factor in the casting 
with counterpressure is shown in Figure 3, based on the growth 
rate of the sales of counterpressure products. The S1 curve 
shows the development of domestic sales, and the S2 curve shows 
the sales abroad. 
The sales in other countries start with a time lag t from 
the start of the domestic sales. The t in this technological 
field is about 7 years. 
During these 7 years, about 40-50 new products were developed 
based on this technology. They have been implemented in all 
branches of the national economy. The machines and tools for the 
realization of the technology were improved, experience accumu- 
lated, and specialists trained. Production facilities were cre- 
ated for the production of machines and tools and also for the 
production of products with this technology. The domestic market 
was developed. At the time of the first sales abroad, the alumi- 
num castings produced with the new technology had already captured 
about 10% of the domestic market share. 
The t, this difference of 7 years between the start of the 
sales domestically and abroad, is very negative. It slows down 
the profits from sales on the large international market. What is 
more, the risk that during this time another competitive technol- 
ogy may appear and reduce the international market for our tech- 
nology or even capture the entire potential international market 
for our technology, is very strong. 
A more general question can be answered by the life cycle 
theory: does an original technology, created in a small country, 
necessarily have to go along the two curves (Sl, domestic market 
curve and S2, international market curve; see Figure 3 ) ?  
The purpose of developing a new technology is to obtain 
maximum profit from the sales of the technology itself or of the 
products produced with this technology. It is not possible to 
obtain maximum profit from the domestic market of a small country, 
because it is limited. Maximum profit can be obtained, however, 
from the international market. This means that the strategy in 
the development of a technology and its products must bring them 
to the international market. 
Is it possible to avoid the S1 curve, i.e. to start sales im- 
mediately on the international market? 
This is difficult because of the fact that the technology 
itself can hardly be sold there with the expected profit, nor is 
it possible to find a firm strong enough to invest resources in 
joint development of the technology, because in the beginning of 
its development, the technology has not yet proven its high ef- 
ficiency and competitiveness. Development along the S1 curve, 
therefore, is necessary, in order for the technology to prove its 
advantages. We realized that in order to start along the S2 
curve, a necessary condition it go some way along the S1 curve. 
Then a second question appears: how is it possible to speed 
up the development of the technology along the S1 curve, i.e. how 
to make the curve steeper and how to reduce the t? 
High rates of development of original and highly efficient 
technologies, initiated in a small country, can possibly be pro- 
vided under the following conditions: 
* if the state gives priority to these technologies and creates 
some privileges for their development; 
* if the firm which is developing the technology concentrates 
resources (financial, intellectual, etc) deliberately on 
research activities, creation of production facilities, and 
marketing. 
One condition for reducing t is the accelerated development 
along the S1 curve. The second condition is timely marketing on 
the international market in order to find potential products 
which could be implemented and sold on the domestic market. 
Important conclusions come also from the analysis of the 
management system from the appearance of the technology as an 
scientific invention until the present moment, because a relation 
between the technology dynamics and the management system is 
observed. Relating the organizational forma and the stages in 
the development of the technology, it is possible to make the 
following observations: 
* Different organizational forms existed during the different 
stages in the development of the technology. Before the 
stage of large-scale production is reached (i.e. during the 
development stages), a research establishment, the classic 
form of managing fundamental research, existed. In the 
further stages, the organizational forms corresponded to the 
degree of implementation of the technology and to its market 
significance. 
* The goal throughout all stages has been that each next or- 
ganizational form should exceed the preceding form in terms 
of efficiency. 
* The organizational forms are more dynamic in the stages 
which succeed the implementation of the technology in produc- 
tion and its gain of signification market share. They were 
more dynamic also before the producer worked out a strategy 
for the development of the technology. During the period of 
growth, the technology for casting with counterpressure was 
implemented in a relatively stable organizational form, al- 
though its structural elements were developing. 
* The organizational forms tend to improve in order to reach a 
better synchronization within the cycle "research-implementa- 
tion," and to reduce it. The organizational form which 
unites science with production assists an accelerated devel- 
opment of the technology and its implementation into prac- 
tice. 
* Some organizational forms must be crated before starting the 
activities which they will serve. 
CONCLUSION 
The life cycle concept is an instrument which can assist 
managers in assessing technological development objectively and 
tell them what is the present situation of a technology -- in 
which phase of development the technology is and what its position 
among competitive technologies is. This is a new method which, 
along with other methods for analysis and comparison, serves not 
only to assess the present state, but also to make strategic 
decisions. In order to create conditions for the speedy develop- 
ment of technologies, it is necessary to know the proper organiza- 
tional forms that correspond to the different phases of tech- 
nological development. The match between the process of tech- 
nological development and the management system creates a favor- 
able environment which stimulates technological innovations. 
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The world steel production in 1985 was 634 million tons, 
including 156 million tons electric steel, and a 4% increase over 
1984. The forecasts for 1986-90 are to keep the total output 
stable, but with electric steel increasing annually by 1-1.5%. 
Seen against the background of the decreasing or stagnation 
of total steel output (see Figure I), the continuous increase of 
electric steel output and its share of the total is impressive 
(see Figure 2). This is due to indisputable advantages of the 
electric arc furnaces regarding production dynamics, capacity to 
obtain high quality metal, rapid technological development, pro- 
ductivity and level of automatization and computer management, 
all at the highest level in metallurgy. 
The good prospects outlined of electric steel productive give 
management an opportunity to approach with optimism the planning 
of development activity aimed at market enlargement for new pro- 
ducts and technologies. This is a premise for the technical 
progress in electric steel production. 
Graphite electrode costs are one of the essential elements 
in the working cost of electric steel. They make up 15-20% of 
direct operational costs. Their decrease is the long-term goal 
of our enterprise. An object of this report is the management of 
this process, its market realization and clarifying the prospects 
for its development. 
The electrode consumption is presented in kilograms of gra- 
phite per ton of steel produced. In technological aspects (see 
Figure 3), it consists of four components: 
* tip consumption 
* stub loss 
* side oxidation 
* breakage 
The first two are called "technological" by steel producers. 
They are constant and can be related to the operational parameters 
of the furnaces. Stub losses and breakages are accidental and to 
a great extent determined by the skill of the staff and the exper- 
tise in choosing electrode quality and diameter. Many researches 
confirmed that tip consumption is a function of the operational 
current and normally is fixed in the project for the power perfor- 
mance of the furnace. Side oxidation consumption varies for 
different furnaces from 30 to 70% of the total. Our investiga- 
tions showed the side oxidation rate varies along the electrode 
column from 1.5 to 7.2 kg/mz/h. 
In the electric arc furnaces, the electrodes operate at 
surface temperatures from 1500 to 2100'C. 
The technological analysis of every kind of consumption shows 
that, with the exception of the side oxidation, they are in- 
evitable and it is impossible to influence or reduce them. The 
side oxidation is useless due to a disadvantage of carbon to 
oxidize easily over 600'C. That is why 40 years ago, technolo- 
gists began to look for ways to reduce side oxidation. 
In the 1950's, chemists created materials resistant to 1700- 
2000'C. They conducted many tests with these new materials as 
protective coating to preserve the electrodes from side oxidation. 
They used metal powder, calcium carbide, quartz, etc. and tried 
iron chloride and manganese chloride as well. Because of dif- 
ferences between thermal expansion coefficients of the electrode 
and the coating, it cracked and fell down. It is proposed to fit 
a metal net on the electrode and to fill it with a protective 
material. But all attempts were futile. The statement of Glater, 
pronounced in 1957 at a congress of electric arc furnaces, is 
very interesting: "the graphite electrodes consumption demon- 
strates the importance of the surface losses and gets conclusion 
that a method of surface oxidation reduction will be very valu- 
able. The researches are performed in laboratories and their end 
is visible." 
What Glater expected was rather optimistic. The protective 
coating appeared much later and was based on principles 1-ery 
different from those tested. 
The three Bulgarian protective coatings were created during 
the period 1958-1972. In 1972, FOSECO produced non-conductive 
protective coatings which are deposited under the contact of the 
electrode column with the current clamp. They have a limited 
application. 
After 40 years of attempts, during the period 1980-1986, many 
research studies and industrial trials were carried out with so- 
called combined electrodes, a combination of a water-cooled metal 
electrode and a graphite one (the last one only is consumable). 
Such electrodes were developed by the firms CONRADTY and KORF in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, STELKO in Canada, etc. After 
many industrial tests, this technology turned out not to be com- 
petitive. 
The basic reason the coating was rejected by the market was 
that the researchers had on the way to high melting coatings. As 
we pointed out, they do not have good prospects due to the great 
difference of their linear expansion coefficient regarding gra- 
phite, which is very low (longitudinal 1.5 x 10-6'C; transverse 
2.5 x 10-6.C). 
The basic conception of our research group, headed by Prof. 
Dr. Al. Valchev, is that the coating must have at least one lou 
melting layer (melting point under 700°C), which must smelt before 
the intensive graphite oxidation and perform its protective func- 
tions in a melted state. 
During long-term laboratory and industrial research studies, 
three kinds of coatings were created, representing three stages 
of development before market realization. 
1. Coating of silicon carbide and BzO3 (1958-60): It has a 
perfect impermeability, but low thermal resistance, up to 
1500'C. It is also an isolator. But it was used on small 
furnaces (4 tons) during 1960-62. 
2. Coating of Sic and Al: Taking into account the mentioned 
disadvantages, the low temperature BzO3 was shifted by alu- 
minum. The resulting coating increased its resistance up to 
1850'C and became current-conductive. In line uith good 
technological qualities, its disadvantage was the complicated 
operational technology, demanding highly skilled staff. The 
coating was used in the works where it was created during 
1962-64. But this disadvantage banned its market realiza- 
tion, and that is why intensive investigations continued in 
this direction. 
3. Aluminum alloy coating: Based on collected experience and 
after many laboratory and industrial trials during 1967-70, 
aluminum alloy was created with Si, Sic, Ti and B, possessing 
all qualities required for stable industrial operation. 
In this stage, the protective coating had gone far beyond the 
works of its creation. Following this technology in 1970, units 
for protected electrodes were built up in the Iron and Steel 
Works L. Breznev, Bulgaria and the British Steel Corporation, 
United Kingdom. 
Regardless of its qualities, this coating finds a limited 
application. The basic limiting condition is the high investment 
cost. During 1970-74, a favorable factor appeared in the interna- 
tional conjuncture. The price of graphite electrode rose sharply 
(as an petroleum product in parallel with oil prices) from 250 
pounds/ton in 1972 to 900 pounds/ton in 1977. The graphite price 
movement is shown in Figure 4. This increase the customers' 
interest in our product and made a market break-through easy. 
In the 1980's, however, unfavorable factors appeared for the 
market realization of the coating. These included the replacement 
of part of the refractory for electric arc furnaces with water- 
cooled panels. The furnace height was reduced, the power schedule 
changed, SO the electrode consumption was greatly reduced. More- 
over, electric steel producers turned to two-stage operation as 
the furnace performed only scrap melting and the refining is 
realized in a ladle-unit. This changed the rules of electrode 
consumption with an unfavorable influence on the economic effect 
of the coating. 
To overcome such factors, the enterprise is working in two 
ways : 
1. Perfecting and increasing equipment productivity for produc- 
ing the coating and 
2. Creating new coatings of higher quality. 
Our activity on point 1 can be seen from the development of 
the equipment. In general, the classic scheme from production 
creation to market break-through is well kept: 
* During 1958-70, we operated with primitive equipment demand- 
ing low investment and much manual labor. 
* During 1970-74, we moved to a conveyor line with every tech- 
nological operation begin done by a separate machine. Manual 
labor is minimized, but with increased investment. 
* In 1974, research groups, headed by Senior Scientist Vassil 
Peev, created an universal machine MNE accomplishing all 
operations with a high level of automatization. During 
1975-85, the machine is continuously improved, up to the 
last model MNE 06M. 
* In 1988, we expect to start a computer-managed machine. 
On point 2, after long investigations, a new coating has been 
tested on the furnaces at the Iron and Steel Works L. Breznev. 
The new product is based on a nickel-iron alloy of aluminum and 
is expected to appear on the market in the second half of 1987. 
The new coating ensure a 60% higher effectiveness, and we hope to 
overcome the market fluctuation of the 1980's. 
During the development of the technology to produce protec- 
tive coatings and the use of protected electrodes, we gathered 
important experience on some details that were then developed as 
separate technologies. They are as follows: 
1. We utilized the experience from the electric arc treatment 
to develop direct current heating in metallurgy. This re- 
sulted in the creation of a ladle-furnace unit with direct 
current having important metallurgical applications. 
2. Relating to the coating, we accomplished improved construc- 
tion elements for current contact clamps for electric fur- 
naces. For this, our enterprise has a good market among 
steel producers. 
3. Regarding the normal operation of the contact between pro- 
tected electrode and contact clamp, we created an "air cush- 
ion" sealing device to have the furnace gas exit through 
electrode holes. This resolves environmental problems in 
steel plants, and steel producers are very interested in 
this product. "Electrotermia" has gone on the market. 
4. We produce by-products of waste electrodes on a large-scale 
for the market. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INVENTION 
The research work to create protective coating began in 
1958. A small laboratory, consisting of one engineer and three 
technicians and headed by Eng. Al. Valchev, was organized in the 
Iron and Steel Works Lenin-Pernik. After the first coating Kas 
developed, a pilot plant with 4 workers was formed for the ex- 
perimental production of coatings. 
After one successful testing and commissioning, the group 
enlarged its operation on the frame of the entire steel industry 
and covered also the foundries in the machine construction in- 
dustry. For this goal in 1970, a management decision was made to 
form a "Protective Coating Department" at the Iron and Steel 
Research Institute, Sofia, consisting of 4 engineers and 8 tech- 
nicians. A production plant for coated electrodes was built up 
in the L. Breznev works. Its intention was to cover the entire 
Bulgarian market and to produce coated electrodes for industrial 
tests to realize them on the international market. As the depart- 
ment's activities enlarged in many branches (technology, electri- 
city, machine construction, industrial production, and foreign 
trade), a natural need arose to form an independent organization, 
and in 1975, the Research and Industrial Enterprise "Electroter- 
mia" was created. It accomplishes: 
Research activities, 
Projects for protective coating plants, 
Projects and production of equipment for protective coatings, 
Delivery, installation, and start of equipment, 
Operational staff training, 
Tests to demonstrate economic efficiency, 
Training of the staff to serve the coating introduction in 
steel works, 
Complementary specialized activities. 
The trade activity is performed by a specialized trade or- 
ganization for license deals on a commission basis. The invention 
break-through on the international market is being done under 
conditions of competition with large companies-producers of elec- 
trodes. We have to consider our foreign trade policy and techni- 
cal issues in view of this situation. That is why they both act 
as a self-formed engineering organization; although formed by two 
enterprises, it works in common on the specific conditions of the 
international market. 
The invention realization is done principally by license 
sales of the method and by equipment delivery for protective 
coatings. Chronologically, the invention has been realized abroad 
as follows: 
United Kingdom (1970) 
Federal Republic of Germany (1975) 
USSR (1976) 
Sweden (1977) 
Czechoslovakia (1978) 
Canada (1980) 
Spain (1981) 
Austria (1982) 
France (1983) 
Benelux (1984) 
USA (start in 1985) 
Japan (start in 1987) 
LIFE CYCLE OF THE METHOD 
In our case, it can be described by performance as the Bul- 
garian production of coated electrodes domestically (see Figure 
5) and abroad (Figure 6) as well as by the effectiveness of the 
market realization (see Figure 7). 
It can be seen that in general the market penetration follows 
the S-curve. If we look at Figure 5 for Bulgarian production, we 
shall see only the initial trend of the stages "introduction" and 
"growth." But this is a totally covered market, and every elec- 
tric steel plant is included immediately as that is determined by 
the central planning of the national economy. 
For the world market (see Figure 6), we expect the aluminum- 
silicon coating to reach the saturation phase in 1988. Simul- 
taneously, the development of the new iron-nickel-aluminum coating 
begins. Taking into account its greater efficiency and the well- 
treated market for coated electrodes, we expect to shorten the 
phase of rapid growth and to reach saturation in 1996. So we now 
have a double S-curve for the relative effectiveness, as the 
second one is forecast for the new product (see Figure 7). 
If the expertise establishes that the aluminum matrix has ex- 
hausted its potential, we are planning to search for new ways and 
methods to create products capable of staying on the market. 
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2.7. SESSION TWO DISCUSSION (Excerpts) 
Ayres: The latter part of Prof. Goldberg's talk was focusing 
fairly strongly on the uses of technological forecasting, 
although he did not use that phrase. I am reminded of the 
recent book, which perhaps you have seen, called Innovation: 
The Attacker's Advantage. This book contains many examples 
of the benefits of guessing right as to when a new technol- 
ogy is ready for adoption and when the old technology is 
reaching its saturation or its mature phase. However, the 
methodology of actually determining this is relegated to an 
appendix and very little is said about it. In the case of 
the steel industry, are you aware of any formal efforts to 
forecast steel production technologies, to compile measures 
of efficiency and forecast them? 
Goldberg: Yes, a number of such efforts have been done. Prof. 
Acs could be most capable in giving you some and as could 
Dr. Anderson or Prof. Rosegger. There are a certain number 
of things, for example, many prototypes and developments are 
being practiced. The GDR has been pioneering, as Sweden has 
been, with slightly different technologies in plasma steel- 
making. In the GDR, there is a plasma steel plant in opera- 
tion in a Socialist country, which would nullify any preju- 
dice against this type of technology in an old, maturing 
industry in Socialist countries. In Sweden, there are three 
different approaches, which means the standard for the in- 
dustry has not been shaken out yet. But this is definitely 
one methodology which is forthcoming, and you should not 
forget the electro as you saw in Dr. Nakicenovic's tables 
yesterday. The electro steel is not new. but it has under- 
gone many drastic improvements over the last years, and it 
is the fastest growing new technology which is coming forth. 
Anderson: I think your question is really the old exercise. I 
think the United Nations had years ago a conference in Warsaw 
where they tried that. We have tried that among the members 
of the International Iron and Steel Institute, where we ask 
what they think will be the main processes for steel-making 
in year 2000, 2050, in a sort of Delphi exercise. It does 
not work. I find that the steel engineers are perhaps more 
conservative than others. In fact, if I ask them and I have 
to make studies on future raw materials requirements, I am 
entirely dependent on the vision of what the shelf electric 
furnaces and DRI and blast furnaces will be. Even over the 
normal planning horizon in the steel industry, which is 
between 5  and 1 5  years, depending on the country, I do not 
get a clear answer. It is very difficult to get some com- 
petent people to express a view and really make some tech- 
nological forecasting in the sense that you are looking for. 
Danielsson: I was involved in the development of the Caldo pro- 
cess, and everybody remembers some of this. It is a rotating 
vessel. As you all know, it was a failure. So why? I was 
coming to some conclusion that leads into what you said. We 
had a very good starting point. We had a market demand for 
better steel. The basic Bessemer, which was dominating at 
this plant at that time, was not good enough, too much nitro- 
gen, too much phosphates. We needed low cost. We took the 
liquid steel from one vessel to another. We had a problem 
with the environment of course. We wanted to use the high 
phosphorus ore available in that place. 
So all of this resulted in the Chief Executive Officer of the 
company being very interested, the Chief Operating Officer of 
steel was very positive, and we had a fellow called Calding, 
who was the inventor of this. "Caldo" stands for Calding 
and Donner. So we got a process, Calding heated up those 
rotating things, and we had money. This is important. We 
had made a lot of preliminary experiments, started on a 
small scale, and so on, and developed the whole thing. Why 
did it become then a failure? First of all, the cost was 
too high. It did not give better steel or gave just as good 
steel as open-hearth. It was too hot, I would say. Second- 
ly, we did not take a multiple view. If we had investigated 
what would be the future of iron ore, for example, we could 
have known at that time that phosphorus ore is out. 
Ballance: I was interested in Prof. Coldberg's orientation. I 
know at least from the U.S. steel industry that the attitude 
of management until fairly recently has been: "We make the 
steel, you make the cars, leave us alone and we will do our 
business." That of course is changing to some extent now, 
partially because of Japanese ownership as well as the crisis 
itself. But I think that if we think about it in the context 
of a life cycle, steel firms have passed through a crisis. 
In terms of life cycle, the embryonic stage is equally a 
crisis in any industry. The percentage of failures is going 
to be very high. Looking at other industries, not being 
particularly a steel economist, I see that some of the domi- 
nant characteristics in the embryonic stage are a large 
activity of inter-firm collaboration. Vendors may coalesce 
for an installation in the case of automated equipment and 
immediately disperse. This type of collaboration is repeated 
from time to time. The limited literature I have seen on the 
earlier years of BOF suggest that there might have been 
similar instances in that case, albeit often personal con- 
tacts. When we document or attempt to document the life 
cycle in other industries, we often look at that. 
One question I have is: Is such a procedure practical or 
would it be relevant in the case of steel, various steel 
technologies? Could it give us a more definitive history of 
the life cycle, if practical? Another dimension, I think, 
is the role of government procurement. At least in the 
Western European steel industries, state ownership was domi- 
nant particularly 15-20 years ago, and remains dominant 
today. In the industries that UNIDO is looking at today, in 
the early stages or in the crisis stages, the government is 
almost always a dominant buyer and also a heavy supporter, 
albeit not through protectionist measures, mainly because 
government officials do not know which technologies to pro- 
tect, but they favor certain ones. Again this could be 
another characteristic in general that could fit into a 
documentation of the life cycle. 
Well, my main question is are such features relevant coming 
from an economist who is not a steel economist? One personal 
query I have, you mentioned that the steel industry is often 
more labor-intensive than it is capital-intensive. Again, I 
may be laboring under false assumptions or false limits of 
measurement, but I come up with the other version when I 
look at my own figures. Are you thinking for example in the 
product specific sense, rather than in an industry-wide 
sense? 
Rosegger: I think it would be very useful to distinguish between 
the notion of capital intensity or labor intensity, which is 
of course a theoretical notion having to do with factor 
proportions in a timeless world, and what I would like to 
think of as factor dominance, which is which input really 
fits the pace of what goes on in a steel plant. There, of 
course, quite in contrast to, let's say, an automotive as- 
sembly plant or some other manufacturing plant, the pace is 
clearly not set by the capital equipment, in part because we 
are dealing with a batch process whose lead and lag times 
are clearly determined by labor and in part because the very 
technology embodied in that capital equipment militates 
against its setting the pace. 
The other point I think we very often overlook unless we 
acquaint ourselves with a given industry is that there is 
much more flexibility in the amount of labor and the amount 
of capital that goes into a plant from the very moment when 
the first hole is being dug in the ground. I have argued 
that for a long time, particularly with respect to industrial 
plants in less developed countries where of course the ap- 
propriate technology question rears its head again and again. 
The example also says that even if you have a very modern, 
apparently very highly capital intensive plant, when it is 
constructed in a country in which labor is plentiful before 
you even produce the first product or unit of product, that 
plant already contains 3, 4 or 5 times as much labor as it 
would contain if it had been constructed in a country in 
which labor is very expensive. So there is an awful lot 
more flexibility there than we economists teach about or 
talk about when we draw our neat diagrams of factor propor- 
tions. 
Anderson: I shall draw attention to the differences between 
different types of economies and between economies in dif- 
ferent atages of growth. What I want to do is just briefly 
speak more about the product, steel. There are many reasons 
which I have mentioned already that lead to structural change 
in the economy and the service economy perhaps, and satura- 
tion for consumer durables, decline in the investment share, 
and so forth. 
But one other point we should not forget is of course the 
replacement of steel by other materials. I have over the 
last 30 years tried to study this subject and find out also 
for forecasting purposes what is the actual impact, and I 
have failed each time. 
We are now doing another attempt of this sort, where in 
general terms we want to find out how much higher would 
steel consumption have been had it not been for the use of 
plastics, aluminum and other new materials. This time we 
have tried a trick with the help of some very ingenious 
engineers where we have taken sector consumption of steel, 
aluminum, plastics, wood, and cement, and have recalculated 
the figures from tons onto a strength-weight index and a 
stiffness-weight index. That means that theoretically you 
can then add up the total consumption of these materials in 
a given sector. Then we have compared the development of 
the material used between two years, 1973 and 1983. 
Now if I really had confidence in these figures, which I do 
not, you could finally calculate how much steel has been 
replaced by other materials, but I have refrained from doing 
that because I think it is very misleading. We have looked 
at the key consumption sectors for steel for countries like 
Australia, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United 
States. As everybody knows, to come by sector consumption 
data for steel or any other material is already difficult, so 
there are lots of estimates in there. We have not published 
this yet; it might still take some time because we have to 
do a lot of work on it. We have looked at the sectors in- 
dustrial machinery, electrical machinery, ship building, 
transport equipment, sometimes we have the automobile in- 
dustry separately, packaging, household articles, and of 
course the big construction sector. 
For instance, let's take transport equipment. This is the 
sector where I am really concerned that some new technologies 
or products could be almost lethal to a great part of the 
steel industry. Let's look at an important automobile pro- 
ducing country like Italy: the total sector consumption for 
automobiles is steel, aluminum and plastics (for other coun- 
tries some timber products as well). In Italy, steel ac- 
counted in 1973 for 95% of the total material input, and in 
1983, 10 years later, it was still 90%. In Japan, the change 
went from 87.7% (1973) to 86.3%. Aluminum has increased its 
share from 3.5% in Japan to 6.6% and plastics from 2.7% to 
3.9%. In the United Kingdom, the share of steel has gone 
down from roughly 78% to about 76%, aluminum has funnily 
enough decreased in the United Kingdom, but plastics have 
increased their share from 2.5% to 5.3%. 
In the United States, now there I have the whole of the 
transport sector (we could not get data for the automobile 
industry separately for all the consumptions). Steel there 
accounted in 1973 for 80% and in 1983 for 86.5%; plastics 
have gone up from 2.6% to 4.2%, aluminum from 6.6 to 8%. 
Now of course in the United States for instance, where one 
of the main effects on steel use was the down-sizing of the 
automobile, it is clear that steel (the main material) is 
more affected because it accounts for 80 or 60 or 70% of the 
total than another material like plastics or aluminum which 
accounts for a smaller share of the total. 
What I want to say is that although steel is affected very 
much by the competition from new materials, it still remains 
the main material in the key sectors like automobile. It 
will take another product life cycle break-through before it 
will go away. So far, and I hope at least for my lifetime 
or the time I will be connected with the industry, steel 
will hold out for quite a while. 
In other sectors like packaging, of course, the share of 
steel is much smaller. The impact of aluminum, plastics, and 
glass has been considerable. But there is a constant fight 
there, and steel is coming back. For instance in Canada, the 
steel can for beverages has come back because the steel 
industry has participated in the re-tooling costs of the 
can-makers and has introduced a connecting system for steel 
beer cans or other beverage cans as have the aluminum people. 
So very often it means that the industry must develop new 
strategies in order to keep a market share. In other sectors 
like machinery, steel is unchallenged. Of course, in office 
machinery, plastics and aluminum are advancing very much, 
but in any type of heavy machinery, of course, steel is 
really defending its position very well. If its share, 
weight-wise being equal, the strength-weight index or stiff- 
ness-weight index goes down sometimes, the reason for that is 
that steel is its worst enemy because weight-wise it in- 
creases its service properties very much. 
I was surprised to hear Prof. Rosegger say that one of the 
reasons why his share of hot metal in BOF in the United 
States was going up was these take-or-pay contracts. Now I 
am surprised to hear that because the only one 1 knew for 
iron ore was the unfortunate involvement of British Steel 
Corporation Fire Lake. Most of the coal for the US steel 
industry comes out of their own mines. It is not good enough 
just to look at what we call direct steel consumption, that 
is the steel consumption of steel production plus direct 
imports, minus direct exports. Much better results are 
obtained, also for the United States, if include indirect 
trade in steel, that is to say the import of steel-containing 
manufactured goods, is included. The correlation then be- 
comes much closer. 
As GNP has all sorts of odd things in it, if anybody wants to 
venture again to make forecasts for steel requirements in the 
future, he had better look, if he can and if he has good 
data, at the future development of growth fixed capital 
information. 
Goldberg: When preparing Iron and Steel, I asked Volvo, which 
had just presented its experimental car 2000, the car of the 
future, if I could use their figures on steel consumption 
because it would have been a technological forecast of the 
time. Unfortunately, despite my life cycle involvement in 
Volvo, they refused so I had to use Mercedes. The then- 
president of Mercedes said the presentation of the 190 model 
was the greatest technological achievement in the history of 
Mercedes. By ordinary production or construction methods, 
the car would have been 365 kg heavier than it actually was, 
so it was a quantum leap. This may not be reflected in your 
figures because the 190 arrived in approximately 1983. In 
the case of the Volvo car, it of course would be still a more 
substantial reduction. 
This brings me to another example, since you refer to sub- 
stitution material which I think is very important. Essen- 
tially my metaphor for this was to look at the alternatives. 
One of the most striking examples of life cycles (and not 
life cycles) is satellites versus cable for message transmis- 
sion. The satellites had already paid off the cost of re- 
duced transmission costs by 1969. But by 1976, cable had re- 
gained its competitive situation. It was breaking even with 
the satellite transmission, and presently one cable is being 
placed into the ocean between Europe and United States. 
This was something which would have appeared illogical in the 
satellite development. This is still the old generation, but 
heavily improved for example by going to digital and reducing 
the need of amplifiers along the cable. The next generation 
of cable is almost unbeatable for the satellite. It is opti- 
cal. It will only need one amplifier station on each side 
and use the combination of optical and digital technology. 
Now I must say something different, in connection with what 
Prof. Lynn referred to, the Japanese. We are in a kind of 
collective aging, and he is hoping that the Japanese will be 
aging collectively. One of the problems of the steel in- 
dustry in the West has been that the International Iron and 
Steel Institute has been so excellent in showing the trends 
of the future, so that the industry has had no reason to look 
elsewhere. 
Anderson: Small companies, these mini-plants or market mills, 
really only became possible through the development of con- 
tinuous casting. The great obstacle had been that it was 
only economic to roll semi's in mills over 1,000,000 or 
2,000,000 tons. When the small continuous, the first verti- 
cal continuous caster, came with a capacity of 120,000 tons, 
that was the great break-through for the mini-mill. 
Of course, there is a relationship between the size of the 
plant and the size of the market. For a long while, many 
mills were in the business of rolling reinforcing rods and 
bars for a relatively scattered market. It was a niche that 
they had discovered. They had a limited number of products, 
and they could produce that in a batch size that was econo- 
mic. They had, furthermore, the great advantage of having a 
very small and short command structure. These plants were 
operated by 60-80 people and were very flexible. They then 
profited from the general improvement in productivity of the 
electric arc furnace in the introduction of water-cooled 
panels and also from the fact that they came into a period 
where scrap started to become much less expensive than it 
had been early on. This was because we had been assuming a 
rapid growth of steel-consuming industries providing prompt 
industrial scrap and also based on past experience of steel 
consumption (10, 1 5  years ago), where through rising living 
standards more and more steel containing manufacturing goods 
were scraped and became available for remelting. 
Now, of course, the mini-mill is changing. First of all, 
they have all been growing and that is one of their pro- 
blems. In fact some have became too big, have also gone into 
equipment making, and gotten into some financial troubles. 
But they are all growing. They are growing 1 million tons, 
1 . 5  million tons, and now they are attacking the flat pro- 
duct. Another technological break-through is the casting of 
thin slabs, which is now starting. That means that they can 
go on to the flat product sector. But again I believe there 
is a strict relationship between the scale of operation and 
the scale of consumption. 
The hot-white strip mill was invented because there was a 
belt conveyor and there was a large-scale press shop in the 
automobile industry. 
Maly: One of the MTL hypotheses is that good management with 
certain features is one of the main preconditions of high 
innovativeness of the company. The problem is that if, for 
instance, Japanese companies had at that time almost similar 
conditions for the innovativeness in BOF technology, why was 
a company like Kawasaki with very good management, very 
young people in top management, with technological back- 
grounds, and so on, one of the last companies which adopted 
BOF in Japan. What was the reason why Kawasaki was one of 
the last companies? 
Lynn: I think the case of Kawasaki is very interesting and per- 
haps instructive. This was one of the fastest growing Japan- 
ese steel companies, which picked up in market share during 
this period. It was headed through most of the years after 
World War I1 until the early 1970's by a prize-winning steel 
engineer, an open hearth engineer in fact. As indicated, 
this was the last of the major Japanese companies to intro- 
duce the basic oxygen furnace. What lesson did I draw from 
that? 
From my interviews, it seemed clear that Kawasaki was almost 
a one-man company in a sense, despite the size of this enter- 
prise. It was headed by a brilliant open hearth engineer, 
and at that time Kawasaki may have had the best open hearths 
around, who saw huge possibilities for improving the open 
hearth. I think he committed his company to realizing those 
improvements and perhaps looked down on other technologies. 
In fact, the people I talked to remember him making very dis- 
paraging remarks about the basic oxygen process at the time, 
that it was sort of a glorified Bessemer convertor and he 
did not really want to have much to do with it. It strikes 
me that the bigger lesson from that story relates to where 
you want technological expertise in an organization. 
It seemed to me with the limited number of cases I have 
looked at that if you have your technical expertise at the 
very top, there is always a hazard of engineers committing 
themselves and their firms to the technology they know best. 
If you have engineers too low, perhaps the company does not 
make any rational technical choice. At some level in between 
you perhaps have a management that can draw on the expertise 
of engineers and perhaps can draw on the expertise of various 
engineers who have various knowledges. 
This had struck me as what happened at the first of the 
Japanese companies to introduce the basic oxygen process. 
They had engineers very near the top, but not g& the top. 
Ayres: What you have just said suggests another interesting 
aspect of the life cycle which I did not talk about yester- 
day: the apparent differences in the role of engineers, 
scientists, pure managers, financial people, lawyers, and so 
on at different stages. There certainly does seem to be 
quite a lot of anecdotal evidence that in the early stages 
of the life cycle of a new innovative product, the managers 
are likely to be technical people. That is very much the 
case today in the semi-conductor and the computer industry. 
But later on, for various reasons which we might talk about, 
somehow the role of the engineers and the scientists seems to 
become diminished and the role of the pure managers, the 
financial people, the marketing people, and eventually law- 
yers somehow get involved in the late stages. I find that 
one of the most interesting characteristics of this life 
cycle. 
Lynn: I would like to make one cautioning comment with respect to 
the technology we are talking about and those remarks. That 
is, in steel you have got several different technologies. 
The basic oxygen process is for steel-making, and there are 
iron-making technologies and rolling technologies, etc. I 
am not sure when you have a situation like that with es- 
tablished companies and perhaps some new product life cycles 
beginning as others may be ending or you may be in different 
phases of different ones. I am not sure how one would expect 
the rise of engineers to progress with regard to that, whe- 
ther the balance of the technologies, whether the technology 
if you aggregate steel-making, iron-making, and everything 
becomes important or not. It seems to me it becomes very 
complicated. 
Haustein: A Greek philosopher was the first to look at the world 
development in cycles instead of a simple linear way of 
thinking. You spoke about two metrics of time. One was the 
Newtonian, if I may say so, and the other one was the rather 
socio-cultural one. But we should be aware also that there 
exists a third metric, the historical one, a qualitatively 
different time we should also be aware of. 
I have two questions to Dr. De Bresson. The first is the 
following. I read very carefully your paper, and it was 
very interesting and helpful for me. You spoke about the 
proportions and the changes between custom production, batch 
production, and mass production. 
In our country, we had statistics for the metal-working 
industry. In terms of processing time, there was shown the 
proportions of batch production, of custom production, and 
of mass production. Interestingly enough, these proportions 
did not change over a long time in the past in our country. 
I suppose that the same was true for other countries. I 
think the Americans have also such kind of statistics of 
batch production. 
Well, but now the question is the following. What will be 
in the future? I mean, you have shown that in the micro- 
sphere, we will have very fast changes between these modes 
of production. But what will be on the aggregate level? 
Will it be the same stability as it was in the past or not? 
The second question is how do you measure economies of scope? 
De Bresson: I was using the concept first of all in reply to 
Prof. Rosegger of a stock of know-how in relationship to an 
industry in operation. I think there is no difficulty if you 
are using the technology to conceive basically that what you 
learn, you do not forget, and use innovations as indicators 
of stocks. Because they are sold and continuously on the 
market, it means that basically you are keeping alive your 
knowledge. 
I just think that it is important to conceive that there are 
cases when you have people with trade skills that basically 
humans can forget and individuals move on. But remember 
that we are animals with memories, we have museums, we have 
books. Even the mummification techniques, although they are 
a very delicate combination of skills that the Egyptians 
had, it seems that we are able to revive at least a pretty 
approximate substitute of them, although the skill, the 
basic skill, has eluded us. So I think that if we are going 
to conceive of know-how either as a flow variable or a stock, 
we have to clearly put it as a stock. That is the only point 
I was trying to make. 
My example about steel may be wrong, and I prefaced by saying 
I know nothing of it. It is true that there are examples of 
a diffusion with the technology not changing much. There 
are a few in my reading of economic history; they are probab- 
ly rarer than the ones that change. There are probably 
factors of diffusion of innovation technologies which are 
stable, which are the standard economic or other type. Even 
if my example is wrong, I could find another one which is 
right. 
What I am trying to point is methodologically in a human 
investigation in the social sciences, you want a theory 
which you can go from backcasting to forecasting, where you 
can go from an ex-post argument to an ex-anti argument, 
where you can have some useful information to try and guide 
the span of choices. 
A way, I think, of going about this is to say ok, we had an 
oxygen-producing technology, which allows us to try this 
process. It starts up in 1952, then you have got a number of 
problems, the pollution, the refractory technique, a number 
of problems. 
Then you can reason strocastically, in other words, condition 
probability. IF you solve the pollution problem, THEN there 
are a number of opportunities of adoption possible. So you 
have a conditional probability model that, having identified 
the obstacle, the technical constraints, you can say yes, if 
we solve these problems, we might get to a type of a S-curve. 
But there are techniques that never take off (and there are 
many examples in history) because there are blockages, where 
the sustaining technique is not available and therefore you 
cannot proceed until much later. 
I was interested (this is to reply to the question of custom, 
batch and line) in Woodward's work in 1959, in her examina- 
tion of southeast England. She found that 60% of all produc- 
tion was done custom or batch. There are no statistics in 
the US as to scale of production. There is word going around 
amongst engineers that 70% of US production is done in runs 
of less than 100. My hunch is that this is a fairly univer- 
sal phenomenon, that we have been obsessed with this image 
of Adam Smith and the pin factory. It seems that there is 
good reason, if you think of industry as a conflict-coopera- 
tion area, that you can have people working in the high 
margins, custom aspects, but not really in frontal conflict 
with the line producer, and that you can have people going 
for a segment of the market, a specialized niche or batch, 
and there can be co-existence. 
I see the custom manufacturer as reaping what has been called 
economics of specialization. You want something that fits 
exactly the need of somebody. There is no real cost competi- 
tion; there is a performance, purely performance, competi- 
tion. They coexist with people who are trying to reap econo- 
mies of scope and variations, product variations, and other 
people who are more specialized in the mass production lines 
where there are cost reductions. 
It would be interesting to rebuild our understanding of equi- 
librium because it is true that some people react to just 
price. There are equilibration phenomena in economics with 
a typology which might extend for much further than these 
three types, which by the way, I take from Woodward in econ- 
omic history. I have no idea where it is going to go. My 
sense is that, and this is just purely speculation, as the 
part of work which is design-conception increases, the more 
and more the speed of technical opportunities and innovative 
opportunities increases, that that would mitigate in favor 
of getting more flexibility and not locking oneself into 
line production. 
I think this major problem, which is the object of another 
TES project, is can one combine flexibility and scale econo- 
mies, can one create this CAD/CAM. There are very few cases 
of combination of CAD/CAM that I know of as of 1982.  I have 
heard that IIASA's CIM project has gathered quite a few case 
of computer-integrated manufacturing. But can one ally the 
flexibility of product variation with economies of scale? 
If we manage that, it would be extraordinary. 
REMARKS (excerpted from Session Two Discussion) 
Prof. L. Lynn 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA 
I would like to say a few words regarding some research I 
did which seems to bear on the topic of national comparisons. 
The piece of research I did compared the introduction of the Basic 
Oxygen Process by the Japanese and the Americans and was based 
largely on interviews of individuals who were involved in those 
processes. I think some of the things I encountered relate both 
to some of the remarks Prof. Coldberg made this morning regarding 
information scanning and some of the things that management does 
when it comes searching for solutions or adapting to changes in 
the environment. I think they relate as well to some of the 
things Prof. Rosegger mentioned regarding systems and the need to 
look in a broader sense at the systems in which management may be 
imbedded as well as the technical systems. 
The specific question I was interested in was the one that 
seems to have been raised as well in the United States, that 
American managers seem to perform rather less well than the Japan- 
ese when it came to identifying the basic oxygen process as a 
technology that ought to be adopted. One could get into a rather 
technical discussion of really demonstrating that. But one in- 
dicator to me was that in a period in the late 1950's, when there 
was some reasonable choice apparently, when steel firms around 
the world were still using open-hearth, that it had not been fully 
demonstrated that that was not necessarily the best or the worst 
(or less desirable) way to go. In that period, the American in- 
dustry was still building a large number of steel plants, as were 
the Japanese. But in that period in the late 1950'9, the Japanese 
chose the basic oxygen process about two thirds of the time, the 
Americans about one fourth of the time. So one of the things I 
was interested in was how does one account for that? Of course 
there are some economic factors and some adjustments which would 
be necessary, but this was dealing with plants that were in- 
tegrated plants, that had blast furnaces, and so some of the 
obvious reasons were controlled for. 
The conclusion I reached was that the Japanese were, partly 
imbedded in a system and partly because of management styles, much 
better at reducing some of the uncertainty surrounding the new 
technology, of coming to a sense that they understood what the 
problems were and where the solutions might lie. Now some of 
that relates, as I said before, to the system they were imbedded 
in, some of it relates to the management itself, as I interpret 
it. Some of these factors are not necessarily still in place 
today. Times have changed since the 1950's. But I'd like to just 
mention some of the institutions involved and then mention some 
of the management differences that I noted in talking to people. 
One fairly obvious starting point in looking at an industry 
and making national comparisons is the role of government. MITI, 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, has received a 
lot of attention in the West as a sort of omniscient body watching 
over industrial policy. In the case of the basic oxygen furnace, 
this was one instance where MITI did seem to be remarkably percep- 
tive. They were not always so, but in this case, they did seem 
to be. They had remarkable expertise in-house. Some of the 
outstanding metallurgical engineers in Japan at the time were in 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. One thing they 
had then that they don't have now was control over Japanese for- 
eign exchange, which gave them the right to some extent to monitor 
technologies that were being imported into Japan. Basically, 
firms that wanted to buy a foreign technology such as the basic 
oxygen furnace had to go to MITI and get permission. That is 
where the expertise became very important, because if they had had 
incompetent people there, it is hard to say what would have hap- 
pened. 
One of the things that MITI did for the industry was that it 
encouraged the various firms in Japan interested in the new tech- 
nology to find out everything they could about it, and then when 
it came to the point when these firms might have been competing 
against each other and thereby bid up the price to buy the tech- 
nology, MITI quickly stepped in and said only one firm can go to 
Austria to purchase the technology. So only one firm would be 
the conduit, the window as they called it, for this technology. 
On the other hand, all firms in Japan that wanted to use the 
technology would be allowed to do so on an almost equal footing, 
so the advantage of presenting the technology quickly and going 
to Japan was that one had a little more direct contact with the 
Austrians and could find out more about it, but no firm in Japan 
could be kept from using the technology and the price of the 
technology was the same to all of them, the per-ton royalties 
that each paid were the same. 
The Japanese had a complex arrangement where they paid a 
lump sum for the technology, $1,000,000 or so, a relatively small 
sum, and then they divided that up on a lump sum basis, based on 
how much each of the steel firms had used the technology, so that 
it cost perhaps half a cent per ton for them to use. So this is 
one area in which a government institution was involved and faci- 
litated the introduction of the technology and again facilitated 
the diffusion of the technology within the industry. The result 
was within 5 years of the first basic oxygen furnace in Japan, 
all of the integrated steel-makers in Japan had basic oxygen 
furnaces and were competing, yet were also sharing information in 
strategic ways. 
Another point is related to the suppliers, not so much the 
customers as was mentioned earlier, but the suppliers. There 
were some rather interesting differences as well in how the sup- 
pliers in the Japanese steel industry helped with the reduction 
of uncertainty that facilitated decisions to use this new technol- 
ogy. One type of vendor of a sort was the vendors of information, 
the general trading companies of Japan, which going back to the 
1920's had subsidiary companies in Europe, specifically set up to 
scan a technology, to purchase it, and to bring it back to Japan. 
Even in the post-war years when they were constrained in their 
activities, they had metallurgical engineers in Europe watching 
technological developments. One result was that around two years 
before the first Alpine BOF was established, the Japanese already 
had considerable information on the technology, and they had 
teams coming over to Europe before the technology was actually 
implemented. So they had very extensive information at an early 
point from an organization of a sort that does not even exist in 
the United States, general trading companies. 
Another role of suppliers in which the structure was somewhat 
different concerns the suppliers of refractory brick. In the 
case of the United States, the suppliers of refractory brick 
supplied all the firms in the industry and were not trusted by 
any of the firms for fear that any sharing of information would 
be conveyed to their competitors. So the American steel-makers 
who were considering adoption of the BOF had some difficulty 
running a pilot plant or other experiments, because they did not 
want the refractory suppliers to know what they were doing. In 
the case of Japan, the suppliers of refractory brick were closely 
linked and indeed capitalized by the major steel-makers, and so 
it was quite easy for them to be invited in to work with the 
steel-makers to develop brick or to find out indeed if the brick 
could be developed. 
Another key component of the technology was the lamps, the 
piping that blows the oxygen into the steel. In the case of the 
Japanese, a joint venture was formed between a major steel company 
and an engineering company that produced this equipment, so again 
they were able to experiment with things such as the multi-hole 
lens, which blew out several streams of oxygen and made it easier 
to build larger BOF's than had been done in the past. This again 
is another example. Other things could be mentioned relating to 
the vessel and other parts of equipment used where the vendors in 
Japan were more closely linked to the steel companies themselves, 
and the steel companies themselves did more research on their own 
than process development, which seems to have facilitated the 
introduction of the process. 
Another kind of systemic organization in Japan which might be 
mentioned is the trade association. The Japanese received some 
aid from such organizations as the Japan Iron and Steel Federation 
and the Japan Iron and Steel Institute. These organizations 
collected literature from around the world and produced Japanese 
language abstracts of technical articles, often within weeks of 
the time they were published. So the Japanese could get articles 
from "Stahl und Eisen," even people who could not read German or 
any other foreign language. Engineers could conduct this type of 
technical research very easily in Japan, and this was not the 
case in the United States. 
Indeed, when I was doing summer research about 10 years ago, 
I was going to the data rooms of the Japan Iron and Steel In- 
stitute just about every day, and at that time they were install- 
ing computers and new data sets, whereas when I came back to the 
United States, I discovered that almost at exactly the same time 
this was happening, the American Iron and Steel Institute was 
disassembling its data room in New York. It was selling off the 
books from their library. So there is this kind of difference in 
the service ~rovided. Some of it was related to American anti- 
r 
trust laws, I suppose, in terms of what can collectively be done 
without some concerns of legal action being taken. 
I have mentioned these systemic things that were quite dif- 
ferent in the two systems. Some of them have changed. MITI no 
longer has that kind of centralized control over foreign exchange. 
Some of these things are not quite the same now, but many of them 
do continue substantially as before. Within the firm, I think one 
could go through all the things Prof. Goldberg mentioned. In- 
dividual life cycles where the Japanese in the 1950's were quite 
young executives, division managers in their 30's, something that 
would be much less true today. One could talk about many other 
life cycles involved, some of which have changed. But two things 
struck me as being significant. 
One relates again to information collection. Something that 
was constantly mentioned to me by executives in the American 
industry where, particularly in the 1950's and 60's, they were 
just astounded at how the Japanese would come visit their plants, 
typically in a team of 5 or 6 ;  two things especially impressed 
them. One was that these Japanese were not vice presidents. The 
Americans were telling me at the time (this has changed a bit too) 
that only Americans at the most senior level would get a trip to 
Japan or Europe because that was considered something of a benefit 
rather than true information collection. The second thing was 
that these teams of operating engineers who came through would 
never repeat the same questions, that somehow there was organiza- 
tional learning to the extent that if a group asked you something 
6 months ago, the next group that came through already knew the 
answers and did not repeat the question, but asked something new. 
I've seen reports that were written by Japanese and circulated 
about their views of various steel plants in the United States or 
Europe and the comments they made; that information is quite well 
distributed in Japan. 
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Prof. Evka Razvigorova 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the successful implementation, development and exploita- 
tion of technologies, certain organizational and managerial condi- 
tions should be created. How a company can increase its ability 
to change and how managers are able to manage change, especially 
technological change, are very important for creating these condi- 
tions. The impact of technological change in an organization is 
usually very broad, complex, and integrative. The more companies 
are able to cope with this change, the less any inhibiting factors 
play a role in the process. 
The life cycle concept can be useful in explaining tech- 
nological change. A better understanding of the characteristics 
of the technology life cycle and of the relation of management 
systems to different life cycle phases will help to identify the 
managerial and organizational conditions necessary to manage tech- 
nological change. 
Change can be defined as the introduction or adoption of new 
conditions or relations within or without an organization. Tech- 
nological change occurs when a new technology is adopted by a com- 
pany or when existing technology is improved or modified. 
Changes can be radical (revolutionary) or evolutionary. 
Revolutionary changes occur when basic innovations are introduced; 
evolutionary changes take place when a technology develops in the 
course of its exploitation. From this point of view, changes and 
transition periods between different life cycle phases are evolu- 
tionary changes. Technological changes correspond to management 
and organizational changes. This is of course known to management 
scientists, but regularities of this correspondence have not yet 
been deeply studied. How does management change when technology 
changes, to what extent are changing management features related 
to different phases of the technological life cycle, and how can 
this be used as a management tool? These are some of the ques- 
tions that have not yet been fully answered. 
Management and its changes are paramount in this era of 
technology globalization and internationalization (Razvigorova, 
1986). Management can be considered one of the critical success 
factors in current technological development. Despite protective 
national strategies and trade restrictions, technologies are 
today more easily available and more rapidly diffused than two or 
three decades ago. This is due to rapid scientific diffusion, 
increased technical collaboration, and new information tech- 
nologies. The success of today's companies depends to a great 
extent on the ability of their management systems to select the 
winning technology at the appropriate time and to create or- 
ganizational conditions appropriate for its development and dif- 
fusion. Many management studies have concentrated on the inter- 
relations among technology, organization and management. 
The phases of the early innovation process (i.e., the period 
in which innovation appears) and the internal laws of innovation 
development have been studied by Schumpeter, 1939; Abernathy/Ut- 
terback, 1975; Mensch, 1979; Marchetti, 1981; Yakovitz, 1984. 
Innovations usually appear in groups, with a lag between the time 
of their appearance and that of their implementation (Marchetti, 
1981). Some researchers even assume that the discoveries or 
inventions which develop into basic innovations follow the prin- 
ciple, "first appeared, first served" (Mensch, 1979). Attempts 
have been made to answer the question to what extent the technol- 
ogy determines the management system and, if this is so, what the 
regularities are. The relations between structure and technology 
have been very carefully investigated as well (Woodward, 1958; 
Walker, 1962; Pugh/Hickson/Hennings, 1969). Their results, how- 
ever, were very contradictory. At first, a direct relationship 
between technologies and organizational structures appeared to 
exist. Later studies proved that this relationship is only in- 
direct and is due to a number of other factors which are less 
determined by specific technological features. Comparing the 
structure of companies from one branch (Goncharov/Vasko, 1983), 
researchers have proven that similar or analogous structures are 
nevertheless successful (in terms of productivity and efficiency 
in technology development) to varying degrees. 
The organizational structures and forms used by companies to 
carry out innovation activities to channel a rapid implementation 
of technologies, or to transfer and develop new technologies have 
been attracting the attention of managers and researchers for 
many years. An intensive study of contemporary forms, such as 
small industries, technological centers, or venture capital divi- 
sions, also points to this general interest. To what extent the 
organization, due to its structural type and flexibility, can 
cope with changing conditions of technological process and enhance 
efficiency has not yet been answered. There are indications 
which show that the organizational and hierarchical structures in 
current business practice can hardly fulfil contemporary tech- 
nological requirements. The way to solving organizational pro- 
blems and creating structures to promote innovation is probably 
beyond existing traditions and conventional approaches (Miles/- 
Snow, 1986). 
Empirically, it has been proven that large companies (Uhl- 
mann, 1977) usually produce basic innovations and that improve- 
ments and imitations are due to the activities of smaller com- 
panies. In real life, while there are many practical examples of 
very innovative large companies, there are also examples of large 
companies which are extremely inflexible and vice versa. 
The kinetics of internal conflicts among executives and the 
influence of leadership style on technology management have proved 
that dynamic entrepreneurs are risk-takers, consolidators, gen- 
eralists, risk-adviser controllers or excellent marketing experts 
who can best serve a company in different situations and phases 
of technological development. 
An accelerating rate of social, political and economic fac- 
tors are pressuring companies in their technological choices. 
Faced by the discontinuity of change, it is difficult for many or- 
ganizations to predict future developments in their environment. 
The integrative decisions within the company must be able to cope 
with the integrative impact of external factors. This usually 
calls for significant collaboration between marketing, production 
and R&D people and demands that today's manager be a proficient 
synthesist (Mensch, 1985). 
One of the reasons for the greatly varied results of man- 
agement studies is probably that technology management is usually 
an object of different concepts. Moreover, it is also usually the 
subject of separate organizational functions. The problems of 
managing technology are split between science and its management, 
RLD (innovation concepts), and production management. In fact, 
technology management makes it possible to examine and manage the 
entire technology life existence, from the idea generation to its 
eventual replacement by a new and more competitive technology. 
The introduction of the life cycle concept also makes it possible 
to introduce the concept of technology management. 
TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS -- THE LIFE CYCLE CONCEPT 
The study's overall concept is that the development of every 
technology is a cyclical phenomenon. Technological cycles are 
regarded as non-deterministic systems driven by causes of a cum- 
ulative nature (Sahal, 1981) and can be expressed by cumulative 
adoption curves, known aa S-shaped or logistic curves. Based on 
the metaphor of biological evolution, the life cycle concept is 
an economic theory that recognizes similar stages in the evolution 
of product technologies, industries, organizations, etc. For the 
purposes of our study, three types of life cycles are relevant: 
technology, product, and industry life cycles. 
The relation between different cycles has been the subject of 
several studies (Abernathy/Utterback, 1975; Ayres, 1987), result- 
ing in the inter-relations between product and process life cycles 
as well as organizational and technological life cycles. The 
technological life cycle is of greatest importance to this inves- 
tigation. It begins with a technology breakthrough and follows 
the life cycle of a given technology until it is replaced by a new 
and better one. The technology life cycle can be investigated on 
three different levels: world, country, and company (See Figure 
1). 
Figure 1. 
Technology can have a very broad meaning. For the purpose 
of this study, technology is regarded as a united set of methods, 
skills, knowledge, tools, and equipment to produce different 
goods, services or information. Technologies are recognized as 
existing in almost all spheres: social, management, marketing, 
etc., as well as production (hard-, soft- and orgware). Within 
the production sphere, different types of technologies can be 
recognized. 
Production technologies can be divided into process (generic) 
and product technologies. For technological development, both 
are equally important. Process or generic technologies produce 
completely new products or change, improve or more efficiently 
produce existing products. New products can also be produced 
through new combinations of already existing process technologies 
(See Figure 2). 
NEW PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES 
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FIGURE 2 
Production technologies usually change other technologies 
such as marketing, logistics, and management. Technological 
changes are integrative in nature, regardless of the field in 
which they have been applied. 
Technology management should be the main scope of analysis 
in order to study the complexity of management problems. Technol- 
ogy management takes into account the implications of accelerating 
technological and economic changes and of organizing technology 
implementation and exploration. This is a complete cycle which 
concerns a specific object of management, that of technologies 
within the system (company or country). Technology management is 
considered a field linking engineering (and other natural sciences 
which produce technologies) and management in order to plan, 
develop, and explore technological capabilities and to help com- 
panies' achieve their strategic and operational objectives (Nation- 
al Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 1987). Within the scope 
of technology management are different management functions: 
strategic planning, operational management, control (See Figure 
3 )  
MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 
Human Resources 
Strategy Information Systems 
Marketing Planning 
Investment 
Production Control 
Quality 
I I 
FIGURE 3 
Analysis of technology management makes it possible to in- 
tegrate innovation management and production management during 
different phases of technology evolution (See Figure 4). Based 
on the above concepts, the study assumes that economic and perfor- 
mance characteristics change along the technology life cycle as 
does the management system. Different management characteristics 
(strategy, structures, control, etc.) should be described in 
different phases of the life cycle, based on which management 
changes can be analyzed and defined. Management systems during 
different phases of technological life cycle, especially during 
transition periods, can be elaborated as well as differences and 
similarities. 
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To compare management and organizational features and study 
their dynamics, the S-shaped curve should be divided into phases. 
Concerning the names, numbers and boundaries of phases, eleven 
concepts have been taken into consideration. The conclusion is 
that a lack of statistical data for some phases does not permit 
an accurate estimation of the phases' boundaries. As a result of 
the rather poor amount of empirical evidence on distinct tech- 
nological life cycle phases (DeBresson/Lampel, 1985), only a few 
indications have been received (Ford/Ryan, 1982; Cleland/King, 
1983; Meffert, 1980). Qualitative descriptions should be used 
for that purpose as well. The number of phases should be rather 
small. The following phases have been adopted for the study of 
technology development: implementation, take-off, growth, matur- 
ity, and post-maturity (senescence) for some technologies. 
The first two phases are very difficult to define. This is 
especially true at the company level, where there is a marked 
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lack of information about the duration and other economic and 
technical characteristics of the innovation process. For the 
purpose of our analysis, the first two phases will be described 
very broadly, and the life cycle itself will be analyzed in the 
other four phases. 
: TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PHASE: 
Boundary: Research indicates a potentially valuable 
technology; decision made for technology- 
oriented research. 
Event : First (research) costs occur connected with 
new technology, decision made to invest in 
new technology, construction of prototypes, 
purchase of license. 
: IMPLEMENTATION PHASE: 
Boundary: First Output 
Event : Losses are still accruing from the new tech- 
nology; construction of an improved model. 
* TAKE-OFF PHASE: 
Boundary: Effect of scale of monopoly; many fields for 
application; sub-market penetration. 
Event : Losses still possible; high risk investment; 
stream of parallel inventions or improvements. 
: GROWTH PHASE: 
Boundary: First profits accruing, break-even-point 
passed; first follower on the national mar- 
ket/first buy of license produces output. 
Event : Imitations; technology penetrates through the 
market. 
: MATURITY PHASE: 
Boundary: Point of inflection of output curve passed; 
first turnkey deal. 
Event : Further increase of (national/world) market; 
large-scale automation. 
* POST-MATURITY PHASE: 
Boundary: Maximum of output curve passed; substitution 
processes; license agreements expire. 
TECHNOLOGY MANAOEMENT - THE SYSTEM APPROACH 
In the absence of a powerful theory able to incorporate the 
results of previous studies and information concerning technologi- 
cal development, systems theory and a systems approach can help to 
synthesize different analytical results and to focus on certain 
questions or a combination of various aspects to achieve an in- 
tegrated and broad theoretical view with practical applications 
about technology and its management. The systems approach permits 
a step-by-step analysis and study of separate system elements and 
their relations, while connecting the whole system. Based on 
that, a simple model of technological development and its manage- 
ment can be built (See Figure 5). 
FIGURE 5 
In this model, technological process embraces the activities 
of creation, development, implementation, exploitation and even- 
tually replacement of one technology or group of technologies. 
The internal structure of this process can be described through 
different models (life cycle, research-production cycle, etc.). 
The impacts experienced by the technology selected for our study, 
during the stages of birth, growth and maturity differ in nature, 
intensity, and direction. But they can be integrated and expres- 
sed (as is shown in the model) in the following way: 
Input: the input to the process of technological development 
(technological process) is defined by the resources necessary to 
be used in this process as well as by their availability and the 
ability of the system to spot and use them efficiently. Those 
resources can be described as RCD efforts or activities, even as 
the RCD level of the environment (i.e., the ability of the en- 
vironment to carry out RCD activities through which new technolo- 
gies in the field can emerge, including the intellectual input to 
the process). Skills needed in the process to make the new tech- 
nology work as well as to improve already existing technologies 
are also considered as an input to the process (i.e., availabi- 
lity of various skilled personnel and organizational settings for 
their education and training). New raw materials with better 
quality, easier procurement, and lower cost are essentially impor 
tant as a main input in the process. Ideas of any kind are also 
very important. 
Output: the output of any technology should be described as 
a product or service with higher quality and greater value as 
well as a better standard of living for society, better working 
conditions, greater environmental protection (in some cases, even 
its restoration). 
Both the output and input of technological processes should 
be managed by the company. It is important to study to what 
extent these factors depend on the environment and to what extent 
the company is able to forecast and manage them. 
The environment plays a major role in technology management. 
The main factors influencing technological development and its 
management outside the system (company, country, or industry, 
etc.) can be summarized in the following groups: 
* Stage of economic development: characterized by the level of 
industrial and economic development of a country, region, or 
economic system which either facilitates or inhibits the 
technological development of the system under study. A well 
developed infrastructure and favorable economic conditions 
can facilitate the introduction, development and exploitation 
of technology. 
* Organizational culture within the environment: can play an 
accelerating or inhibiting role in the development of tech- 
nology. This influences the style of the system and in- 
dividuals working in it through the value system and cultural 
habits. Society's learning curve for managing big organiza- 
tions and technologies is also connected with the stage of 
industrial and economic development (nations with a short 
industrial history have no accumulated organizational and 
managerial experience and habits, which in any case does not 
facilitate technology management itself). 
* Government policy and strategy: the participation of govern- 
ment in financing different technological ventures as well as 
the organizational settings created to facilitate the pro- 
curement of various types of inputs to the process has an 
important impact on the technological process. 
* International scientific collaboration, trade and production: 
results in extensive scientific and technical cooperation 
between countries and research organizations. Many new 
technologies are already resulting from the work of special- 
ists in different countries. Therefore, technologies are 
more easily available to different systems than decades ago. 
* International trade through the exchange of goods, operation- 
al know-how, services and knowledge: provides easier access 
to some of the process inputs for companies and countries. 
* International cooperation: one of the main reservoirs of 
new technologies and all types of innovations. Technology 
transfer between countries as well as between two economic 
systems is a growing phenomenon despite political and econo- 
mic difficulties. These conditions advance the problem of 
transferring managerial and organizational know-how as well. 
Based on the above concept and model, the study hypothesizes 
the following: 
Technologies require for their development and exploitation 
similar conditions and experience similar impacts, not because of 
their technical nature and characteristics, but because of the 
stage of their development (rate of novelty) and the source of 
their procurement (inside or outside the system). 
Companies behave similarly during the various phases of the 
technological life cycle. This makes the life cycle an instrument 
for company technology management. 
The life cycle model is one of several possible models ex- 
pressing technological development. Its phases can be used not 
only to study the dynamics of technology, but also to study the 
dynamics of management and organization. 
Management is influenced by both internal and external fac- 
tors which change the impact of the technological life cycle. 
Technological life cycles at different levels have different 
impacts on company technology management. 
To check the elaborated hypothesis, a pilot study concentrat- 
ing on the steel industry was undertaken. The following method- 
ological issues were taken into consideration within the pilot 
study: 
* Specifying the technological life cycle on three different 
levels (company, national, and world) and the boundaries 
between the various phases to serve as a base of comparison 
and analyais of management dynamics. 
* Describing technology management, concentrating on strategy, 
by developing sets of variables. 
* Creating an appropriate data base necesaary for performing 
analytical and empirical investigations. 
* Elaborating and aelecting appropriate methods (mathematical, 
statistical, and others) which will result in useful find- 
ings. 
Data to describe management must be selected very carefully 
because much of it is so-called "soft data" and very difficult to 
quantify. According to recent research (Sciberras, 1986), all 
commonly used indicators of RLD activities suffer from severe 
limitations (in other words, value to wait ratios of finished 
products, RCD expenditure, number of RCD employees, patents and 
licenses, rate and direction of technology flow). Furthermore, a 
reliable understanding of the role of management can be obtained 
only by combining quantitative data with more qualitative sector- 
based research. Different studies use a number of different 
kinds of data or indicators to describe management (e.g. Goncha- 
rov, 1982 and 1983; Jamielson, 1980). 
The study has developed a set of variables constructed in a 
way that allows technology management to be described in countries 
with both centrally planned and market economies (See Appendix). 
Two approaches in choosing variables describing management 
and organization are possible. The first is to choose qualitative 
variables which reveal organizational behavior. Qualitative 
variables make it possible to evaluate the relations of the tech- 
nology development process in a given organization to such tan- 
gible factors as management style, methods and environment. The 
second approach is to choose variables which can be measured 
quantitatively and mainly indicate company performance, such as 
economic efficiency of implementing a new technology, resources 
allocated to RCD or technology change, and so on. The results of 
each analysia permit us to draw qualitative conclusions about the 
efficiency of technology management, but it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the nature of the organieation's behavior 
towards the environment and the pattern of management itself. 
The combination of the two approaches will create a better 
appraiaal of the efficiency and usefulness of the management 
system in a given organieation regarding technology. 
Over 50 different variables expressed through various in- 
dicators and applied in various combinations are being used most 
frequently in the field of innovation management and technology 
management. 
Seven groups of variables were chosen to describe the company 
in general terms, the technology under study, economic performance 
and results; parameters were selected to describe the functioning 
of the organieation's management system through strategies, struc- 
tures, and also environment impacts. The list can provide a 
common framework to study the dynamics of management and organiza- 
tion and changes in both in connection with technology changes. 
This list is a basis for developing precise parameters for spe- 
cific research tasks and objectives, specific conditions of dif- 
ferent technologies under study, and specific countries partici- 
pating in the research (i.e., this was the basis for developing a 
special methodology to investigate new original and license tech- 
nologies in Bulgaria). The list should be considered as open; 
other variables and parameters can also be included. 
SOHE PRELIMINARY EFFECTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A pilot study was designed to check the elaborated methodol- 
ogy. As an object of analysis, the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) 
steel technology was selected. The reasons for this choice were 
as follows: 
* The steel industry is well documented in many countries 
(including all IIASA member countries). 
* The steel industry is considered to be a mature, even senes- 
cent, industry and can be used as an example to demonstrate 
explicitly the entire range of life cycle phases. 
* Several types of steel technologies changed and were diffused 
through many countries and companies in the last century. 
* The data base can be supplemented by much information from 
literature and previous IIASA studies to save time and per- 
sonnel resources. 
* The BOF technology was first introduced in Austria by Voest- 
Alpine in 1952. About 30 companies then adopted the technol- 
ogy in its early stages. These "early adopters" are chosen 
for more in-depth study because we consider them to be com- 
panies operating in a favorable environment encouraging the 
introduction of new technology and under management able to 
spot and pick up a new technology. The suggested approach of 
defining the first (take-off) phase of the life cycle was 
the achievement of a 10% technology diffusion rate (Tchijov, 
1987). 
Data (quantitative and qualitative parameters) were gathered 
through company records including annual reports, questionnaires, 
statistics and literature. The data base has been constructed 
and is ready to perform cluster analysis through which differences 
and similarities in company behavior can be elaborated. Qualita- 
tive information concerning the type of strategy employed during 
the period under study (1950-1985) is also available (See Appen- 
dix) and will be analyzed based on expert judgement. 
The elaborated methodology allows us to draw the following 
conclusions: 
1. The use of the concept of technology management makes it 
possible to analyze the entire process of technology intro- 
duction, development and exploitation. This allows us to 
study more deeply the integration existing within the system 
and focuses the attention on management synthesis of that 
phenomenon. In this way, some of the difficulties and imper- 
fections of branch innovation studies as well as a separate 
analysis of innovation and production management are over- 
come. 
2. The study of technology management dynamics analyzes the 
changes occurring in transition from one phase to another as 
well as the changes due to changing economic conditions and 
social environment. This can serve as a basis for conclu- 
sions about the management of technological change. 
3. Cross-country analysis of technology management, despite 
national cultural and economic differences (or maybe because 
of them) can provide useful results to facilitate the process 
of transferring operational experience and organizational and 
managerial know-how. 
4. A systems approach to the study of technology management 
will permit an analysis of the relations between system 
elements and an integration of results from other studies. 
This approach will also permit different objects to be stud- 
ied and analyzed within the same framework using the same 
approach and methodology. 
The defined changes in organization and management of dif- 
ferent groups of technologies can make it possible to foresee 
changes in management and organization. Such predictions can be 
used to develop new management paradigms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern product ion automation, i n c l ud i ng  f l e x i b l e  product ion systems, i s  
(FMS) usua l l y  considered as a major ing red ien t  o f  the so l u t i on  t o  many 
s t r u c t u r a l  problems of the manufacturing indus t r ies .  I t  has sometimes 
had a dramatic in f luence on product ion economy: d e l i v e r y  times, Lead 
tines, storages, c a p i t a l  use, u t i l i z a t i o n  r a t e  etc. (Bessant et.al., 
1985, Horn et.al. 1985). 
However, f l e x i b l e  product ion systems and advanced product ion automation 
u i t h  computer in tegra ted  manufacturing (CIH) have so f a r  been app l ied  
mainly by large and/or the most progress ive companies. The d i f f u s i o n  o f  
FMS (and CIH) concepts has been ra the r  slow and i n  f a c t  the  f l e x i b i l i t y  
o f  FHS has not  always been as great  as expected (Jaikumar 1986). Thus 
i t  can be p ro jec ted  t ha t  the  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  FHS, and o f  product ion 
automation i n  general, depends on t he  development o f  the t echn i ca l  
p roper t ies  o f  FM-systems o r  on the f l e x i b i l i t y  o f f e r e d  by the 
technology i t s e l f ,  and on the o ther  hand t o  a great  extent  on how t he  
b e n e f i t s  can be r ea l i zed  dur ing the  a p p l i c a t i o n  design o f  the  
product ion automation system. 
Because the  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  the p o t e n t i a l  bene f i t s  o f  FMS seems t o  be 
more a soc i a l  o r  an o rgan iza t iona l  quest ion than a pure techn ica l  
question, i t  seems uor thwhi le  t o  study FHS i n  context o f  the innova t ion  
management. Furthermore the concept o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  has a wider meaning 
than a product ion technology - rea la ted  i n t ep re ta t i on .  F l e x i b i l i t y  
seems t o  have a cen t r a l  r o l e  when an assessment o f  d i f f e r e n t  company 
i s  made. Horeover t he  technolog ica l  l i f e  cyc le  concept i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t o  be discussed from the  po i n t  o f  t he  view o f  FH-systems development. 
I t  i s  the re fo re  a l s o  r e a l i s t i c  t o  r e l a t e  FM-systems and modern 
product ion automation t o  the concept o f  product ion f l e x i b i l i t y  and a lso  
t o  est imate uhat k i n d  of techno log ica l  advances ( i n c l ud i ng  
o rgan iza t iona l  innovat ions) are needed t o  increase product ion 
f l e x i b i l i t y  and uhat innovat ions are necessary t o  ass i s t  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  
the  bene f i t s  dur ing  the design o f  FH-systems. 
The second i n t e r e s t i n g  quest ion i s  the  r o l e  o f  the small and medium 
sca le  companies. I t  seems apparent t h a t  the  l i f e  cycle theory i s  q u i t e  
t oo th less  i n  descr ib ing  o f  the  technology management i n  small and 
medium scaie companies. 
2. THE LIFE CYCLE flODEL REVISITED 
The l i f e  cyc le  model has had a c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  descr ib ing the  e v o l u t i o n  
o f  a product  from infancy through growth and matur i ty  t o  decl ine. 
Or ig ina l l y ,  t he  model uas developed as a framework t o  support 
i nnova t i on  and product management. The model i s  usua l ly  extended a l so  
t o  descr ibe the evo lu t i on  o f  an i ndus t r y  o r  a branch o f  i ndus t r y  
(Porter, 1980). 
The d i f f e r e n t  stages o r  phases o f  the  l i f e  cyc le  model are: conception, 
in t roduct ion ,  grouth, ma tu r i t y  and dec l i ne  (or conception, infancy, 
adolescence, ma tu r i t y  and post -matur i ty  according t o  Ayres (1984)). The 
e s s e n t i a l  po in t  i s  t ha t  the  product  o r  t he  indust ry  evolves through 
these stages and t h a t  each stage i s  charac ter ized not  only by the  
product  i t s e l f ,  but  a l so  by product ion  technology, marketing 
technology, research and development a c t i v i t i e s ,  etc. 
Table 1 summarizes the  phases o f  the  l i f e  cyc le  theory (Ayres 1984). 
Table 1. Summary o f  the  modi f ied l i f e  cyc le  theory (Ayres, 1984) 
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There seems t o  be a one-to-one correspondence between the  l i f e  cyc le  
phase and the  product ion  technology (or R + D, marketing). Th is  
correspondence i s  usua l l y  used i n  a s t ra igh t fo ruard  manner as t h e  bas is  
o f  a strategy formation. 
There has been considerable c r i t i s i s m  of  the one-to-one correspondence 
between the s t ra tegy  and the l i f e  cyc le  phase (Dowdy et. a1 1986, 
Olleros, F-J., De Bresson e t  al., Voss, C.A. 1985, Hac Donald 1985). 
Mensch e t  al.  (Mensch 1985, Hensch et. a l  1986) po in ted out  t ha t  t h i s  
simple correspondence can lead t o  wrong po l i cy  opt ions emphasized tha t  
r e a l  l i f e  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from the model: even i n  mature i n d u s t r i e s  
product  innovat ions dominate. There are attempts t o  make so-cal led 
r a d i c a l  product innovat ions i n  order t o  ga in  rea l  compet i t ive power by 
a r a d i c a l  improvement i n  the  product (or by a so-cal led "take-off"). I n  
general, r a d i c a l  innovat ions - both i n  the  product and the product ion  - 
are  a t o o l  which a mature i ndus t r y  can use t o  de-mature (see Dowdy e t  
at. 1986). The r a d i c a l  innovat ions usua l ly  lead t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  changes 
i n  market dominance. 
This ra ises  t h e  question: what i s  a mature indust ry  o r  product? Or: do 
we need d i f f e r e n t  models f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  evo lu t ion  and product 
innovat ion? Should we t a l k  of  product generations, so tha t  each 
generat ion has i t s  oun l i f e  cycle? Can a spec i f i c  i n d u s t r i a l  branch or 
product  ever be mature i n  the  sense of  the l i f e  cyc le  modet? 
What we need i s  a new evo lu t i on  model, w i th  the a i d  o f  which we can 
search f o r  the  invar iances and the  common log ic  w i t h i n  the  dynamics o f  
product  (or i n d u s t r i a l )  evolut ion.  
F i r s t l y  we must no te  t h a t  t o  each product (or indust ry )  we can r e l a t e  
product  technology, p roduct ion  technology, o rgan jza t ion  and management 
technology and ma.rketing (or  market segmentation) technology. Thus we 
descr ibe  the technology r e l a t e d  t o  a product o r  an i n d u s t r i a l  branch as 
a f ou r  dimensional dynamic system. Innovat ions can be made w i th  respect 
t o  each ax i s  o f  t he  system: r a d i c a l  innovations on any ax i s  can g i ve  
compet i t i ve  power t o  t he  innovator. 
Secondly the technologies i n  the d i f f e r e n t  axes have d i f f e r e n t  l f f e  
cyc le  phases, rak ing the system i n t e r a c t i v e  and dynamic. Thfs bas ic  
proper ty  a lso  includes the fact  t ha t  innovat ions on any ax i s  opcn 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o r  create p o t e n t i a l  f o r  new innovat ions on the o ther  
th ree axes. Usual ly the product o r  i ndus t r y  evolves i n  a continuum o f  
succeeding innovations i n  the d i f f e r e n t  dimensions. 
One basic problem i s  tha t  the c l a s s i c a l  l i f e  cycle theory does not  take 
i n t o  account the soc ia l  needs and the s o c i a l  (and economic) context  i n  
which the new technology i s  introduced. This s o c i a l  context se ts  
p r i o r i t i e s  and goals and modi f ies the dynamics of the evo lu t i on  of the 
technology and has an in f luence on the d i f f e r e n t  phases o f  the l i f e  
cycle; e.g. d i f f e r e n t  organ isat iona l  innovat ions are needed i n  
d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  contexts. The s o c i a l  context  can be t te r  be taken i n t o  
account through organ izat iona l  and market ing innovations. 
2.2. Invar iances and analogies 
D.T. Jones from the Sience p o l i c y  research u n i t  of the  Un ive rs i t y  o f  
Sussex (Jones 1985) analysed the automobile i ndus t r y  i n  the foregoing 
context  (as a four dimensional system) and concluded tha t  the 
i ndus t r y  i s  by no means a mature industry.  The reasons can s h o r t l y  
explained as fol lows: 
The automobile indust ry  reached i t s  m a t u r i t y  i n  the terms o f  the l i f e  
cyc le  model a t  an ea r l y  stage (standardized products, common product ion  
technology). A f te r  that, Japanese indus t r y  made product ion innovations, 
organ izat ion  and management innovat ions and developed a new, e f f i c i e n t  
way t o  produce standard cars and a t  the  same time t o  guarantee high 
q u a l i t y  of the products. The Japanese indus t r y  was able t o  create r e a l  
compet i t ion power. The development o f  product  i on  technology opened the  
way t o  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  o r  the economic means t o  produce d i f f e r e n t  models 
and versions i n  smal l  batches. This development opened p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
marketing innovations, which together w i t h  the  incorpora t ion  o f  modern 
e l e c t r o n i c s  led  t o  product innovat ions o r  t o  a new up-scale segment o f  
the  cars, o r  t o  a new concept o f  luxury  cars. This development a l so  
gave new p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  small European manufacturers. 
The whole concept of the  automobile indust ry  i s  s t i l l  i n  a s t rong 
developmental stage and we can expect innovat ions on each axis, which 
w i l l  lead t o  f u r the r  innovat ions on the other axes. I n  p a r t i c u l a r  we 
can expect r a p i d  development o f  the management and o rgan i za t i on  
technologies, because the  f l e x i b i l i t y  requires a new k i n d  o f  s k i  11s and 
knowledge on the p a r t  o f  the  product ion  workers. (Brbdner 1985, Toikka 
1986, Hyb ty l i i nen  1986). I t  i s  a l so  q u i t e  apparent that, a t  leas t  i n  
Europe, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  get  workers f o r  less q u a l i f i e d  tasks and t o  
work i n  a poor work environment. This soc ia l  context  requ i res  a new 
k i n d  of  approach t o  work organizat ion.  
The development o f  the  semiconductor indust ry  has been ra the r  s i m i l a r  
(Ernst, 1983, B e l l  1986, Business Week 1986, Dosi 1984). The beginning 
was character ized by a r a p i d  product innovat ion phase, u n t i l  the  
standard products <microprocessors, memories, standard l o g i c )  dominated 
the markets. A f te r  t h a t  there  was a pe r i od  o f  r a p i d  growth o f  
product ion innovat ions (Business Week 1986, Gu te r l  1984), which lead t o  
a new k i n d  o f  market balance and t o  a dominance o f  producers o f  
standard products which could compete by product ion  costs, product 
q u a l i t y  and h igh  a v a i l a b i l i t y .  As i n  the case o f  t he  automobile 
indust ry  the  development o f  p roduct ion  technology (and design methods) 
opens p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  improved f l e x i b i l i t y ;  i.e. f o r  e f f i c i e n t  
design and product ion  o f  so-cal led custom design components. Besides 
the  f l e x i b i l i t y  market ing innovat ions  are needed f o r  compet i t i ve  power 
i n  the  custom design business. 
Market segmentation opens p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  a new, p r o f i t a b l e  business, 
and p r a c t i c e  seems t o  show that, a t  leas t  i n  t he  f i r s t  stage, there  are 
o ther  producers dominating t h e  custom design business than i n  the mass 
market areas. The balance between the USA, Japan and Europe seems t o  be 
ra the r  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  the  automobile industry.  We can a l s o  expect 
new kinds o f  product  innovat ions because o f  the  b e t t e r  p roduct ion  and 
design methods (GaAs, op toe lec t ron ics  etc.). 
The above tendencies can a l so  be detected i n  robo t i cs  and NC-machinery. 
The development and product ion  o f  standard robots and NC-machines are 
dominated by companies which can compete w i th  product ion  costs and 
h igh  qua l i t y .  Again, there  e x i s t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  e.g. spec ia l  robots, 
which s a t i s f y  the p a r t i c u l a r  needs o f  c e r t a i n  market segments. It i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  note t h a t  even i n  the heavy process industr ies,  such as 
paper making, the above l o g i c  i s  s t i l l  apparent: the market (and 
product) segmentation from standard papers t o  f i n e  papers and spec ia l  
(coated) p r i n t i n g  papers, which has required a l o t  o f  product ion and 
market innovations, I s  one evidence o f  t h i s  logic.  
What can we conclude? 
There seems t o  be an i nva r ian t  l og i c  o f  the  product (or indust ry )  
evolution, uhich can be use fu l  i n  analysing the fu tu re  trends o f  
f l e x i b l e  manufacturing systems, i n  es t imat ing market balances and i n  
eva luat ing  new business p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  This l og i c  can be described as 
fo l lows. 
I n  the f i r s t  phase the product (or  indust ry )  evo lu t i on  seems 
t o  obey the c l a s s i c a l  l i f e  cyc le  model 
(concept ion- introduct ion- growth-maturity). During t h i s  phase 
the d i f f e r e n t  technological  a l t e rna t i ves  compete w i th  each 
other. Before the matur i ty  stage we f i n d  the standardizat ion 
o f  products and product ion methods. During the ma tu r i t y  stage 
a l o t  o f  p roduct ion  and organ izat ion  innovat ions are made, 
uhich usua l l y  lead t o  a new market balance and t o  a dominance 
o f  new producers. Furthermore these product ion and 
organ izat ion  innovat ions create a new p o t e n t i a l  f o r  product 
and market innovations. Uhen the standard products are known, 
i t  i s  eas ier  t o  recognize the app l i ca t i ons  where they can be 
used. Spec ia l  needs and the means o f  s a t i s f y i n g  them are a lso  
more e a s i l y  recognized. Both market and product innovations 
lead t o  market segmentation and product d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  A f te r  
t h a t  the  product-production -organization-market-system 
evolves as a h i g h l y  dynamic i n t e r a c t i v e  system. The 
segmentation process a l so  means tha t  those producers which are 
able t o  apply the technology (product, production) t o  spec i f i c  
customers' needs, or  which are able t o  make product and 
marketing innovat ions a t  the same time, w i l l  win a b e t t e r  
market share and a lso  make p r o f i t s .  This w i l l  lead t o  a new 
balance i n  the markets. 
Ye can describe t h i s  basic l og i c  by the f o l l o u i n g  v i sua l i sa t i on .  
(Fig. 1). 
many a l t e r n a t i v e  
products and 
product ion methods 
i n t r  duct ion  Y 
grou h I 
matu r i t y  
standardization, 
volume product ion  
product ion innovations, 
neu p o t e n t i a l  f o r  product 
and market innovat ions 
f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  
product ion  
market innovat ions 
+--------+ 
neu product i n t e r a c t i o n  spec ia l  
d i v e r s i -  TCeEf s~ segments I I I segmen ta t i on  
f i c a t i o n  
( new product ion 
Fig. 1. I n t e r a c t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  innovat ion axes 
2.3 Extension of t he  basic concept 
I t  uas s ta ted prev ious ly  t h a t  the  l i f e  cycle model makes no assumptions 
about the re la t i onsh ips  between technolgy, economy and s o c i a l  context  - 
t he  evo lu t i on  o f  a  technolgy through i t s  l i f e  cycles occurs 
independently o f  the  s o c i a l  context .  Houever, i t  i s  necessary t o  widen 
the  concept so t h a t  the in f luence of the soc ia l  and economic fac to rs  
can be taken i n t o  account. 
Perez (1984) and Dosi (1984) used the  terms techno log ica l  style, 
techno log ica l  form o r  techno log ica l  t r a j e c t o r i e s  t o  descr ibe the  
technology - economy (soc ie ty )  p a i r  as a  dynamic system. The concept o f  
t h e  techno log ica l  form o r  s t y l e  corresponds t o  the  s t a t e  concept i n  the 
theory o f  dynamic systems. The s t a t e  o f  the system descr ibes the  
prev ious  h i s t o r y  o f  the  system and, together w i th  the  ex te rna l  con t ro l s  
and inf luences, determines the  f u t u r e  dynamics. 
O r i g i n a l l y  Perez (1984) and Dosi (1984) attempted t o  exp la in  t he  
phenomena uhich i n  economic terms can be measured as the  so-cal led long 
cycles. Houever, uhat i s  e s s e n t i a l  i s  t ha t  the  techno log ica l  form 
( s t y l e )  inc ludes not  on ly  t he  bas ic  technolgy but a l so  the  u t i l i z a t i o n  
forms (products organization, management concepts etc.) and u t i l i z a t i o n  
area (products, i n d u s t r i a l  branches etc.). The basic idea i s  t ha t  
c e r t a i n  basic innovat ions have a  great  p o t e n t i a l  t o  create neu economic 
values, not  only i n  t echn i ca l  and product terms but  a l so  i n  terms o f  
t he  app l ica t ions  i n  the  widest sense throughout society.  The successful  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t he  ideas and concepts a l so  requires neu o rgan i za t i ona l  
and managerial concepts, so t h e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  the neu technology 
c l e a r l y  means a  neu techno log ica l  form o r  sty le.  
I n  t h e  basic concept there  a re  severa l  important fac tors :  the mot ive 
branches, uhich produce t h e  key f a c t o r s  and the key technology, and 
the  c a r r i e r  branches, uh ich  are mainly responsible f o r  the  u t i l i z a t i o n  
o f  t h e  key factor, the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  key fac to rs  i n t o  t he  
products, the  production, t h e  organ iza t ion  and the management prac t ice .  
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  note t h a t  t he  bas ic  idea or  t he  framework i s  no t  
on l y  app l icab le  i n  the  s o c i a l  and economic context, but  a l so  i n  
analysing o f  the  development an i n d u s t r i a l  branch or  a  s p e c i f i c  
technology. 
Perez (1984) forecasts tha t  the  coning techno log ica l  form or  the  next 
form t o  come I s  re la ted t o  the f e x i b i l i t y  (or  the f l e x i b l e  product ion) 
and in format ion  technologies. This means there i s  a spec ia l  i n t e r e s t  t o  
analyze f l e x i b l e  manufacturing and i t s  f u tu re  app l ica t ion .  
3. FLEXIBLE PRODUCTION AUTOMATION: THE LIFE-CYCLE MODEL AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
3.1 F l e x i b l e  product ion automation: c a r r i e r s  and motive branches 
I f  ue apply t he  basic idea above then ue must de f lne  the  motive 
branches and the  c a r r i e r  branches. 
The c a r r i e r  branches are b a s i c a l l y  the manufacturing industr ies,  f o r  
example uorkshops, metal product industr ies,  the  automobile industry, 
uood product industr ies, the  c l o t h i n g  industry, uhich are a l l  t r y i n g  t o  
f i n d  out  neu management concepts, t o  improve de l i ve ry  times, t o  shorten 
lead times, t o  improve u t i l i z a t i o n  r a t e  - o r  increase the  f l e x i b i l i t y .  
The basic ideas are a l so  introduced t o  t he  other branches, such as 
process i ndus t r i es  (paper making, s t e e l  industry, f i n e  chemicals etc.) 
The motive branches are e lec t ron i cs  and in format ion  technolgies i n  
general  (computers, sof tuare engineering, communication). 
The ides of t h e  concept can bee seen 
- i n  apply ing e lec t ron i cs  and software i n  machine con t ro l s  
- i n  apply ing software and computer technologies on the  l e v e l  o f  
manufacturing systems 
- i n  t he  search f o r  neu o rgan i za t i ona l  forms, work content, 
s k i l l  p ro f i les ,  uhich are the  p re regu i s i t es  t o  achieving t h e  
b e n e f i t s  of  the  neu product ion  concepts. 
3.2 Product ion automation: the s t r u c t u r e  and the business 
A s t r u c t u r i z e d  model o f  p roduct ion  automation i s  presented i n  Figure 2. 
Fig. 2. The l eve l s  o f  p roduct ion  automation 
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The e s s e n t i a l  po in t  i s  t ha t  there  i s  no single, w e l l  designed 
product ion  automation technology, but  i t  combines many d i f f e r e n t  
t echn i ca l  products and u t i l i z e s  a h igh  Level o f  i n teg ra t i on .  I t  i s  a l so  
e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  software engineer ing p lays  a major r o l e  on the systems 
l e v e l  and tha t  o rgan iza t ion  innovat ions and marketing innovat ions 
(understanding spec ia l  needs) are the key fac to rs  i n  the successful  
design o f  app l ica t ions .  
Th is  i n teg ra ted  system aspect o f  the product ion  automation 
makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  develop "a L i fe -cyc le  model" f o r  f l e x i b l e  
manufactur ing automation. A system concept ( C I M  or  FMS) are s t i l l  a t  
the  emerging stage, but  i t  can u t i l i z e  mature technologies as 
components and c l e a r l y  r a d i c a l  innovat ions and take-of fs i n  the mature 
components (robots, NC-machines) can have a major r o l e  i n  f u t u r e  
trends. 
The FMS o r  C I M  systems can be considered as products and as product  
innovat ions.  However major d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s e  when i t  i s  noted t h a t  FMS 
and CIM-systems mean product ion  i.nnovations f o r  many i n d u s t r i a l  
branches. The successful a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  FMS or  C I M  or  o f  the  concept o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  requires major o rgan i za t i ona l  innovat ion  i n  prac t ice .  The 
FMS and the  CIM-system are always special, customized systems designed 
t o  f u l f i l  usua l l y  very spec ia l  needs - there  e x i s t  no uni f ied,  standard 
FMS or  CIM-technologies. For t h i s  reason app l i ca t i on  know-how 
(marketing innovat ions) i s  essen t i a l  i n  the systems planning and the  
p r o j e c t  de l i ve r i es .  Again we can conclude tha t  f l e x i b l e  product ion  
automation has a very i n t e g r a t i n g  nature and t h a t  the f u t u r e  t rends and 
e s p e c i a l l y  the  d i f f u s i o n  o f  FMS- and CIM-technologies w i l l  depend on 
many f a c t o r s  - on many techn i ca l  components, o rgan iza t iona l  f a c t o r s  and 
a p p l i c a t i o n  design c a p a b i l i t i e s  (Bu l l i nge r  e t  a l .  1985). 
The i n t e g r a t i n g  nature  and a l s o  the  emerging nature o f  the  FMS- and 
CIM-concepts a l s o  r e f l e c t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  as business areas, FMS and C I M  
are  very  d i v e r s i f i e d :  there  are  spec ia l i zed  vendors f o r  NC-machines, 
robots, AGV's etc. I n  a d d i t i o n  the re  i s  a new emerging business: 
systems i n t e g r a t i o n  and systems engineering, which i s  sof tware 
o r i e n t e d  bu t  which requires deep knowledge o f  a c e r t a i n  a p p l i c a t i o n  
area. 
The lack o f  common standards a l so  provides p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  going { n t o  
business w i t h  specia l ized,  i n t e r f a c e  - and communication o r i en ted  
software. Furthermore there are considerable p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  small, 
high-tech firms, which are spec ia l i zed i n  very narrow technology areas 
such as spec ia l  sensors, s i gna l  processing, image processing etc. 
(Bu l l i nge r  e t  a1. 1985, Bessant e t  a1. 1985, M i l l e r  1985). 
F i n a l l y  i t  hou ld  be noted tha t  each i n d u s t r i a l  branch (metal products, 
e lec t ron ics ,  c l o th ing )  requires i t s  own spec ia l  a p p l i c a t i o n  knowledge 
which, i n  general, i s  not  t rans ferab le  from one branch t o  another. 
3.3 The concept o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  
F l e x i b i l i t y  i s  u n d e r s t o o d i n  t h i s  paper t o  mean an a b i l i t y  t o  adapt t o  
changing customer needs (see Ranta 1986, Toikka 1986, Recent 
t rends ... 1986, Slack 1983, O'Grady e t  a1 1986). The a b i l i t y  t o  adapt 
inc ludes both  long and short  term changes: t o  adapt t o  r a p i d  d e l i v e r y  
requirements o r  t o  adapt t o  long-term market changes. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  the  adaptab i l i t y ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  the  manufacturing 
industr ies,  the  concept o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  a l s o  inc ludes requirements 
r e l a t e d  t o  process performance and product ion  economy, such as 
- sho r te r  lead times 
- decreased storages 
- improved u t i l i z a t i o n  r a t e  
- b e t t e r  q u a l i t y .  
Thus as a measure o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  we can use on the one hand performance 
and economical i nd i ces  and on the o ther  hand " a d a p t i b i l i t y  power". The 
l a t t e r  p rope r t y  i s  v i sua l i zed  i n  Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. The batch s i ze  and p a r t  fami ly  s i ze  
Thus the  e s s e n t i a l  measures are the  product ion capac i ty  and the  p a r t  
fami ly size. The f l e x i b i l i t y ,  o r  the  adaptab i l i t y ,  i s  c l e a r l y  increased 
i f  the  p a r t  f am i l y  can be increased wi thout  loss  i n  batch s i ze  or  
p roduct ion  capaci ty.  Moreover, the f l e x i b i l i t y  o r  t he  a b i l i t y  t o  make 
d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  a l s o  r e f l e c t s  the  a b i l i t y  t o  adapt t o  f u t u r e  changes i n  
t he  markets - the  greater  t he  f l e x i b i l i t y  the  less i s  t h e  r i s k  o f  the  
investement. 
Ye can the re fo re  measure t h e  development o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  and a p p l i c a t i o n  
t rends w i t h  respect  t o  batch s i z e  and p a r t  fami ly  s i ze  (or  i n  more 
general: p roduct ion  capac i ty  and product mix). Th is  means tha t  i n  t he  
manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s  one measure o f  t he  performance o f  a 
product ion  system i s  t he  a b i l i t y  t o  make p a r t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  shapes and 
s izes  i n  smal l  batches; o r  t o  assemble the  p a r t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s izes  and 
shapes. 
With respect t o  d e l i v e r y  t imes and customer needs the  a b i l i t y  t o  adapt 
t o  d i f f e r e n t  lead t imes i s  one important f a c t o r  o r  a  measure of 
o f f l e x i b i l i t y .  
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Technical trends, o r  new characters and a b i l i t i e s  o f  robots, 
NC-machines etc, can extend the c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  a product ion  system and 
a l s o  increase the  f l e x i b i l i t y .  On the  o ther  hand, t h i s  decreases the  
economic b a r r i e r s  t o  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  FMS and can considerably ease 
the  d i f f u s i o n  o f  FMS. 
3.4 Technological components: t rends and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
Software engineer ing 
Software engineering o r  software systems have a key r o l e  i n  system 
in teg ra t i on .  This has many performance consequences, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  
has a great  impact on the r e l i a b i l i t y  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a system. On 
t h e  other hand the software systems can a l so  improve the  f l e x i b i l i t y .  
On the  software s ide standards w i l l  p lay  an important ro le .  Today, 
customizing and i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  the  systems are c a r r i e d  out w i th  the  
a i d  o f  software. Each system requ i res  - i n  p r i n c i p l e  - basic software 
and communication software modules which must be developed separately 
f o r  each system. This i s  nowadays a s i g n i f i c a n t  cost f a c t o r  and i s  i n  
f a c t  a lso  a major en t r y  b a r r i e r  f o r  newcomers t o  the  system i n t e g r a t i o n  
business (FMS and CIM-systems). I t  a lso  increases a l so  t h e  costs o f  the  
s p e c i f i c  app l ica t ions  (see a l so  Horn e t  a1 1985). The standard modules 
- both  f o r  communication and bas ic  functions, which could be used i n  
many appl icat ions,  can remarkably decrease the  development costs o f  a 
system. 
I n  general  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i d e n t i f y  a l i f e  cycle model f o r  software 
products. But we can say t h a t  t he  s tandard iza t ion  o f  the  basic software 
modules corresponds t o  t he  ma tu r i t y  stage o f  the product Life-cycle. 
The s tandard iza t ion  usua l l y  means cost decrease and thus opens 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  newcomers and spec ia l i zed systems. 
Thus, i f  e.g. the  MAP-development i s  t o  succeed, we can expect t ha t  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  the s tandard iza t ion  i t  w i l l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  or  p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  cost e f f e c t i v e  means t o  r e a l i z e  spec ia l i zed systems archi tectures,  
o r  i n  o ther  words t o  increase the  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  the systems 
development process i t s e l f  (as w i l l  usua l ly  happen a t  the  mature 
stage). This means that :  
the economic b a r r i e r s  f o r  neu e n t r i e s  u i l l  decrease, 
the spec ia l  purpose systems o r  the subsystems can be 
economically real ized, uhich means the c reat ion  o f  new 
business segments and increased d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  the system 
products, 
the technology oriented, spec ia l i zed subsystems o r  system 
(s igna l  processing, image processing) can be economically 
rea l i zed  as a p a r t  of the standard system; t h i s  again means 
neu growing market segments, 
i n  a longer perspect ive a11 these trends r e f l e c t  on the  
app l ica t ions  o f  FRS: economic b a r r i e r s  u i l l  s l ou l y  decrease, 
app l i ca t i on  areas u i l l  extend and the concept o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  
u i l l  broaden w i th  respect t o  p a r t  fami l ies  (shapes and 
s izes) . 
NC-machines are key components o f  the FMS f o r  the p a r t  manufacturing o f  
metal  and wood products. The NC-business has many i nd i ca t i ons  o f  a 
mature indust ry  (Horn e t  a l .  1985, EEC 1985): standard products, cost  
compet i t ion and new market balance, i n  which the winners seem t o  be 
e f f i c i e n t  producers ( u i t h  respect t o  costs and product qua l i t y ) .  
However, a t  the same t ime there  are analogous trends and signs as i n  
t he  automobile industry:  incorpora t ion  o f  electronics, software 
func t ions  and the f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  product ion processes oeen a neu 
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  spec ia l  purpose machines, which u i t h  t h e i r  h igh 
performance s a t i s f y  the needs o f  a spec ia l  appl icat ion.  A f t e r  many 
years there  i s  a grouing c lass  o f  small manufacturers which have b u i l t  
up a compet i t ive power based on spec ia l  segments and customized 
machines. Moreover, we can expect t ha t  the  previously described t rends 
i n  software engineering u i l l  ease the customizing process. and open new 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  product development. 
On the  systems l e v e l  important aspects o f  NC-machines are: new 
measurement technologies, f i x t u r e s  and p a l l e t  changers, t o o l  and uork 
p ieces changers. The development i n  a l l  these aspects means an 
increas ing l eve l  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  and increas ing performance measures o f  
FM-systems. 
One r a d i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  which cou ld  change t h e  whole p i c t u r e  i s  l a s e r  
process ing.  I f  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  of l a s e r s  inc reases  they  c o u l d  
become an e f f e c t i v e  means o f  i n c r e a s i n g  f l e x i b i l i t y  ( m i l l i n g ,  d r i l l i n g  
and t u r n i n g  by t h e  same too l ;  no t o o l  maintenance and d r i f t ;  
f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  software; a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  d i f f e r e n t  m a t e r i a l s ) .  T h i s  
cou ld  be a r e a l  q u a l i t a t i v e  change from t h e  p o i n t s  o f  view o f  b o t h  
p r o d u c t i o n  and t h e  NC-machine business. I n  genera l  we can c l a i m  t h a t  
o p t i c s  could, i n  a  wide sense, be t h e  technology which necess ia tes  a 
new t e c h n o l o g i c a l  fo rm i n  t h e  m a t e r i a l  p rocess ing  and p o s s i b l e  a l s o  i n  
i n f o r m a t i o n  process ing.  
Robo t i cs  
Robot manufac tu r ing  shows some o f  t h e  same tendencies as t h e  NC-machine 
i n d u s t r y :  t h e r e  a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  a  mature i n d u s t r y .  The s o - c a l l e d  
s tandard r o b o t s  a r e  an area i n  which c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  h i g h l y  cos t -  
o r i e n t e d .  There have been remarkable changes i n  t h e  market balance: 
many f a c t o r i e s  have been c losed  down and t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  a few s t r o n g  
manufacturers. A t  t h e  same t ime new p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and p o t e n t i a l  have 
been c r e a t e d  i n  s p e c i a l i z e d  r o b o t i c s  f o r  ve ry  narrow a p p l i c a t i o n s  b y  
adding s p e c i f i c  t e c h n i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  (speed, accuracy, in te r faces ,  
s i g n a l  processing, image process ing)  w i t h  t h e  a i d  o f  e l e c t r o n i c s  and 
so f tware  eng ineer ing .  S p e c i a l i z e d  robo ts  have a l s o  opened p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  s m a l l  manufacturers.  
The e f f e c t s  o f  r o b o t s  seem t o  have two major  trends. F i rs t ,  t h e r e  a r e  
many stand a lone  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  s tandard robots, such as p o i n t  and 
a rch  welding, p a i n t i n g  and o t h e r  su r face  f i n i s h i n g  t a s k s  etc. The 
d i f f u s i o n  o f  robo ts  seems t o  depend ma in ly  on t h e  c o s t s  o f  s tandard  
robots.  Thus, because t h e i r  cos ts  are decreas ing  and t h e i r  e f f i c i e n c y  
i s  i n c r e a s i n g  we can expect a  steady d i f f u s i o n  o f  t h e  s tandard 
a p p l i c a t i o n s .  The second main a p p l i c a t i o n  t r e n d  i s  t h e  use o f  r o b o t s  a s  
a p a r t  o f  manufac tu r ing  systems (FMU, FMS, FMS, assembly systems etc.). 
The t e c h n i c a l  f e a t u r e s  and t h e  performance o f  r o b o t s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  
these  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  The c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  r o b o t s  can have a 
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r e p a r k a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  and t h e  techno-economical 
performan_ce measures o f  FMU, FMS and FMS and a l s o  o f  assembly c e l l s  and 
systems. I n  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  accuracy, speed, f l e x i b l e  g r i p p e r s  
and i n t e l l i g e n t  i n t e r f a c e s  ( t a c t i l e  sensors, v i s ion ,  o t h e r  s i g n a l  
processing) p lay an important ro le.  New achievements i n  these areas 
always mean new p o s s i b i l i t i e s  on the  systems l e v e l  and a l s o  increase 
the  f l e x i b i l i t y .  
Specia l  machines 
I n  manufacturing areas such as the c lo th ing  industry, e lec t ron i cs  and 
a l so  the  metal product industry, there are many spec ia l  machines. They 
are aa in l y  dominated by the t r a d i t i o n a l  producers. However, s igns o f  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  are clear. Espec ia l l y  i n  the  c l o t h i n g  sec tor  new 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  are created by electronics,  software engineer ing and 
robot ics .  New e n t r i e s  have occurred and w i l l  cont inue t o  occur - the  
product ion  technology w i l l  experience r a d i c a l  changes i n  the  near 
fu ture .  
Orgnization, s k i l l s ,  t r a i n i n g  
The new forms o f  product ion organ iza t ion  and t r a i n i n g  methods seem t o  
be essen t i a l  f o r  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  the bene f i t s  o f  modern product ion  
automation (Ranta 1986, Hybty lh inen 1986, Brbdner 1985, Bessant 1985). 
New organ iza t ion  and management innovat ions are requ i red  t o  b r i n g  the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  the system t o  the  accepted level .  This can be a 
remarkable d i f f u s i o n  b a r r i e r  because o f  resoursecs which i s  required. 
The r e s u l t s  of  the comparative studies made by Jaikumar (Jaikumar 1986) 
c l e a r l y  show the s ign i f i cance  o f  o rgan iza t ion  and management prac t ice .  
Moreover, new t ra in ing ,  organization, management so lu t i ons  have 
a c t i v e l y  t o  be searched and those which are innovat ive  and not  bound 
w i t h  o l d  habits, w i l l  win a compet i t ive advantage. 
4. THE ROLE OF SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE INDUSTRIES 
The r o l e  o f  smal l  and medium scale enterpr ises  i s  very i n t e r e s t i n g  - 
concerning both product innovat ions and product ion innovations. 
One general  hypothesis i s  t h a t  because o f  t h e i r  f l e x i b i l i t y  the  smal l  
and medium scale i ndus t r i es  are able t o  make r a d i c a l  innovations. I n  a 
smal l  country, where the  home markets are small, successful  product 
development and product c o m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  seen t o  requ i re  a t i g h t  
spec ia l i za t i on  and a uor ld -w ide operat ion i s  usua l l y  t he re fo re  
required. This inc ludes major r i s k s  f o r  the small company, uh ich  i s  
technology- (or  design-) o r ien ted and based on product  innovations. 
The product development process includes not inc lude on l y  the techn ica l  
product innovations, but a l so  requ i res  many marketing innovat ions  and 
l a t e r  on product ion  innovations. This i s  t r ue  wether t h e  product  
s a t i s f i e s  a q u i t e  new need (or perhaps must even generate new needs) 
represents a r a d i c a l  innovat ion  i n  a nature branch, where the  market 
s i t u a t i o n  i s  s t a b i l i z e d  and dominated by uell-known supp l ie rs .  I n  both 
cases a considerable e f f o r t  i s  required t o  rake the  product  known and 
accepted. The achievement o f  a balanced growth, which t h e  
technology-marketing-production development requires, can be c r i t i c a l  
f o r  sna l l -  and medium scale enterpr ises  (see Ranta 1986b). 
I n  the  app l i ca t i on  o f  modern product ion technology (FMS, C I M )  t o  
managing the  r e l a t e d  organ iza t ion  and management innovat ions  can be 
great  problem f o r  a smal l  company because of  resources and s k i l l s  which 
are  needed t o  make an assessment. Moreover the  modern product ion  system 
can remarkably increase product ion  capaci ty which requ i res  new 
marketing and s t ra tegy  p r i nc ip les .  
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Fig. L. The s tab le  growth o f  a technology-oriented en te rp r i se  
To put the Idea f u r t h e r  we d l v l de  the smal l  and medlum scale enterprises 
I n t o  the fo l l ow lng  bas ic  categories: product o r l en ted  f i r m ,  product ion 
or len ted f i r m  and g e n e r a l i s t  f l r m .  Each o f  them requ i res  own type o f  
st rategy and moreover a strategy, which d i f f e r s  considerably from the 
l i f e  cycle concept. 
Product o r i en ted  f I r m  
A small company, which i s  product ion oriented, t y p l c a l l y  manaps 
product technology, i.e. can develop the  products and i t s  technology and 
has a good techno log ica l  knowledge. Typ ica l  examples o f  t h i s  k i n d  o f  
companies are spec ia l i zed  h igh  technology companies o r  design product 
companies. 
Their  problem and s t reng th  a t  the same t ime are j u s t  product o r i en ta t i on .  
Because o f  t ha t  they have knowledge t o  make a techno log i ca l  renewal 
process. Because o f  l i m i t e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and ma te r i a l  resources they have 
usual  problems w i t h  market ing and manufacturing. Because o f  spec ia l i zed 
product they are opera t ing  i n  a narrow market segment which requ i res  a 
wor ld wide marketing network. To b u i l d  up t h i s  organ iza t ion  requires much 
more resources than the  techno log ica l  development work and q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  knowledge and s k i l l s .  This can be overhelming f o r  a smal l  
company. 
Qui te analogous problem i s  t o  develop a manufacturing process which 
requires f i n a n c i a l  resources and q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  s k i l l s  and knowledge 
than techn ica l  product development. 
Bas i ca l l y  the  problem analogous t o  emerging i ndus t r y  (O l le ros  19861, 
although a product o r i e n t e d  f i r m  can be i n  a mature business ( l i k e  
ready-made c lo th) .  
A s t a b i l e  s t ra tegy  could be as fo l lows:  
- s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  according t o  the own product 
imago 
- development o f  the  organizat ion and the marketing network 
- u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a compet i t ive advantage r e l a t e d  t o  product  
technology t o  develop product ion  process and t o  create cost 
compet i t ion - a concept c a l l e d  a design product o f  long runs 
- manage the  renewal and growth 
groduct.ion o r i en ted  f i r m  
This k i n d  o f  a company, t y p i c a l l y ,  manage a c e r t a i n  manufacturing 
technology, which o f f e r s  a compet i t ive advantage regarding t o  cost and 
q u a l i t y .  This can be a s t rong base t o  operate as a h igh  q u a l i t y  p a r t  
suppl ier .  However, t h i s  requ i res  a continuos development o f  manufacturing 
technology and c l e a r  focusing. The company can be even a high-technology 
f i r m  - the manufacturing can base on u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  h igh  technology. A 
problem can be, as above, marketing and s e l l i n g  capacity. A s o l i d  
s t ra tegy  could be as fo l lows:  
- d e f i n i n g  o f  opera t ing  p r i n c i p l e s  and focusing 
- developing o f  manufacturing and bui ld ing-up o f  customer 
re la t i onsh ips  
- renewal o f  manufacturing and extension o f  the  operat ion 
- managing the  marketing and growth; b u i l d  up o f  a own s e l l i n g  
organ iza t ion  
General is t  f i r m  
A strategy seems t o  q u i t e  i n d e f i n i t e  - or  " to  make a l l  possible". 
Strategy opt ions  are as fo l lows:  
- t o  be a g e n e r a l i s t  
- t o  become a product o r ien ted company 
- t o  become a product ion  o r i en ted  company 
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3.3. TIME, SPACE, INNOVATION MANAGEMENT AND THE LIFE CYCLE CONCEPT 
Sven B. Lundatedt 
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The relationship between innovation management, its several 
life cycles, and time is a critical one, yet remains poorly under- 
stood. This paper will explore some of the aspects of this rela- 
tionship concerning the conduct of the management of innovation. 
It has a bearing not only upon the general theory of the firm, 
but also upon firms in the steel industry. Because time is such 
a critical variable in the success of innovation management, it 
must be appreciated as a fundamental dimension of a philosophy, 
or methodology, of innovation management. We will include a 
definition of the concept of time and then examine that definition 
in the light of the practice of innovation management. First a 
definition of innovation management. 
Innovation management is concerned with the process of in- 
novation in modern industrial and production organizations. Its 
unifying theme is that complex sequence starting with an inven- 
tion, or a reinvention, and ending with a product that is manufac- 
tured, sold, and eventually used in some way by people. Along 
the way, original invention may change its form into a usable 
object, process or technology suitable for marketing and distribu- 
tion. Innovation is a complex activity which proceeds from the 
conception of a new idea to a solution of the problem and then to 
the actual utilization of a new economic or social value. Innova- 
tion is not scientific discovery, although relevant discoveries 
may be incorporated into the innovation. Innovation should also 
be distinguished from invention, which is the creation of a new 
product or process or a concept of a means to satisfy a need. 
Finally, innovation is not the diffusion of technology, which has 
been defined as "the evolutionary process of replacement of an 
old technology by a newer one. The period of innovation is as- 
sumed to extend over a bounded interval of time, extending from 
the first realization, to when the first commercially successful 
embodiment of the innovation entered the market place."l~z 
This complicated process involves many aspects of organiza- 
tional life at different levels of an organization at different 
times,. coordinated in time and space to produce a desired result. 
Consequently, the competent management of time has always been 
essential in the successful coordination of management and produc- 
tion activity in innovation. 
Time is a complex idea that is usually associated with the 
concept of space, but there has been little historical consensus 
about it. Einstein, for example, described a four dimensional 
space-time continuum which includes three space dimensions and 
one time dimension. Newton thought of time and space as separate 
dimensions and conceived of time in an absolute as well as a 
relative sense. He meant by this absolute, true, mathematical 
time. Time and space are interrelated, but the elements of space 
possess unique rhythms of evolution and change. Consequently, 
because of different natural time rhythms, essentially different 
metrics of time are not only possible, but common. The term 
"concepts" is used precisely to indicate that it is the idea of 
time that is important. Measured time is not something inherent 
in an object or process, but an epiphenomenon -- a metric con- 
struct superimposed upon the natural rhythms of events. This 
metric is illustrated by mechanical devices like clocks which 
track the rhythms of events and processes. 
So, there can be many metrics of time to describe natural 
rhythms of development, evolution and change in natural processes 
and events. This is a highly relativistic concept of time, sub- 
ject to biological and physical variation as well as to psycholo- 
gical, sociological and cultural differences. This has consequen- 
ces also for the social coordination of production because any 
product or process is the result of different rhythms and streams 
of activity. If they do not coordinate, there will be no product. 
This rather obvious idea of coordination of events through time, 
while reflecting the inherent rhythm and pattern of activity 
required by the events, is true of the simplest biological tasks 
in humans and animals and the most complex industrial systems. 
Yet though this seems self-evident, so-called scientific manage- 
ment seemed to have disregarded this fact by using a single metric 
of production time to organize a work force and production proce- 
dure. The result has often been asynchronous dislocation and 
eventual systemic breakdown. More will be said about this later 
on. 
Historically speaking, the most basic time metric is the 
solar day based on the daily revolution of the earth. The rota- 
tion of the earth is said to be quite close to an ideal time 
standard. Also, so-called sidereal time based on the stars was 
the dominant concept of time long before clocks were invented. 
Calendars throughout history also reflect a cultural variety of 
concepts of metrics of time. Chinese and other Asian peoples 
distribute calendar days into cycles of sixty days each. The 
early Egyptians began with a lunar calendar as did the Hindus. 
The Greek calendar used a combination of the rhythm of the sun 
and moon as does the Jewish calendar. The Hejira or Muslim calen- 
dar was also based on lunar motion. The question as to which 
metric is the better one is probably not so important. One would 
have to specify important for what end? The point is that within 
these and other systems there was much variety as to metric units 
of time such as days, months and years, even though common natural 
rhythms of the sun and moon were used. 
The Perception and Experience of "Time" 
For human beings and all other forms of life, a space-time 
orientation is essential to adaptation and survival. Orientation 
in time and space is one of the fundamental adaptive requirements 
and conditions of existence. It is so basic, obvious and com- 
monplace that it is often overlooked and taken for granted, and 
so often in the management of complex systems this fundamental 
reality is ignored. We know, for example, that information and 
feedback is an essential functional component of a time-space 
orientation. However, in many organizations, this basic com- 
munication requirement for successful adaptation may be ignored, 
and thus managers may fail to provide opportunities for workers 
to utilize their basic time-space orientation fully. A deeper 
meaning of "participative management" recognizes this basic need 
in people, because it assures that people will have some indivi- 
dual control over time and space in their lives on the job. 
Other Issues 
In the past, errors in perception, assessment and application 
of certain concepts of time have resulted in serious asynchronous 
(mismatched) outcomes: Taylorism (scientific management), the 
rationalization of work procedures, is an early example. It 
presumed that an ordering of events according to rigid time se- 
quences, to which the individual was "fitted," would result in 
both efficiency and effectiveness. Perhaps it was less Frederick 
Taylor's design error initially than an interpretive error by 
those who later interpreted his work. The general case is il- 
lustrated below in Figures l and 2: 
Rationalized 
Production 
time metric 
Individual 
time metric 
Coordination or matching of the two rhythms is necessary to reduce 
costs due to the conflict between human and machine rhythms. 
Creation of the conditions for this type of conflict is an his- 
torical error not at all limited to the industrial revolution and 
thereafter. Given the over-determined commitment to rationalism 
during and after the Enlightenment, it is not hard to see the 
basis for this error in practice. Figure 3 illustrates the com- 
bined person-product relationship to productivity and time. We 
would assume an eventual decline in productivity would eventually 
occur, which is certainly the historical experience and a factor 
in the formation of such societal responses to conflict. 
Productivity 
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The modern socio-technical solution to this problem has been 
to create and to manage a convergence of human and machine 
rhythms, illustrated in Figure 4. 
Productivity 
Adaptation/Learning 
time metric 
Fig. 4 
Synchronous Time/Space Relations 
and Productivity 
Following a period of successful adapting and learning, the 
usual pattern has been to show an increase in productivity. A 
case example may illustrate some unwanted outcomes of asynchroni- 
city. Over three decades ago, a very large corporation con- 
structed a new assembly plant for cars in Ohio, USA. The produc- 
tion line was exceptionally well designed using the latest tech- 
nology. But, the rhythmic fit between people and the assembly 
line was poor. One factor that contributed to a major strike and 
shut down the plant was changing the speed of the assembly line 
(timing) beyond human ability to respond. A public sector example 
of asynchronicity involving a production line was the U.S. Post 
Office in an earlier day. The inability of workers to speed up 
their response rhythms and still meet basic human needs became 
apparent. The problems were the familiar outcomes of productivity 
decline, absenteeism, turnover, and costly errors. 
The recent solutions to the problem of asynchronicity have 
largely been socio-technical in nature as illustrated by the 
Swedish example at Volvo's Kalmar plant, in the new Honda in- 
tegrated automobile plant in Ohio and a Ford stamping plant in 
northern Ohio. All three have been reasonably successful solu- 
tions to meeting human needs while reaching requirements in pro- 
duction logic and manufacturing. As a matter of fact, the longer 
run effects of time rhythm sychronicity are usually salutary and 
overcome the long run adverse effects of asynchronicity ~hich 
eventually arise. The price paid for historical blindness toward 
the dangers of rhythmic discontinuities has been very high in 
human suffering ranging from labor unrest to accidents and the 
longer term effects of work stress, not to mention poor produc- 
tivity quality. One regularly told anecdote is in the form of a 
warning never to purchase cars built on Monday or Friday because 
rhythmic asynchronicity is highest at these times in many cases. 
Flexible times for working has been one solution to this difficul- 
ty. 
The perception of time is a critical factor in productivity, 
quality control, work satisfaction, and overall performance qual- 
ity. Reference to cultural differences has been made earlier. 
It is easy to see that the perception of time will affect the 
natural conduct of production. If employees cannot maintain 
schedules, get to work on time, or coordinate with others because 
of different time perceptions, serious production discontinuities 
will arise. 
Paul Fraisse has said thatVRhythmic induction, or the occur- 
rence of organic periodicities which synchronize with periodici- 
ties in nature, constitutes a form of adaptation to the temporal 
conditions of existence. The general biological and psychological 
significance of this statement for adaptation is obvious. Rhyth- 
mic induction permits living creatures to turn reflex reactions 
into reactions of anticipation ... The existence of organic rhythms 
induced by periodic variations in the environment has particularly 
important consequences for man. They provide him with an internal 
clock..."2 My point is that because this internal "clock" will 
vary from person to person, from group to group and from culture 
to culture, the design of any production system may also have to 
vary. Modern "flexitime" policies for employees recognize this 
fact in contrast to earlier production and management systems 
which rigidly superimposed an arbitrary metric of time for every- 
one and to which everyone was regimented, regardless of individual 
differences and needs which was illustrated in Taylorism. 
There are not only variations in the perception of time, but 
evidence also that differences in attitudes and motivation can 
have the effect of changing the perception and response to time 
duration. It will affect our subjective evaluation of time dura- 
tion where such an evaluation may lead to important changes in 
behavior. An over-consciousness of time, for example, may be 
related to boredom on the job. Time seems to pass more quickly 
when there is high motivation and interest in the work than where 
not. In an interesting discussion of time perspectives, Gonzalez 
and Zimbardo illustrate the relativity of time and show how it 
relates to such variables as age, gender and income, for example.3 
Levine and Wolf explain how time is also culturally defined and 
determined . 4  
This evidence suggests that the initial strategic design of 
the organization requires careful attention to how measured time 
is conceived and integrated into the overall rhythm of production. 
Modern socio-technical management recognizes the need to accom- 
modate in some appropriate way the separate individual behavioral 
rhythms of employees with the overall production rhythms of the 
organization whether it be a factory or an office. 
Time Perceptions and Rhythms 
Consider the interesting side effects of different percep- 
tions and rhythms of time as they might also affect communication 
between people. Assuming a single metric like a clock is the 
standard of comparison, then it is not uncommon for different 
cultures and individuals to interpret that metric either very 
loosely or very stringently with point interpretations in between 
these two extremes. Some people are punctual, others not. For 
some, the interpretation of time with reference to this metric 
standard is always quite precise. To others, personal rhythms as 
shaped and affected by personal needs and wants predominantly 
seem to influence the perception of time. 
For example, during the industrial revolution in England and 
the United States, punctuality became an enforced standard to fit 
people to machines to assure maximum productivity efficiency. 
Consequently, indigenous peoples in less developed areas, where 
the use of the time metric and standard to enforce national pro- 
cedures in production is employed, would undoubtedly function 
less well in an assembly line system until they have adapted 
their sense of time. Their sense of time might better fit custom 
and batch mode of production. According to Max Weber's definition 
of bureaucracy, enforcement of a uniform time standard is an 
underlying characteristic of the "routinization of charisma" and 
regularization and rationalization of organizational behavior 
common during and after the industrial revolution in the West. 
However, rigid standardization of the time metric by clocks 
is now being reinterpreted in modern organizations in such a way 
that the needs and wants of employees are given greater recogni- 
tion in the new industrial and organizational environment. The 
rapprochement between the formal organization and the individual 
is the result of a compromise which is based on a recognition that 
if the clock standard is interpreted less rigidly, productivity 
may actually increase because life styles and production styles 
can become mutually supporting rhythms. 
Consider below in Figure 5 the hypothesized implications of 
a variable perception of the standard of time in five cultures. 
- Japa 
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The obvious conclusion is that the personal "metric" for time is 
highly varied as is the cultural norm. Person/machine coordina- 
tion is more difficult in cultures when there is greater varia- 
tion. 
Socio-Technical Leadership: An Example of Time Responsiveness 
Chosen here because of its relative comprehensiveness, 
Likert's "System 4" management approach seems implicitly to encom- 
pass these socio-technical time requirements for effective innova- 
tion management. For example, when providing leadership and 
supervision, "System 4" managers act in supportive ways towards 
employees by providing praise and positive feedback to them about 
their work. In addition to the obvious motivational value of re- 
warding behavior, an incentive in itself, it also encourages a 
positive space-time orientation, especially toward important 
people in the work environment who have power and control over 
their environment. Consequently, this may reduce the level of 
anxiety associated with work stress, especially that coming from 
a powerful other who may be seen as a source of threat to one's 
ability to cope effectively and to survive in that environment.5 
An emphasis on effective team development and team behavior 
provides a second important aspect of leadership. To the extent 
that effective work teams flourish, different individual rhythms 
of productive behavior are coordinated through group process in 
more effective ways. The satisfaction of personal needs in groups 
complement individual productive behavior so that individual 
"time" frames and group "time" frames are more synergistic. 
Complex jobs are made easier if people are friendly and help one 
another. For example, the production team approach in the Volvo 
Kalmar plant in Sweden is a case in point, as are the Honda system 
and other new socio-technical approaches in the General Motors and 
Ford corporations. Team members are able to adapt their time 
orientations to their work roles and responsibilities as personal 
and group needs require to reach overall production goals. 
A third aspect of such leadership concerns the provision of 
technical support and other useful job related information by 
managers, including necessary tools with which to work. Some of 
this technical support may be educational over a long period of 
time, a common example being employee development programs. 
Again, this addresses the issue of time management and space-time 
orientation through effective information and task related tech- 
nology. Obvious as it may seem, this is still an area of major 
problems in management. Employees often do not know what they 
are doing or what they are supposed to do all the time, especially 
where job related systems undergo change. An individual's know- 
ledge base may not be up-to-date or functional and timely, nor 
are they always given proper tools with which to work. 
A fourth aspect is concerned with future time orientation 
about productivity goals. Expectations about future events, 
especially those which bring rewards and success, are very impor- 
tant motivators and integrating factors in behavior. Expecting 
the highest possible reasonable standards of work goals from 
everyone is essential to developing a high level of work satisfac- 
tion and a sense of team and organizational loyalty and pride. 
Lack of a suitable orientation for work energy dissipates that 
energy, often in non-productive ways. 
The fifth aspect involves enlarging the sense of ownership 
through encouraging greater participation in all relevant facets 
of the production system. Participation, therefore, encourages, 
through the sense of ownership of a part of the life of the or- 
ganization, a blending of the pattern of an individual's concept 
of the future with that of the organization. One is more likely 
to accommodate one's personal rhythms more readily to what one 
owns than to what is seen as foreign to one's needs, expecta- 
tions, aspirations and other personal goals. Lateness and absen- 
teeism, physically or psychologically, are important problems in 
time management, and would seem to be correlated with the extent 
to which there is less personal involvement in the organization's 
activity by employees. 
Other important aspects include the timing of interpersonal 
communications within and among employees and work groups; the 
rhythm of tactfulness, awareness and propriety reflecting a basic 
attitude of respect for others' psychological "life space." 
These leadership characteristics form a basis for improved time- 
space consciousness in management closely related to higher pro- 
ductivity, lower error, and lower absenteeism and lateness.6 
Strategic Organizational Time-Space Considerations 
Time and the rhythm of choice in strategic decision making 
is critical in innovation. This concerns pacing innovations from 
the initial invention to final diffusion of a product in a market, 
encompassing the critical steps of research and development, 
raising venture capital where needed, and marketing. A most 
difficult aspect of innovation management is forecasting future 
need. For the most part, forecasting technology is poor at best. 
Sensing when to invest is still a difficult art. Timing is still 
less frequently successful when based on formal analysis, than on 
experience and intuition. It is more of an art than a science, 
and holistic and intuitive. 
Marketing, management science and organizational behavior 
contribute to understanding decision making and choice under 
uncertainty which can be applied to problems of innovation manage- 
ment. Along with everything else, innovation management at this 
level, including strategic planning, requires highly effective 
information systems that help organizations to locate their time- 
space focus in the innovation management cycle from invention 
(R&D) to product diffusion. Readiness to innovate will depend, 
in part, on information about the past, present and future human 
needs and wants. If there is a match between those needs and 
wants and the particular product innovation offered to the market, 
the innovation may succeed. Timing once again is critical at all 
phases of a life cycle. 
Marketing technology, much of it borrowed from the social 
sciences, has become very effective by including survey research, 
among other techniques. Measurement of consumer preferences 
(consumer behavior), in a tradition started years ago at The 
University of Michigan's Survey Research Center economic behavior 
program by the late George Katona, is still one of the most effec- 
tive methodologies for this purpose. Yet consumer preferences 
may not always reflect certain reported needs and wants at a 
given moment. One may like to own an innovative car, but one may 
not either need or want one at that moment in time. Complex 
individual and group circumstances may transcend the statistical 
regularities of a given survey of preferences no matter how exten- 
sive the population sample. So even though it is important to 
include this kind of data in one's information menu for decision 
making, it is necessary to do so with a certain amount of careful 
analysis of the situation at the moment. 
Just when we think we may have captured the essence of con- 
sumer attitudes toward a product we can be surprised to find it is 
different because the rhythm of behavior has moved beyond our time 
boundaries. Leon Festinger once pointed out that in measuring 
attitudes one had to keep in mind the distinction between thinking 
and doing -- between thought and action. While one may like a 
particular product for some reason or other, one might never go 
out and buy it for entirely different reasons, some of which may 
include not having enough money, peer pressure, and so on; as 
aspects of timing, attitude measurement and timing are closely 
related and are far from simple. Yet apart from these limita- 
tions, such "decision support systems" are necessary in effective 
innovation management. 
Planned obsolescence and other strategic choices are not 
unusual in innovation management. Information about consumer 
wants and needs often is ignored for strategic and tactical rea- 
sons that have nothing at all to do with consumer needs and wants. 
Innovations are often held back to control the rate of diffusion 
so that greater market control is attained along with greater 
profits for a longer period of time. Sometimes it may take the 
form of planned obsolescence. If innovations are dribbled out a 
few at a time, the possibilities for increased market control are 
greater, although sometimes public clamor for something new and 
better will be so great that a manufacturer cannot ignore it. It 
is far from clear if consumer readiness to buy is more intrinsic 
or extrinsic, and whether advertising always works as it should. 
Other organizational time-space considerations include over- 
all management of research and development as a source of inven- 
tion and innovation. The patterns of RLD management are numerous, 
ranging from the earlier creative forms used by the E.I. DuPont 
Company, which led to the discovery of the polymer called Kylon. 
Without the creative R&D environment, almost like what one might 
find in basic research in a university, perhaps Wallace Carothers, 
the discoverer of Nylon would never have done so. The impact of 
this discovery and all the innovation and inventions it spawned 
is an industrial legend.' Other forms of R&D innovation manage- 
ment can be more focused on immediate results that have a market 
value in the short term. It is also not hard to create a man- 
agement environment in which the rewards are such that scientists, 
engineers and others in product development work for short term 
results and "bottom line" goals if that is the strategic objec- 
tive. But this may come at different stages in the "life cycle" 
of a product. 
The interesting and perplexing question is again one of how 
to think about time and space. Where should strategic manage- 
ment's focus be located? Upon short time horizons or upon longer 
time horizons, or combinations of the two in strategically oppor- 
tune ways? Notwithstanding the limits of most, if not all, fore- 
casting, we do need to have a greater sensitivity toward the 
future since it is often true that what will develop spontaneously 
within a longer period will be quite surprising. Innovation 
management requires a creative combination of time series, time 
horizons and a sense for both long and short rhythms of events. 
Moreover, the words long and short are, as a rule, not very des- 
criptive or precise forms of language to use in this case. A 
more precise and flexible metric of time is needed to identify 
length of time and place. For example, when we speak of short 
and long term, do we mean minutes, days, months, years and so on? 
Quarters are widely used. 
The rhythmic free style of some music is a good analogy and 
example of the creative use of meter to reach certain novel ef- 
fects of variation and contrast similar to nature. In natural 
settings, rhythms change, often rapidly. Compare the rhythmic 
variations in the classical symphony form with those of a Stravin- 
sky and one has an idea of how important variations in meter can 
be to express the ideas of time and space in music. In the pro- 
duction systems of the future, the meter and rhythm of work may 
be highly variable. Perhaps an analogy with some of the better 
forms of modern music is not inaccurate. Instead of the block 
form of classical rhythms with its regular meter, modern forms 
change often from bar to bar, but the overall effect is a meaning- 
ful pattern which makes sense. It is interesting that pre-classi- 
cal forms often displayed a high degree of rhythm variation, thus 
reflecting more natural rhythms. 
Time is an arrow and never a boomerang and as a measured 
rhythm always has a forward thrust and is in reality non-repeti- 
tive. Even in so-called cycles when some events seem to recur 
again and again, they recur differently. No cycle or pattern is 
a true repetition. Consideration of time, therefore, is develop- 
mental, evolutionary and unique. Clocks and engines, as well as 
people, wear out eventually. Trees may bear different qualities 
and quantities of fruit each season. The cycle of a given innova- 
tion may differ each time so that it loses its value or gains new 
value. 
Other Spaces, Other Considerations 
Innovation management often requires other forms of coor- 
dinated institutional management which may involve externalities 
such as public policy and government. For example, 1978 and 1979 
seemed to be bumper years for commentaries on this theme. The 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) published a report on 
stimulating technological progress and explored such agendas as 
tax policy, technology transfer, and federal support of R&D. The 
U.S. National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council 
in 1978, 1979, and 1980 completed monographs based on studies of 
trade and related economic issues among other things. The Carter 
Administration's Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation 
issued its final report in 1979 with reports on economic and 
trade policy, environmental, health and safety regulation, in- 
dustry structure and competition, patent and information policy 
and procurement and direct federal support of RCD.819 
Recurring agendas seem to include recommendations about 
economic and tax policy, federal R&D support, regulation, patents 
and information policy, antitrust regulation and so on. The time 
coordination of such multiple agendas of such orders of organiza- 
tional and societal complexity raise a spate of questions concern- 
ing "industrial policy" and when and how government is to play a 
role in the encouragement of innovation, new ventures and economic 
development in general. When to intervene in any given economic 
situation is, for those who guide public policy in market or 
planned economies, an interesting strategic question. The painful 
failures due to misplaced innovations in the Third World due to 
poorly time, and planned, investment and aid are well known. 
Often in the past, the timing for a particular form of support 
for innovation is wrong or misplaced because a culture's concept 
of time is not well enough understood. Also government support 
in the U.S. does not take a concerted form as in Japan where 
coordination between public and private sectors is close. Because 
of the structure of the American government, unilateral decisions 
of an economic nature are usually not possible without Congres- 
sional approval if they are far reaching and important. 
This discussion so far is not intended to be exhaustive, but 
to show that the time and space attributes of innovation manage- 
ment are critical. Time is ubiquitous and underlies all analyses 
of management systems and procedures. To oversimplify it is a 
serious mistake because the rhythms of measured time are so stra- 
tegically important in resource allocation. We not only need a 
more varied definition of time, but a more creative attitude 
towards its definition and use. 
Reflections on Time and the Learning Curve 
To illustrate how errors in estimation and judgments can 
occur because of under specification of time in theory, consider 
the following example of the familiar learning curve concept from 
economics. The economic definition of a "learning curve" can 
take this form. 
Experience X 
time metric 
The assumption is that as "experience increases (ceteris 
parabis), costs should decrease and productivity increase, but 
the term "experience" is an under-specification of the actual 
human learning process. Learning is much more than just "ex- 
perience;" it is a highly complex cognitive process and a way in 
which the mind adapts to a new situation. There are, of course, 
numerous ways to think about the learning process. However, for 
the purposes of this example, a taxonomy, created by B. S. Bloom, 
that identifies six fundamental mental processes in learning as 
an "experience" will be used to make this point. 
Learning involves knowledge (data) and comprehension, but 
equally important are the complex mental processes and cognitive 
behaviors called evaluation, application, analysis and synthesis. 
Evaluation, for example, is complex because this cognitive process 
involves using a value system to judge and assess a product and 
process. Consequently, the manner in which an individual a )  
acquires (learns) values, whether by conditioning, imitation or 
insight, and b) judges something using them is necessary to know 
if one is estimating the time it takes people to progress along 
the learning curve. 
The same may be said for such mental processes as applica- 
tion, analysis, and synthesis. Especially where new tools are 
put to use, application is central. Whether given in training 
sessions or in the form of written manuals, the steps from an 
explanation of how something works to its internalization by an 
employee, and then to its subsequent expression in performance, 
not only takes time, but also reflects the fact that people vill 
differ in the time it takes to learn to apply (see Figure 7). 
Ignoring such individual differences in learning rates only adds 
to under and overestimation and serious error in design and man- 
agement. 
WHO ARE: 
Moderately Fast 
This last point is, of course, an invitation to learn someth- 
ing about the psychology and sociology of human learning, one of 
the most critical and least understood aspects of organizational 
and economic change. 
Learning itself, that is, the manner in which these cognitive 
processes are acquired, is highly complex as well as open to 
several kinds of interpretation. Learning theorists such as B. F. 
Skinner and others follow a conditioning model. Gestalt theorists 
like Koffka and Kohler follow a "systems-gestalt" model of learn- 
ing. Edward Tolman, on the other hand, tried to combine the two 
in his "sign-gestalt" learning theory. So time in the learning 
process will be interpreted differently depending upon which of 
those points of views one holds. 
Note Figure 8 which is intended to illustrate the point that 
a gross, undifferentiated measure of learning can lead to under 
and overestimation of the time it takes a group to learn data, 
theory and facts, to comprehend them and then to apply, evaluate, 
analyze, or synthesize them. 
Function 
time metric 
Learning: Change in Cognitive Functions 
Knowledge 
Comprehension 
Application 
Evaluation 
Analysis 
Synthesis 
Ecological Changes 
All Human systems are ecological in nature. That is to say, 
they are ecological because they are affected by resources and 
competition for them, and always are subject to changes due to a 
process called succession -- the process by which one phase or 
stage is followed by another ending with a so-called "climax 
community." In this way, time maps the ecological changes due to 
changes in residents in a system including not only plants and 
animals, but also the influence of technology. The number of 
residents in an ecological system at any given time is critical. 
Who drops out and who survives is also important because those 
who remain may either be generative bringing new life, or degen- 
eratove bringing decline in the eco-system. To the extent that 
the world is seen as a eco-system, we may now seriously question 
whether the human race as a planet occupant is sufficiently regen- 
erative ecologically given our destruction of the global ecology. 
This way of thinking about time emphasizes the configurational 
changes over time in both structure and process, bearing in mind 
that it is the underlying processes undergoing change and not the 
time metric. Note the progression in Figure 9. 
Rate of Eco- 
logical Change 
by Residents 
Fig. 9 
Final Remarks 
Consider finally the important distinction between the terms 
"cycle" and "evolution" and why it is necessary to make a distinc- 
tion between the two. The Oxford Dictionary defines a cycle as a 
recurring series, while an evolution is defined as an "opening 
out" or "development" over time. The natural rhythm of time in a 
regular cycle, such as the rising and setting of the sun and 
moon, is a stable recurring event that itself has been the stan- 
dard of the metric of time. Or consider as another example side- 
real cycles or the measures of time using observations of succes- 
sive apparent movements of certain stars. 
It is quite obvious that in highly routinized forms of manu- 
facturing, the basis of volume production and economies of scale 
is to create small cycles of activity. Custom and batch produc- 
tion is much more evolutionary in the sense that the product may 
be individualized and changed as it is made. The former em- 
phasizes regularity of production and efficiency; the latter does 
so less often. 
As previously noted, it would seem that in some cultures the 
assembly line process may present difficulties of fit between 
people and machines where the space-time concept is rather loosely 
defined. Moreover, to utilize a cycle concept of recurring events 
where evolution is required may create a basis for serious errors 
in planning. 
Consider, therefore, Figure 10, which associates the standard 
time metric with the level of strategic analysis. It is important 
to know whether events are truly cyclic or evolutionary. Each 
would require quite different strategies. For example, in econ- 
omic development, evolutionary trends are very important because 
one is looking for improvements in agriculture, manufacturing and 
eventually the quality of life. A mistaken interpretation of the 
weather as a cycle could, therefore, be a serious mistake for a 
farmer when so much weather behavior has an evolutionary character 
and is not strictly recurrent and cyclic. This affects one's 
view of the future and determines expectations and thus allocation 
of scarce resources. 
Even the so-called "long wave" theory may not be a long 
cycle as the theory suggests, but an evolutionary phenomenon. So 
the beginning of the wave is not the same as the end of it. How 
we view the future as well as the past is shaped significantly by 
the degree to which we expect events roughly to be the same or 
different than before. Of course, strictly speaking, nothing is 
every the same as before since clocks run down, the sun's radia- 
tion will change, stars burn out and die, and so on. Yet relative 
recurrence is important to distinguish for obvious reasons because 
we depend on cycles for our existence and welfare, as we depend 
on evolutionary trends. Please consider Figure 10. Figure 10 
suggests how we may profitably view the range of levels of analg- 
sis in strategic planning for any system about which knowledge of 
cyclic or evolutionary activity is required. 
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Levels of Analysis 
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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of the investigation was to find the way 
leading to the construction of a consistent theory of innovation. 
The methodology applied was that of brief reviews of specific 
approaches to the phenomenon of innovation used by the various 
branches of science and their inter-relationship. On the basis 
of a cybernetic model, the system character of the process of 
innovation is explored. Blocks of findings from economics, en- 
gineering sciences, sociology, and other branches of science are 
used to show the applicability of the system approach to innova- 
tion. It is found that innovation is rather a surplus effect of 
the functioning of a so-called technological system. Therefore, 
the technological system, i.e. labor organized into a system, 
from the point of view of the resources of the national economy, 
can be seen as a primary system, while innovation can be con- 
sidered as a tool or means of economic development. 
INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is a complex phenomenon which cannot be kept 
within the bounds of any discipline today. It has generally been 
accepted that in the long-run innovation is the primary drive of 
economic development. Let us have a quick glance at the various 
branches of science to see their specific features and charac- 
teristics, when studying and analyzing innovation as a pheno- 
menon. 
BRANCHES OF SCIENCE AND INNOVATION 
It is a paradoxical fact that economics is the one branch of 
science which has overlooked the primary effect of innovation for 
a long time. Economics used to consider innovation as a sup- 
plementary activity of organization, necessary to satisfy social 
needs, that is, requirements of supply and demand. Some econo- 
mists looked at it as a separate, specific economic system which 
could be placed somewhere between the forces and relations of 
production, while others thought of it as a process separate from 
the material sphere, independent of production, mostly preceding 
production itself. The generated technological knowledge and its 
utilization were judged on the basis of hierarchy, in a linear 
way, stage by stage, "the existing and useful novelty is first 
put into production, then marketed." 
Inventions were considered rather as isolated phenomena, and 
the role played by the knowledge of engineering within economics 
was neglected, despite the fact that from the technical point of 
view innovation is a kind of activity which can never be carried 
out in one step. It is a series of steps; it is a continuous, 
uninterrupted creative work of engineering. 
Sociology is a younger branch of science than economics. It 
is in the sphere of gravitation created by the continuous interac- 
tion between the "hard" social sciences and our current system of 
values. In the case of innovation, however, both the dynamic 
changes of this process and its basic social functions have been 
overlooked by sociology for a long time. Sociology has also 
underestimated the fact that innovation also means a process on 
the micro-level (taking place within the community) and undergoes 
a long, tiresome and painful period of shaping, development, and 
revision, before resulting in a product. 
The study of groups and social structures are in accord with 
political science when innovation is analyzed through the behavior 
and relationships of various groups of society. Here special 
emphasis is placed on the relationship between companies and 
authorities, the attitude and behavior of managers, the central- 
ization (or decentralization) of organizations and management, 
the proportion of state intervention and company independence. 
While political science focuses only on the external condi- 
tions and relations of innovation, psychology, and within this 
socio-psychology, concentrates on and limits its attention to the 
study and analysis of the innermost drives of innovation, that 
is, individual human behavior. It is extremely difficult, how- 
ever, to reveal the stimulus of creative thinking within the 
process of innovation by relying on human psychical behavior 
alone. 
Within the sphere of social sciences, jurisprudence can be 
characterized by its pragmatic attitude. The registration of 
priority means moral appreciation for the inventor and a basis 
for his financial recognition on the one hand, while indicating a 
certain amount of market protection and economic contribution to 
the use of the novelty, on the other. Through the collaboration 
of engineering and jurisprudence, the applied science of protec- 
ting industrial propertx came into existence, and the contradic- 
tions of its own existence were almost immediately recognized: 
the newness and the protection of the novelty seemed to be en- 
dangered by continuous development, by the ceaseless process of 
innovation which had created the novelty itself. 
From the aspect of innovation, the most significant achieve- 
ments have been brought about by the philosophical-methodological 
sciences flourishing on the basis of recognizing the specific 
impact of complex systems and by the various branches of engineer- 
ing connected thereto. 
The sign of development along this line was the appearance of 
system-cybernetic research and the separation of the concepts of 
simple and complex. Complex (non-physical) systems cannot be 
adequately characterized by their complexity alone; they can be 
described more accurately by such factors as the interdependence 
and reciprocal effects of components, teleological character, 
decision-making, impact of subjectivity, conflicts and uncertain- 
ty, insufficient information, the impossibility of comparing 
indicators, self-regulation, and the fact that the total effect 
of the complex system is generally greater than the total effects 
of the individual components. The engineering way of thinking 
has been gaining new ground because complex systems cannot only 
be studied and analyzed, they can be designed and created as 
well. At the same time, the one-sidedness of engineering with 
regard to innovation is shown by the fact that it considers or- 
ganizations as tools and people as elements of the process, and 
thinks in terms of physical measurements and actual efficiency. 
THE FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM 
To illustrate the principle of the complexity approach, let 
us see the application of the interdisciplinary approach when 
setting up one of the possible models of the innovation process. 
The Closed Circle of Innovation, which is often called the 
cybernetic model of the process of innovation, describes the ini- 
tial concept for every related branch of science. It expresses 
the unity of the social process of innovation, its system charac- 
ter. 
The application of the philosophical-methodological prin- 
ciples of complexity on innovation means that we can speak about 
a complex system, sizing up alternatives, striving for purposeful 
decision-making, even when sufficient information is lacking. It 
is a self-generating system, made up of several components, but 
flexible at the same time, not only setting tasks for itself, but 
ceaselessly searching for the information necessary for the most 
expedient solution as well. 
Applying the engineering approach, the model recognized the 
function of the system as a uniform process of generating and 
processing information. Thus, it is not a privilege of R&D to 
feed information into the system, as this can be done by the sub- 
systems of marketing or production, too. To illustrate the hier- 
archical structure of the model in a simpler way, the economics 
approach can be applied. In keeping with this, research, develop- 
ment, production, and marketing are sub-systems of the process, 
but their function does not only involve the processing of infor- 
mation, but also the generation of new information. The engineer- 
ing approach is reflected in the recognition that the process is 
not linear. Its phases overlap both in chronologically and logi- 
cally. There are several feed-backs to the preceding phases, and 
thereby, in an ideal situation, self-regulation of the system is 
achieved. 
As one can see, marketing is a component of the process of 
innovation and, as its sub-system, takes part in the generating 
and processing of information. At the same time, however, it 
fulfills the function of controlling the system as well. Verify- 
ing values through the market mechanism also serves as a social 
control or regulation of the whole technological processing of 
information and facilitates coordination with social needs. This 
is how the theory of information links up with the theory of 
economic value-creation. While the technological system as a 
whole, representing a conglomeration of the elements of the in- 
novation process, considers the generation of information to be 
its function, striving to produce the highest value, the checking, 
verifying mechanism of the market is meant to establish harmony 
between this change and the needs of society. 
A non-empirical, but purely cognitive, model of the Closed 
Circle of Innovation is unsuitable for providing a more differen- 
tiated illustration of relations or a thorough study of the in- 
frastructure of innovation. It can, however, be used as a filter 
of thoughts when thinking within a framework or within the context 
of structures or processes in the course of decision-making. 
From among the general principles of complexity, the follow- 
ing can be pointed out, as being relevant also for innovation. 
* The principle of teleology says that in order to achieve a 
goal several ways are possible. Therefore, we cannot speak 
about an optimum technology from the aspect of the scien- 
tific-technological progress. 
* The principle of minimum stipulation states that the "man- 
machine" type of socio-technological system continuously 
changes in time. Therefore, in order to fulfill its func- 
tion, the organization must have a satisfactory degree of 
freedom and independence in decision-making. Only some 
essential limiting regulations can be tolerated. 
* Efficiency is a feature of complex systems, actually a syno- 
nym for the accessibility of the goal. Therefore, efficiency 
is defined as the probability of achieving the goal in the 
case of a system laid down and functioning within the firm's 
medium. Since in the case of innovation the goal itself 
cannot be considered as flexible and the system and its 
media are mobile factors, efficiency can only be a relative 
factor. When referring to a technological system, it is 
right to speak about technical, political, and cultural 
efficiency, and productivity can be mentioned, too, in the 
context of economic aspects. The principle of joint op- 
timization, however, indicated that there are correlations 
among these factors on a mutual basis and that in the course 
of innovation productivity reaches its maximum value as and 
when permitted by the joint mobility of the technical, so- 
cial, and other components of efficiency. 
CONCLUSION 
The work organized in a system is considered as a technologi- 
cal system; the utilization of new knowledge produced by the 
technological system is regarded as innovation. The author of 
this paper has formed the opinion that technology as a system, 
from the point of view of the resources of the national economy, 
can be characterized as a primary system, while innovation can be 
considered as the tool or means of economic development. Innova- 
tion has been raised to the level of primary economic concepts 
through the recognition of its significance within the economy 
itself. Having recognized its social and economic role, there is 
an urgent need to work out a consistent theory of innovation as 
well. 
3.5. COMPANY SIZE AND INNOVATION ACTIVITY IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
Prof. Milan Maly 
Technology, Economoy & Society Program, IIASA 
Laxenburg, Austria 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the role of company size as an important 
organizational attribute in the area of strategic management, 
especially innovation management. The main objective of our 
current study is to specify the role of company size as a factor 
of time, where time is represented by the phases of the technolo- 
gical life cycle. The new elements in this study are the global 
worldwide viewpoint and the usage of the technological life cycle 
concept. Moreover, a new methodological access for dividing 
companies into groups has been developed. 
There is a general impression among the public that small, 
young companies are more innovative than larger, older ones. The 
number of researchers studying the relationship between company 
size and innovation ability is very high.1 
The notion that small, young companies are more innovative 
is far from unambiguous, but many authors are in agreement on the 
subject. On the other hand, many authors cite examples where 
large companies seem more innovative. 
A further third group of researchers feel the problem of 
determining which size of firm (small, medium or large) is most 
innovative is much more difficult to resolve. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
At the workshop, "Size and Productive Efficiency: The Wider 
Implications," held at IIASA in June, 1979, one of the major 
topics of discussion was the relationship between scale and in- 
novation, in particular the way in which the development and 
adoption of innovations are influenced by the size of the firm. 
One result was that an optimum organization size exists for major 
process innovations: not so small that a diversity of managerial 
experience is lacking and not so large that there is rigid bureau- 
cracy and lack of common purpose. 
lFor more details, see Maly, 1987. 
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The above mentioned facts demonstrate a wide diversity of 
opinion among researchers. We hypothesize that the optimal com- 
pany size from the point of view of innovative activity depends 
on many factors (industry, technological life cycle phase, country 
size, country's industrial structure, etc.) and changes according 
to these factors. From this viewpoint, we cannot speak of an 
optimal size in general, but only of an optimal size under speci- 
fied conditions. We must consider the fact that the optimal size 
is changing over time in conjunction with the changing critical 
factors. 
Company (or enterprise or other organizational unit) size is 
measured by many different criteria, as one comprehensive crite- 
rion to specify size has not yet been agreed upon. These crite- 
ria can be divided into 3 main groups: 
* company's material substance, 
* company input, 
* company output. 
Material substance measurements would usually include the 
number of employees, the value of capital goods, and total capi- 
tal. Input is expressed mainly by the consumption of raw materi- 
als or energy, and output by number of units/tons produced, gross 
output, etc. 
Using any one of these criteria has both strong and ueak as- 
pects. For example, the most wide-spread criterion is probably 
the number of employees, but difficulties arise with this in the 
case of automated production. Each criterion conveys different 
aspects of size. From that point of view, it is necessary uhen 
conducting a concrete analysis to select the criterion most ap- 
propriate for fulfilling the objectives of the analysis, in an 
effort to eliminate inconclusive results. 
The object of our study is the steel industry, namely- BOF 
technology. The most significant and comparable criterion in this 
case is the capacity of raw steel production per year. This 
criterion is usually used to indicate the size not only of a 
steel-mill plant, but of the entire integrated steel company as 
well. Moreover, the criterion is widely used in literature, 
statistics and reports as well as in articles and research papers. 
It is furthermore used in both planned and market economy coun- 
tries. 
Using the number of company employees is not acceptable, 
because of differences in production profiles, mainly of the 
rolling-mills, which greatly influence productivity and the re- 
quired number of employees involved. Other material substance 
criteria, such as the value of capital goods or total capital, 
could be used, but are less suitable when taking into account not 
only Western, but also Eastern companies (where this data is not 
available). Input criteria, such as consumption of raw materials 
or energy, are also not available in many cases. Output criteria, 
for instance total volume of raw steel production per year, is 
influenced by the level of capacity utilization. 
The second methodological issue is specifying the boundaries 
between groups of company size. Three groups are usually dis- 
tinguished in literature, official statistics and reports as 
small, medium and large companies. Authors, however, use dif- 
ferent boundaries for the three groups. These boundaries depend 
on the object of the study under question: an entire industry, 
different branches of industry, or other branches of national 
economies (agriculture, transport, service, etc.). 
Statistics covering the steel industry usually use the fol- 
lowing divisions: up to 500,000 tons of raw steel capacity per 
year for small companies, 500,000 to 1,500,000 tons for medium, 
and over 1,500,000 tons for large. This division is also used in 
literature. If we examine this more deeply, we must state that 
so far these boundaries have been established most subjectively 
and are hardly suitable for a detailed analysis. Our idea is to 
create more natural and homogeneous groups by means of suitable 
mathematical methods, in order to derive more statistically sig- 
nificant results. Figure 1 shows us the example of Swedish steel 
companies divided by the customary boundaries. At once, it is 
clearly visible that these boundaries do not create any natural, 
homogeneous groups. 
SWEDEN - SIZE OF STEEL COMPANY - CRUDE STEEL OUTPUT 
SMALL ; MEDIUM ; U R G E  
(17 COMPANIES) 
Figure 1 
In our case, we used a new method for clustering points 
located on the line of real numbers, combining cluster analysis 
and histogram as developed by S. Miyamoto.2 
After clustering the companies into more homogeneous groups, 
we come to the very difficult methodological problem of how to 
distinguish the more innovative companies from the others. We are 
aware of the difficulties this task presents, but it is possible, 
however, to formulate the hypothesis that the more innovative 
companies are those who adopted a new technology or product in 
the early period following ita firat adoption globally. The next 
methodological question arises immediately: how to specify the 
"early period following its first adoption globally." 
To answer this question, we start from the premise that 
specifying such a period is possible by means of the theory of 
the technological life cycle. This particular theory has been 
developed mainly by Abernathy and Utterback (1975). Empirical 
evidence demonstrate that product and process technologies show a 
rather predictable pattern of dynamic behavior. 
The typical S-shaped function is designed usually by means 
of the degree of penetration of technology as measured by market 
share, percentage of adoption, etc., expressed usually by annual 
capacity or output. We suggest designing the S-shaped curve by 
means of the share of the BOF early adopters to the total number 
of integrated steel companies in the world. This is because we 
want to recognize the early adopters, the firms which adopted BOF 
during the early (i.e. take-off) phase of the technological life 
cycle. We try to eliminate the cases when these same firms 
adopted BOF later on at other plants. 
For calculation, we used the simple Fisher and Pry model:' 
Equation 1. 
The curve is symmetrical, b(t) = b = constant, and point of 
inflection f*(t) = 0.5; f(t) is the share of the early adopters of 
BOF to the total number of inegrated steel companies worldwide 
and c, b are the parameters defining the S-shape. 
So far, we have not developed a exact method to help us 
define the boundaries between the consecutive phases of the tech- 
nological life cycle. The literature regarding this particular 
problem is not very helpful. The only possibility at the moment 
ZFor more details, see Attachment 1 in Maly, 1987. 
is to specify the boundaries from some technological and economic 
indicators. The take-off phase measures the period during which 
the early adopters started to produce steel using BOF technology. 
The last, but perhaps the most important, issue is to what 
extent do we require a data base to resolve the issues. We must 
take into account not only our specific task, but also the avail- 
ability of data. Because the steel industry is well documented 
in statistics and literature, we have decided to gather informa- 
tion from many countries around the world, bearing in mind that 
not all steel companies can adopt BOF. BOF technology can be 
adopted only by companies with certain technological prere- 
quisites. This implies that we must restrict our attention to 
integrated steel plants (i.e., those with blast furnaces, steel 
mills, and rolling mills), and moreover exclude those integrated 
steel plants producing only special grades of steel. In these 
instances, only electric furnaces, not open hearth or BOF, would 
be preferred. 
The next question to arise is what year to take as a basis 
for the analysis of quantitative data. We suggested taking the 
year of BOF's first commercial adoption as the basis for our 
analysis. 
3. FINDINGS 
The first commercial adoption of BOF technology was in 1952, 
when the first convertor came into operation at Voest, in Aus- 
tria. From that point on, other steel companies had to include 
the option of adopting BOF into their strategic planning. 
The main source for our data base is Cordero's survey of 
Iron and Steel Works of the World for 1952. This book includes 
all major producers of iron, raw steel and rolled steel products 
as well as many other producers of re-rollers, tubes, iron powder, 
etc. Hundreds of companies were analyzed from this book in order 
to select the integrated steel companies, excluding those con- 
centrating their production exclusively on special grades of 
steel. 
The list of 123 companies (see Attachment 1) includes practi- 
cally all integrated steel companies worldwide. The only excep- 
tions are the United Kingdom and some less important countries for 
which complete data was not available. By our estimation, about 
140 integrated companies existed in the world in 1952, so our 
eample contains almost 90% of the total. 
We shall start our analysis ueing the standard classification 
of company size, i.e. up to 500,000 tons raw steel capacity per 
year for emall; 500,000 to 1,500,000 for medium; and over 
1,500,000 for large. Using these standard classifications, we 
obtain a division of integrated companies into groups shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 
The main sources for identifying the early adopters were Lynn 
(1982) and Stone (1966). The number of new firms adopting BOF 
worldwide by year from 1952-1970 is portrayed in Figure 2. 
Nu4Bm OF NEW F m  bxxumIDE 
ADOPTING m BOF BY YEAR, 
1952 - 1970 
YEAR NUMBEROF cXMJLATIVE 
F r n  NUMBER 
YEAR NUMBEROF CUMLiLATIVE 
F r n  NUMBER 
Source: L. Lynn (1982); J. K. Stone, (1966) 
Figure 2 
From that data base, the life cycle curve was created by 
means of the cumulative number of firms adopting BOF every year. 
The estimated result of Equation 1 is as follows: 
In f(t) = .292 i (year - 1952) - 4.35 1 - f(t) (25.0) (-35.4) 
D.W. = 0.83 
where the values in the parenthesis are t-values. 
Figure 3 shows the typical S-curve as a result of that sam- 
ple. 
Figure 3 
Total Integrated Firms = 140 (saturation point) 
The take-off phase (containing the early adopters) starts in 
1952 with the first commercial adoption of BOF and finishes in 
1962 as specified from certain technological and economic in- 
dicators. Such a specification is supported by technological and 
economic indicators from literature. Meyer and Herregat (1974) 
came to the conclusion that by 1961 or 1962 all purely technologi- 
cal problems in adopting BOF had been solved and that all coun- 
tries and firms were facing a homogeneous technology. Tchijov 
(1987) concluded that the boundary between the take-off phase and 
growth phase of different technological life cycles in the case 
of steel production might be defined as 9-10% of total production. 
BOF technology reached this ratio in 1962-1963 (Rosch, 1979). - 
During that period (1952-1962), 29 firms adopted BOF. 
Figure 4 contains a list of the early adopters of BOF. 
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Figure 4 
Using the standard classifications, we can divide the early 
adopters into groups as well. The only difficulty is that data on 
the size of all early adopters are not available. For that rea- 
son, we were able to consider only 22 companies (76%). The divi- 
sion of these companies is depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2 
When we compare the results from Tables 1 and 2, we can state 
that in the group of small companies the percentage (36%) is 
exactly the same, in the medium group slightly lower (36 versus 
47%), and in the large group, on the contrary, slightly higher 
(28% versus 17%). We can conclude that large companies were more 
innovative than the medium and small companies. 
Studying the process of adopting BOF, we see that at the 
stage of early adoption, it is very easy to distinguish two main 
waves. The first lasted from 1952 to 1954, during which 4 com- 
panies adopted BOF. After that, there was a 2-year pause and 
then the second wave from 1957-1962, during which 25 companies 
adopted this technology. The percentage of companies by size 
during these two waves is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
From the results, we can see that the small and medium com- 
panies began adopting at the same rate (50%) in the first wave, 
and then were followed by all three groups at even rates. 
In the second step of our analysis, we shall use as an alter- 
native solution the method for clustering points located on the 
line of real numbers combining histogram and cluster analysis. 
The computerized results depicted in Attachment 1 show us the 
clusters of companies by size. We have 20 clusters and from that 
can distinguish the differences in production capacity between 
them. Attachment 2, the histogram, gives us illustrative informa- 
tion about the density and breadth of the "valleys." Combining 
the results of both the cluster analysis and the histogram allows 
us to specify four main clusters (groups) of companies by size. 
Using round figures for particular zones, the boundaries of these 
groups are as follows: 
small : up to 999,999 tons 
medium: 1,000,000 to 2,999,999 tons 
large : 3,000,000 to 5,999,999 tons 
mammoth : 6,000,000 tons and over 
We have to add that no exact mathematical method exists for 
specifying the boundaries, but combining the cluster analysis with 
the histogram creates the scientific framework for rational expert 
specification of the boundaries. The first main factor is the 
breadth of the "valleys" (histogram); the magnitude of the dif- 
ferences between clusters is the second important factor. 
The reason why the breadth is more important than the dif- 
ferences in production capacity stems from the results of the 
cluster analysis. We see that the first clusters (1, 2, 3) with 
the greatest distances (16,700; 5900; 3499) each contain only one 
"mammoth" company. Such results are of no use to our analysis. 
The distance (breadth) between the mammoth size companies and the 
group of large companies is so large (8,600,000 to 5,101,000 
tons) that this in itself implies a homogeneous and natural group- 
ing, without a non-practical division into groups of one isolated 
mammoth company each. We specified the round figure of 6,000,000 
tons as the boundary between mammoth and large companies. 
The next largest distance (breadth) is between 2,505,000 and 
3,750,000 tons (Cluster No. 4), and the round figure of 3,000,000 
tons creates the boundary between the large and medium groups. 
Within the small/medium zone (1,000,000 - 2,999,999 tons), 
determining the boundary between the small and medium groups is 
the most complicated. We cannot use the breadth, because in that 
case we isolate groups with only 2 or 4  companies (2,500,000 or 
2,000,000 tons). In the considered interval (1,000,000 to 
2,999,999 tons), we then have only one other round figure of 
1,000,000 tons. Fortunately, Cluster No. 1 4  is situated on that 
boundary and can be used. Other previous clusters under considra- 
tion are difficult to use from a logical point of view. Clusters 
6, 7, 8 and 9 are in the other area; Clusters 5, 10, and 1 1  create 
uneven groups; Clusters 12 and 13 have only a small number of 
items; and so any round figure cannot be used. 
After specifying the boundaries of the groups, we can con- 
tinue as in the first step, using the standard boundary clas- 
sifications. The division of the 123 companies by size and of 
the 20 early adopters is depicted on Table 4 .  
Table 4 
The results of Table 4 show us more distinctly that the 
group of large companies is over three times as innovative as the 
groups of small and medium companies. On the other hand, the 
group of mammoth companies is completely non-innovative. 
Analyzing the two main waves in the period of early adoption, 
we obtain the results depicted in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Percentage 
From the results of Table 5, we can again see more distinctly 
that the small companies started the adoption of BOF only later 
to be followed by medium and especially large companies, where 
the share was four times higher than the rate of the number of 
companies (17 versus 4%). 
From the results of this analysis, mainly from its second 
step, we conclude that from a global point of view all size 
groups, except mammoth, took part in the early process of adopting 
BOF. The relatively higher share was that of the large companies, 
but the process began with the small companies. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that the results 
achieved have been acquired from a very narrow sample of one 
innovation in steel-making technology, albeit one of the most 
significant and decisive industrial events during the last 35 
years. It is necessary to evaluate the outcomes, bearing this in 
mind. All these facts should be considered prior to drawing 
concrete conclusions from the results. Furthermore, the relative- 
ly narrow data base also does not permit broad generalizations in 
formulating our conclusions. 
The main aim of this study was to verify the different hypo- 
theses regarding the relationship between company size and innova- 
tive activity. Our research aimed to investigate the possible 
concrete implications of the results on management decision-mak- 
ing, especially in the area of strategic management, as well. 
The idea was, in conjunction with the aims of the MTL activity 
and other recommendations, e.g. directions for further research 
done by Buzacott (1980), to analyze the optimal company size 
closely with regard to innovative activity. 
The aim of such findings is clear. These results can pave 
the way for better strategic decisions, not only on the company 
level. To specify the role of company size could be important, 
for example, for governmental policy, bank intervention, as well 
as for a company's own investment strategy and strategic manage- 
ment of innovation technology. Government as well as bank policy 
can differentiate their support of companies using, among others, 
the criteria of size. Governmental bodies and banks can use 
differentiating instruments such as direct RCD funding, condition- 
al repayment loans, cooperative research programs, pricing (in 
planned economies), high-risk loans, patent policies, tax deduc- 
tions, standards and regulations; education/training/re-training 
funding, and export credits in favor of those companies whose 
probability of innovative activity is higher. 
An analysis of the results of our study, a comparison of the 
results of the first and second steps (Tables 2 and 4), and espe- 
cially the results of the second step show most clearly that the 
most innovative group in the case of BOF adoption was the group of 
large companies, three times as high as the groups of small and 
medium companies. The results partially prove Wilson's theory 
and the conclusions of the IIASA workshop (1979) "Size and Produc- 
tive Efficiency: The Wider Implications" in that the optimal size 
lies somewhere between the two outer extremes. But in our case, 
it is very important to recognize that the take-off phase of the 
technological life cycle was started by the small companies. On 
the other hand, we also see the complete lack of early innova- 
tiveness on the part of the mammoth companies. These are the 
facts which must be taken into consideration in strategic deci- 
sion-making. 
A further fact must also be considered. The above mentioned 
conclusions are made up for the take-off phase of the technolo- 
gical life cycle. In the following phases, the situation could be 
(and most probably is) very different. So government, bank and 
company strategic policy must take into account size as a factor 
of time (the different phases of the technological life cycle) as 
well. 
A basic questions could be raised in conclusion. When a 
technology is in the maturity or post-maturity phase (as is BOF 
at present) are these results applicable? The answer follows: 
this study carries primarily a methodological significance which 
can be applied not only in the steel industry to other technolo- 
gies (i.e., continuous casting), but in other industries as well. 
Moreover, the adoption of BOF technology has not yet been 
completed. We have many examples, not just in developing coun- 
tries, but in developed countries both East and West as well 
(France, Czechoslovakia, ERG, Portugal, USSR) in which BOF has 
been adopted since 1981. 
As a suggestion for further research in this area, it would 
be of great value to continue the research through the other 
phases of the technological life cycle (growth, maturity, and 
post-maturity) and compare the results with our findings. It is 
now, of course, a question of obtaining data for these phases. 
In order to generalize the results of our study, it would be 
necessary to test the achieved results not only for other inno- 
vation technologies in the steel industry (e.g. continuous cast- 
ing), but for innovation technologies in other industries as  ell 
(e.g. CIM in mechanical engineering, adoption of IR, etc.). 
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3.6. LEADERSHIP IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE LIFE CYCLE: 
CASE STUDIES OF U.K. STEEL MANAGERS 
Dr. Jonathan Liebenau, with Dr. Christine Shaw 
Department of Information Systems 
London School of Economics 
London, United Kingdom 
The construction of data bases on managers has been made 
possible by analyzing new biographical dictionaries of business 
leaders. Extensive material is available for detailed studies of 
key decisions in the history of the steel industry over the past 
hundred years from the British Dictionary of Business Biographx 
(5 volumes, Butterworth, 1980-1985). The Dictionary and its 
accompanying data base contain 73 entries of managers who were 
recognized as outstandingly successful in the British steel in- 
dustry. They range in time from early iron-masters to people 
involved in the recent reshaping of the British economy during 
the postwar periods of nationalization and denationalization. 
The collection also includes key individuals such as Henry Be- 
ssemer (1818-1898), inventor and development of the Bessemer 
process; George Clark (1809-1898), manager of the Dowlais Iron 
Co., which encouraged Henry Bessemer and adopted improvements to 
his process; Sir David Dale (1829-19061, who was managing director 
and chairman of the Consett Iron Co. and sponsored numerous tech- 
nical innovations, and Thomas Vickers (1933-1915), who developed 
and installed numerous innovations, including steel casting im- 
provements which helped to keep Vickers Co. in the lead against 
major international competition. Recent leaders included are 
Raymond Brookes (1909- ) ,  who persuaded GKN to install modern 
drop forges after the Second World War; Edward Judge (1908- ) ,  
who supervised the relocation and modernization of Dorman Long 
after the Second World War, and Julian Mond (1925-19731, who in 
the last years of his life presided over the re-organization and 
expansion of the British Steel Corporation. 
The collection as a whole is well distributed by period, with 
especial strength in the nineteenth center history of steel- 
making. Thirty-six of the biographies deal with people who were 
most active in the last century, while 23 deal with men who were 
influential between 1900-1935. The other 16 deal with more recent 
figures. More contemporary information will be available about 
these men, especially those who are still alive. But there should 
be no problem in identifying more recent people of importance and 
interviewing them for this project. 
Sources for these biographies come largely from archives, 
many of which are extensive and will yield detailed information 
about the management of companies, including evidence of complex 
decision-making processes. Fifty-three of these archives are 
held in public repositories and will be easily accessible, while 
thirteen are in the possession of companies or other private 
owners, some of which will nevertheless be available for our 
research. Forty-one biographies used company histories as sour- 
ces, and we have an additional bibliography for the history of 
the steel industry in Britain of over 2 0 0  references for further 
background research. Further information about these steel men 
is available from their published writings, which are most reveal- 
ing about their attitudes towards change and management, of which 
34 are available. There is no question that there is sufficient 
material available for detailed studies of most of these managers 
and their companies. 
U.K. Steel History 
The key issues for the history of the British steel industry 
have change significantly over the past hundred years, but follow 
a pattern of decision-making which provides continuity for our 
study. One hundred years ago, discussions about the future of 
the industry centered around questions about siting and scale 
efficiency in terms of the relationship between sources of raw 
materials and transport to markets. Traditionally, steel-making 
needed to be near forests (for access to charcoal) or coal fields. 
The Bessemer process implied less of a need because, by removing 
the need for most of the fuel used in iron pudding, Besserner 
reduced the advantages of a coal field location for the finishing 
trades. At the same time, it favored bigger units capable of 
dealing with the output of its highly productive operations. The 
decision-makers of the time had to deal not only with the prospect 
of a major relocation of plant, and not only with the adjustments 
necessary for new melting technologies, but also with the loss of 
direct managerial control which growth and innovation imply. On 
the whole, they adjusted rather poorly, confronting their deci- 
sions late and adopting reactive, rather than decisive, stances. 
The exceptions, as well as the norm, will tell us a great deal 
about the context of decision-making and the kinds of people who 
go against main trends. 
Around the turn of the century the pressures for integration 
in order to reach large size was strengthened by the introduction 
of blast furnaces. By the years before the First World War, it 
had already become clear that rebuilding would be unavoidable, 
and the critical decisions centered on the timing of the necessary 
investments. Small adjustments to changing circumstances were 
essential, but the firms which made a series of successful adap- 
tions tended eventually to fail to see the need for more fundamen- 
tal changes, which their previously less successful rivals had to 
face. The steady application of minor technological changes took 
place most readily in a setting of growing demand, especially 
when coupled with changes in the type of product required or, 
apparently less radical, when an industry faced severe competi- 
tion. Extreme cases of the first are the introduction of bulk 
steel-making associated with railway demand or, in the sheet and 
tin plate business, the arrival of the wide strip mill. The re- 
lated instances of the second include the attempt to introduce 
mechanical puddling to meet the challenge of Bessemer's process, 
and the various devices introduced into the sheet mills when 
quality sheet was first demanded in bulk in the twenties, and 
when the strip mill was also becoming a potential supplier. 
Significant resistance to technological changes was still 
apparent, despite the recognition of superior large-scale prac- 
tices. Between 1913 and 1928/9, products, techniques, markets, 
company organization and the national framework within which 
individual company decisions were made were all changing at an 
accelerating rate. The influence of reports about American strip 
mill practices played a major part in the industry from around 
the First World War. Discussions about the feasibility of intro- 
ducing such plants to Britain continued through the inter-war 
period, with various conflicting assessments being produced to 
account for contradictory estimates of the potential markets for 
different kinds of steel in various quantities. 
The key decisions of the Second World period and its im- 
mediate aftermath concerned the construction of the largest sheet 
and tin plate complex in Britain, leading to the formation of the 
Steel Company of Wales and new works at Port Talbot and elsewhere. 
This concern so preoccupied the planning of the early 1950's that 
the oxygen steel process (L.D., as it was referred to in Britain) 
was not given sufficient chance to change the minds of planners. 
Leaders of the industry remained unconvinced, and in mid-1956, 
Richard Thomas & Baldwin planned a new melting shop using open- 
hearth technology. Ten year later, the Steel Company was forced 
to replace all its existing steel-making plants with two large 
L.D. vessels, capable of 3.25 million tons per year. 
This summary history of key decision-making situations in 
Britain over the past hundred years is only intended as a guide 
to the careers of the steel producers whose biographies are being 
collected and analyzed. By combining a careful assessment of 
critical periods in the local industry with detailed analysis of 
the individuals, we can learn a great deal about the importance 
of the utilization of information in specific decision-making 
situations. 
Applications of the Data Base 
The purpose of this work, in conjunction with that of Dr. 
Raevigorova and the IIASA team, is initially to develop a method- 
ology for looking at managerial decision-making about technology, 
which makes use of IIASA's unique opportunities for research and 
dissemination. I also hope that my contribution will show how 
the Management of Technological Life Cycle project can be directed 
to firm-level analyses more effectively and address questions 
about managerial techniques and managerial decision-making. The 
work in general intends to contribute to a variety of topical 
issues now exercising the minds of management theorists. Many of 
these ideas are explicitly historical in character, and I think 
therefore that it is not inappropriate for me to apply historical 
methods. Learning curves, business cycles, questions about catch- 
ing up behavior are explicitly historical, but I think would 
benefit from the kind of empirical work which historians are used 
to doing. Questions about the flow of information, about the 
composition of groups of decision-makers, corporate boards, and 
questions about risk management in crisis situations, and in 
particular about how understandings of particular problems in the 
past can influence managers to change their behavior and give us 
some hope that if they can change their behavior by their mis- 
takes, we might be able to influence and change their behavior by 
telling them about the mistakes of others. 
Using firm-level material, we can address a number of issues 
quite straightforwardly. Considering the structure of corpora- 
tions and the problems that those structures create in the flow 
of information and the management of technology, we can analyze, 
for example, the place of technical decision-making within cor- 
porate structures. We want to know a great deal about not only 
the information available to managers and also how information 
which is available to managers is used by them. For that we need 
to know a great deal about their background, the capacity to 
analyze various kinds of information, and what they then really do 
with it. 
By analyzing the organizational charts of a number of large 
corporations, we can see a great deal about what they imagine 
themselves to be and what public image they intend to present. 
What might be revealing, for example, is the relationship between 
company laboratories and top management. We can see, for example, 
in the structures of a number of large American companies, that 
there is a direct relationship between the chief executive and 
the director of laboratories. The opportunities this relationship 
provides, even if it is an imagined relationship, are likely to 
be greater than a top management which presents itself as more 
distant from the source of technical change. This can be seen 
graphically, for example, in the difference between the organiza- 
tional chart used by the American electrical products company, 
RCA, in contrast to the chart used to express the structure of 
the British chemicals products company, Imperial Chemical In- 
dustries. The British company, typically, shows a far more com- 
plex structure, especially considering the effort taken to simpli- 
fy the flow chart. In particular, we see that the access afforded 
the technical people in the company is far less direct to the 
real decision-makers in the corporation, reflecting the fact that, 
despite the fact that this is a highly science-oriented company, 
technologists do not have opportunities to wield a great deal of 
direct power. Indirectly they might do so, but the corporate 
structure is not designed to promote that. 
My hypothesis is a simple one about the relationship between 
the management of technology and relative success. I think it is 
also generalizable and therefore provides the hypothesis or set 
of working hypotheses for comparative methodology. The factors 
affecting good decisions are the interests and abilities of top 
managers vis a vis technology and their relation to the informa- 
tion about technology which their organization is capable of 
providing. The interests and abilities of a technical manager, I 
believe, can be assessed through contextual analyses, by graphical 
analyses. Information can be assessed by looking at both the 
structure of the organization and the mechanisms in place to 
provide standard quality information. 
Consider the variety of types of information available to 
managers: Background, including facilities, competitive position, 
etc.; financial information at various levels and to varying 
degrees of quality; personnel, including knowledge about the 
extent, distribution and quality of workers; and market informa- 
tion about both products and production technologies. These are 
presented in the form of: financial statements (which are rarely 
objective); personnel lists (usually internal, rarely considering 
the state of the labor market); market surveys (usually about 
purchasers and rarely about ultimate users where manufacturers 
are making intermediate products); R&D laboratory summaries, 
usually of a non-technical nature; and cost estimates for produc- 
tion equipment. This summarizes many of the types of information 
with which I am familiar from company archives. 
So what this data base can provide, in addition to the ana- 
lyses drawn from the kind of corporate information generally 
available to researchers, is the generation of new analyses on 
technical decision-makers as individuals and their industrial and 
corporate context. It can provide us with comparisons with other 
business leaders, both of technical and non-technical backgrounds. 
It can show us the differences in decision-making conditions of 
those different groups, and it provides us with an opportunity to 
put our data in the form which other researchers can use to assess 
other groups of leaders, so we can contrast what makes a highly 
successful technical businessman different from other achievers. 
It also gives us a great deal of detail about decision-making 
situations, the information, the time frames, the interests of 
individuals, and the interests of their organizations. 
Let me give you some illustrations. A data base of about 
1200 biographies of business leaders who were active and success- 
ful (successful vaguely defined) in Britain during the 100-year 
period between 1880-1980 is available and can be used to produce 
case studies such as we have developed on Vickers ("Vickers: 
Technical Innovation in a Family Firm") and British Steel Corpora- 
tion ("Julian Mont, Lord Melchett -- Investment Strategy in a 
Nationalised IndustryW).l Similar data bases for other countries' 
business leaders are also rapidly becoming available (e.g., United 
States). Our date base of British business leaders does not 
include Scottish business leaders, a data base for which has only 
just recently become available. 
For a specific example of what can be done with the kind of 
information provided by these data bases, let us look more closely 
these 1200 British business leaders. They are broken down with 
over half in manufacturing, just over 10% in finance, and the 
other third distributed among other industries with a high propor- 
tion of that third in mining. I must note that this reflects 
historians' biases and available evidence, and not a sociological 
technique. 
What is regarded as important for British leaders is their 
social background (for those of you who know something about 
Great Britain, this appears to be relatively important in the 
U.K., where perhaps it is spoken about more than in other coun- 
tries). For our group of 1200, we can break down the social 
background to 60% for social group 1 (in sociological terms refer- 
ring to people from professional and land-owning classes) and 20% 
from social group 2 (skilled workers). There are also social 
groups 3, 4, and 5. So 80% come from the top two social groups, 
using a standard sociological characterization of British soci- 
ety. 
Our preliminary results already show interesting things which 
contradict assumptions about what makes up great business leaders 
in Britain. Immigrants were not over-represented. Consistent 
with this result, the social group 1 is highly represented. 
Private education is over-represented; only less than one third 
(around 30%) attended any further education; half of those at 
Oxford or Cambridge. It also was found that there was an inter- 
esting symmetry in the breakdown comparing founders, inheritors, 
and managers of British business. The high proportion of in- 
heritors is very important in Britain. We have also statistics 
on what happens to families two and three generations later when 
the firms fall out of family hands. 
How we can apply this specifically to the case of British 
steel and the kind of information which will provide a methodology 
for comparative analysis? The data base of British steel men 
consists of 73 leaders for which we can do the kind of analysis 
just described. The general level of education of the steel men 
is rather higher than that of the general sample. A slightly 
1 These case studies, developed especially for the MTL study, 
can supplement the analyses given above. 
smaller proportion have had only an elementary education, 6% as 
opposed to 9%, while a higher percentage has had some formal 
further education, 40% as opposed to 29%. For the time being, 
there is no real explanation for this; I do not know that steel 
was a more demanding industry than the industries in the rest of 
the data base. 
It is by now a common-place assumption (as has been men- 
tioned) that businessmen in Britain have come from backgrounds 
that were comfortable, if not actually wealthy. This generaliza- 
tion holds true for the steel men, only 4% of whom had fathers who 
were clerks or foremen. The fathers of our steel men are dis- 
tributed as follows: 38% were themselves industrialists, 16% 
were engaged in non-manufacturing business activities, 21% were 
members of the professions, and 10% were landowners and farmers. 
When the fathers' occupations are classified according to the 
1968 standard industrialized classification categories, it emerges 
that most of those fathers who were industrialists were themselves 
engaged in metal manufacturing (as were 22% of the whole group) or 
the manufacture of metal goods, including ships and vehicles (as 
were a further 12%). 
It is possible to analyze the biographical information to 
find out the proportion of people who were inventors as opposed to 
those who made technical advances in their companies by being 
dependent on outside technologies. This is an interesting find- 
ing, not just because of the fact that the proportion of inven- 
tors is under 10%. But it is the kind of finding which, if we 
approach our statistics modestly, I think we can compare interna- 
tionally to find out things such as this, that in the case of 
Britain, the early steel managers were significantly more innova- 
tive than later steel managers. It fits a kind of pattern about 
the people who lead new industries tending to be more technically 
interested in those industries, which are passed over to non- 
technical managers later on. I am not generalizing very far, but 
this particular finding does fit that pattern. 
We find overall that the British steel men made their con- 
tribution to the industry by being general or financial managers 
in the industry. Just over 90% were general or financial man- 
agers, of which around 26% had some engineering training, and 
those who had some engineering training (not surprisingly) were 
twice as likely to be innovators. That is the kind of information 
that also provokes very interesting comparative analysis. 
Information about their background in the firm can also be 
drawn. Very few innovators joined the family firm as managers, 
but non-university men were more likely to be innovators in Bri- 
tain. This of course is something which will contrast very 
strongly with other countries, but something which is perhaps 
consistent with our prejudice towards what Oxford and Cambridge 
do to potentially very innovative people. 
Given the opportunities these data bases offer and the types 
of analyses shown in the two case studies mentioned, what I pro- 
pose is an ambitious project for the MTL project at IIASA. We 
have here a large set of very straightforward information which 
provides opportunities for technical comparisons, industrial 
comparisons, and international comparisons. For the development 
of this project, we still have to answer the questions: which 
technologies? which industries? and which countries? It is, 
however, not impossible to expand this methodology to answer very 
interesting questions about the conditions of managerial decision- 
making. I propose to extend it through extensive interviewing 
techniques, in additional to archival work. It is important to 
know both the documents that people have available to them and 
their attitudes about their positions and their perception of 
their power. This must then be correlated as much as possible 
with the quantitative data which is now available. 
Let me sum up some of the advantages of the proposed method- 
ology. First of all, it is highly reliable because the quality 
of information we use and have at hand is very good; we do not ex- 
trapolate. Second, it is easily communicable because, in addi- 
tion to statistical and theoretical analyses, it can provide 
easily comprehensible descriptions of real behavior and can be 
interpreted for practical cautionary tales or other kinds of 
informative anecdotes. Third, it also takes advantage of IIASA's 
unique conditions and opportunities in providing access to numer- 
ous top managers and analysts from different countries. 
The users of the results of this type of study could be 
influential governmental policy-makers who must identify and then 
shift resources to encourage certain kinds of people to do certain 
kinds of activities. The results could influence business leaders 
perhaps to recognize that people in other places dealing with a 
particular kind of decision-making problem have relied on dif- 
ferent factors (more financial information, other types of techni- 
cal information) and modified their approach to the problem. A 
study like this could also be directed to influence management 
trainers at business schools. 
Most importantly, this kind of information can be used to 
assess the flow of information within organizations, and it can 
give indicators of where the most effective decision-making has 
been done and under what conditions. 


3.7. SESSION THREE DISCUSSION (Excerpte) 
Liebenau: I would like to comment on what I see as the key issues 
that we have to deal with in addressing the general issue of 
the management of the technological life cycle. One is the 
relationship between the life cycle concept and industrial 
policy on the one hand and managerial practices on the other. 
The extent to which we can regard our contributions as useful 
will be the extent to which we can prove the validity of 
these concepts for changing managerial practices and in- 
fluencing industrial policy. 
Now, the way to go about seeing that, according to our three 
speakers this afternoon, has been to look at the explanatory 
power of life cycle theory. Dr. De Bresson uses the data as- 
sociated with the life cycle to identify a number of inter- 
esting issues. He chooses thresholds and this question 
about the scope of production. He says that life cycles 
themselves do not provide explanations. On the other hand, 
they give him an opportunity to identify key issues for 
which he can provide explanations, leaving the conceptual 
basis of life cycle theory behind. I rather like his ap- 
proach because his effort to use the data that is available, 
to find interesting issues which are perplexing to people who 
look at the industry in general and which do not derive 
naturally out of the data associated with life cycle, but 
which confound people looking for questions as to why batch 
versus continuous processing. 
Prof. Lundstedt on the other hand wishes to replace the 
concept of life cycle altogether with some concept of pat- 
terns. These he regards as having less explanatory power, 
but he claims to show how to analyze the components of pat- 
terns and then, by analyzing these components, to stress how 
they might be coordinated so that patterns can yield some 
kind of benefit to show managers how to get these patterns 
coordinated more efficiently. I have trouble, I think, 
understanding exactly what the utility is beyond the inspira- 
tional. I think that if presented to managers, it can point 
out underlying components to patterns of change, but he does 
not propose really to explain how these patterns take place. 
Lundstedt: I said you have to make a distinction between genuine 
cycles and patterns. I was not criticizing life cycle essen- 
tially, because there are cycles, but it is logically wrong 
to call a pattern a cycle and a cycle a pattern. When you do 
your analysis, you have to see what is developmental and 
what is repetitive, and what is also repetitive and develop- 
mental at the same time. So that is a very important dis- 
tinction to make in your analysis of things that change over 
time. If you lump everything together under one concept, 
without distinguishing that, you lose a lot of important 
data. 
Liebenau: I did want to make the distinction between the claims 
of explanatory power, between your proposition and that of 
Dr. De Bresson who looks not to the concept of a life cycle 
at all for its explanatory power, but I think uses it for 
its limited utility in identifying key issues which he can 
then justify. 
Lundstedt: I would just add this, that the way you get a better 
or higher degree of explanatory power is by a proper dif- 
ferentiation, proper creation of taxonomy. Then you can 
code and encode things properly. By so doing, you can make 
distinctions and differentiations, you can create frequen- 
cies, and so forth. You can go to higher order relation- 
ships. 
Liebenau: Perhaps there are more legitimate goals that we as a 
group can identify for ourselves easily. But one is the 
theoretical or perhaps academic goals that we have in under- 
standing what this concept of life cycle is and how best to 
apply the methodologies that we have at hand to understand 
it. 
The second is a heuristic goal, which is very high on the 
minds of many people here for both pedagogical reasons and 
for reasons of communicating to people who might not be our 
students, but whom we wish to make understand what the com- 
ponents of our theoretical structure and our observations 
are. 
But the third goal, which I think we all regard as legitimate 
and as perhaps most difficult for us to confront directly, 
is the goal of influencing beneficial change. We have three 
audiences. We have an academic audience, we have students 
and policy analysts for our heuristic goal, and we have in 
the very difficult case administrators and managers who we 
hope our analyses will influence to make beneficial change. 
I do agree very much that we have to use a systems approach 
and to see the firm as an active agent in a large context. 
In particular, this can force on people the aspects of our 
contributions which imply possible non-intuitive practices, 
that is asking managers to invest at times when they might 
think that it is better to leave things well enough alone. 
But I think that that kind of systems approach can provide 
an explanation for how and when and why to act non-intui- 
tively. It is very difficult to make people respond that 
way. 
Rosegger: I would like to start by quoting approximately the 
definition of theory given in .the famous "On War" which was 
goes something like this: "Theory exists so as to put the 
facts in good order in order to have them ready at hand. 
Theory is meant to train the mind of the commander, not to 
accompany him into the battlefield." We economists are 
often accused of putting facts in good order by seeking 
regularity where there is simple recurrence. We impose 
semantically or mathematically or statistically the pattern 
of cycles as an ordering principle on an aggregation of 
facts which perhaps if we were cleverer we could order to 
some other principle. 
The point in any event is that the flare-up of this discus- 
sion that was triggered by Dr. Lundstedt's valuable contribu- 
tion, I think, is essentially around this very issue. It is 
more than taxonomic and it is more than semantic because as 
long as we use the word 'cycle' we are clearly imposing on 
ourselves a mind-set that speaks of regularity, of some 
discernable patterns of regularity, which may or may not 
exist. 
The second comment I want to make is on Dr. De Bresson's 
presentation in which he talked about the accumulation of 
knowledge and very rightly said that whatever you do when you 
learn by doing is like riding a bicycle; you do not forget 
it. That unfortunately tends to be true for individuals 
only, and the analogy for organizations is not there. 
For organizations and for technical systems, there is such a 
thing as forgetting by not doing. In the consequence of the 
so-called energy crisis of 1973-74, there was a tremendous 
revival of interest in the United States in windmill techno- 
logy. At that time, there was one windmill engineer left in 
the United States at one of the more obscure state univer- 
sities of Oklahoma, and I guess the only reason he was left 
was because there is such a thing as tenure. In any event, 
all of a sudden this one last person who still knew something 
about windmill engineering became one of the country's great 
experts, made a pile of money as a consultant because all the 
organizations that had used windmills, many of them in agri- 
culture in the Southwest, had forgotten. Windmills died in 
the 1930's, when rural electrification came in. Organiza- 
tions collectively can in fact forget something that we as 
individuals do not forget. 
Ayres: I doubt if that is terribly controversial. The real 
problem it seems to me is that the pattern is not invariable. 
Taxonomy may be a beginning; we certainly need to start with 
that. What we need to explain is the variations: why does 
the life cycle work this time and not the other time? or why 
do these occasional exceptions or deviations occur? That is 
where we are, I think. 
Dr. De Bresson made a fairly strong point of interpreting 
some of the bumps in the curve of adoption of the BOF tech- 
nology in terms of changing technological capabilities. I 
must admit that his suggestions as to what those changes 
might have been corresponding to, the big leaps and the big 
jumps forward in the adoption, have a certain plausibility. 
On the other hand, we have many cases (and BOF is certainly 
one) where the technology is changing at the same time that 
it is diffusing. That certainly confuses the analysis. I 
do not know whether in this case the technological changes 
were crucial to the apparent changes in the rate of diffusion 
that occurred from time to time. I tend to doubt it a little 
bit. But that of course is an open issue we could talk 
about. 
Acs: I should like to ask Dr. Liebenau whether he knows the 
study of Zacyznik from Harvard University, based on the 
theory of a Swedish psychologist, who introduced the concept 
of the life cycle for the managerial activities. The pro- 
blems of motivation, of driving forces of management deci- 
sions were explained on a psychological basis. Zacyznik had 
a special theory, with very much empirical evidence inves- 
tigation. If Dr. Liebenau could compare his concept and 
methodology with that of Zacyznik, I would be eager whether 
he could maintain his concept, or change that especially to 
find some evidence between the technological life cycles and 
also for the managerial life cycles. 
Liebenau: I think this addresses a key question now for planning 
the methodology about the extent to which this kind of evi- 
dence can be made compatible with other kinds of empirical 
and in particular quantitative information about life cycles 
and about the general history of these industries. We do 
want to take into consideration psychological characteristics 
and in particular career characteristics of managers, place 
in career when the good decisions are being made. 
The greatest problem of this whole methodology is its tenden- 
cy to expand uncontrollably to try to ask too many questions. 
We have to rely very much on what other people have done to 
refer to the appropriateness of the evidence for a particular 
kind of theory. I am mainly concerned with the comparability 
of our material with the long-term quantitative material, 
which the IIASA group has collected. That is my first prior- 
ity. Other characteristics will have to be analyzed later 
on, as secondary results from the project. 
De Bresson: I am trying to think through how this would be use- 
ful, and I think it would be mainly useful for development 
policy people. So basically this type of studies are useful 
for governmental policies in terms of having a sense of what 
type of people will be able to develop at what stage. For 
the individual who is already in a firm, I think it has no 
direct use. 
Another thing that is generalizable is that in the early 
stage of development of innovation, families, clans, and 
fairly tightly knit groups are crucial. It is normal that 
family or clan structures nurture. But in the later stage, 
when you have a technology which is launched and is at the 
improvement stage, it seems to be very different types of 
people. I think it only has a usefulness for general policy, 
not for somebody who is already a manager. 
Liebenau: Well, you started and ended with the same point, so I 
will address that one first. Its utility depends on where 
the study is placed and what kind of opportunities for lever- 
age it has. In some context, it could influence governmental 
policy-makers, I agree, to shift resources in order to en- 
courage certain kinds of people to do certain kinds of ac- 
tivities. I do think that it could influence business lead- 
ers in the sense not that they are going to give up their job 
for their competitor in the company, but that they are per- 
haps going to recognize that people in such situations, 
dealing with a particular kind of decision-making problem, 
in other places have relied on financial or technical infor- 
mation more than they are used to dealing with, and they will 
bring in people to supplement them in their decision-making 
which they previously thought they could deal with alone or 
restructure the flow of information within the organization 
so that they are able to act on kinds of information which in 
other cases have proven utility. 
I am not discouraged about the possibilities for influencing 
managers. I also think that a study like this ought to be 
directed to influence management trainers. If this material 
enters business schools, I will be very happy to see it used 
there. The people we studied, I think, are not necessarily 
skewed towards larger firms. The influential people in an 
industry do become known, maybe much later than their in- 
fluence was actually felt, but experts in the industry look- 
ing back over a 30-year period do tend to pick out people who 
might not have been involved in large corporations, but whose 
influence was such that they gained a reputation. They come 
into the survey. 
Goldberg: This is in connection with the life cycles. One pro- 
blem we have not addressed during this workshop is its time 
dimension. One of the tricky problems with using the life 
cycle concept is that the pulses are not defined or not 
definable. Time may be very slow at some period, and then 
suddenly becomes very rapid. Two things change the pulse. 
One is crisis. The other is managers who see something 
happening in the organization, in the environment of the 
organization, and that is where I address your point. They 
see an opportunity or a strength. Suddenly the time changes. 
This is one point I want to make. 
Number two, I would rather see the life cycle concept re- 
placed by a spurt because we are talking about revitalizing 
a firm by introducing new technology. Let me show you with 
a picture on organizations. At the entrepreneurial stage, 
you see a clear open system, viewed looking to the outside. 
Somebody has found a new thing and wants to bring it to the 
market or is exploring a market with a new thing. A tricky 
problem in organizations is you cannot neglect any part of 
your constituency in the long-run. You can favor or em- 
phasize a constituency for some time, but after that time, 
you must look at other parts of the constituency and please 
them. Otherwise, they will rush away. 
So the next phase, called collectivity stage, is much more a 
human relations kind of an emphasis. You have the entrepre- 
neur still working with the outside, but he is not capable of 
doing it by himself alone. He must have people who share 
his opinion about the technical idea of the firm's situation 
in the market. But later on, you come to the formalization 
and control stage, where we are approaching the life cycle 
concept of maturity, and have become internally oriented. 
This dimension is flexibility, control which is saying that 
you can look at an organization in the continuous phase, but 
still the problem is that the time dimension is flexible. 
You cannot say you have a constant time around which you are 
measuring. 
Now to your questions about the dimensions here which you 
can use and where the managers come in. First, I started 
with the open system model, where the emphasis is resource, 
acquisition and growth. In this flexibility versus control 
situation, it is external/internal orientation of the firm. 
The second is human relations and here the ends resources, 
acquisition and growth mean flexibility and readiness, a 
high degree of flexibility, and it is very much an autocratic 
style of leadership. The second phase means cohesion and 
morale, to get more people than the entrepreneur himself, to 
work for this idea. The ends are the value of human resour- 
ces. 
The third is then moving into the internalized view of the 
organization, hence stability, control, and high producti- 
vity, milking the organization, milking the accounts, means 
information management and communication. 
The next one is rational goal model, means the end produc- 
tivity, efficiency, planning, goal-setting, evaluation, very 
much looking inside. But if you stay there and forget about 
flexibility you will be out in the long-run. You cannot 
neglect any part of the constituency of a curve or the stake 
in the long-run. 
Here is one open question for you; it was a kind of expanding 
on what kind of management and what kind of organizational 
culture you need in the organization. 
Maly: As we look at these problems of leadership and of companies 
and the problems of entrepreneurship and so on, I have the 
following problem. As we know very well, the MTL activity 
has various aims, and one of them is East-West comparative 
analysis. Now I have the problem comparing the managerial 
profile of leadership of Western companies and Eastern com- 
panies. What will be the results and will the results be 
useful for Western and/or Eastern decision-makers? 
The second problem about the hypothesis which was done here 
by Prof. Goldberg is the problem of entrepreneurship for the 
leaders of Eastern companies. In Eastern companies, the 
problem is completely different because the main decision- 
making concerning investment and so on is made on the higher 
level of ministry or state planning. How to compare these 
results and what will be the usefulness of these results for 
all IIASA member countries, not only Western, but Eastern 
countries as well? 
Liebenau: The key to this is to identify what the significant 
factors creating management of technology in each country 
are going to be and then to design a set of questions which 
address those issues. Now we are not interested in how many 
Czech managers went to Eton. That is an absurdity, and it 
may have no functional equivalent in Czechoslovakia. What we 
have to find out is that, because a lot of British steel 
leaders went to Eton, this is a weighty factor in the back- 
ground of steel leaders, and we want to know what are other 
weighty factors in the backgrounds of Czech steel leaders. 
One of the reasons why I hedged so horribly about the defini- 
tion of entrepreneurship when Prof. Goldberg asked is because 
I had used the term leadership in the title of my talk and 
most of my description. One of the reasons for that is that 
it is a vague term which is more easily comparable East and 
West. We do not have to look for Schumpeterian characteris- 
tics of entrepreneurs in Czech industry, but we can identify 
people who were in positions of power and influence and who 
were making decisions about technical characteristics or 
investment in technology where the results were comparable. 
When we ask who introduced BOF technology and why they intro- 
duced BOF technology, we can identify individuals, groups of 
individuals and characteristics of those groups which I 
think are useful and of approximately equal utility to Eas- 
terners and Westerners. 
Ranta: My comment is related to the life cycle concept and some 
managerial implications. Let's take the example, for in- 
stance, of the automobile industry. You have new concepts 
of luxury cars and clearly different kinds of products which 
means that you can also have different kinds of production 
concepts according to products. 
Then we can take the example of the paper and pulp industry 
and consider that industry to be in the maturity stage. But 
what has happened during the last 10 or 1 5  years is a totally 
new kind of concept of product. Originally we had soft 
papers and then standard printing paper for newspapers and 
books. But now during the last 10 years, we have the concept 
of cold-feed paper, sub-coating and lightweight coating, 
with high quality printing purposes. Then we have fine 
papers, a totally new concept of products, requiring new 
kinds of production concepts. 
One implication for management is first to try to concentrate 
on the products which must be produced, and then to try to 
find a proper production method, and try to find out the 
competition through the product specialization. This can be 
advantageous when the industry is at the maturity stage. It 
is the same in the semi-conductor industry concerning the 
standard memory chips and micro-processor chips, and then 
the semi-custom components and custom designed components. 
Even in robotics today, you have a standard robot and then 
specialize in robots where you utilize vision, image process- 
ing, and tactile sensors, etc. 
A second comment related to the problem is that the whole 
concept of management is changing. This is when you cannot 
distinguish so clearly new products, but they are in a very 
interactive way, as a whole. One such examples is the tex- 
tile industry, ready-made clothes industry, where the whole 
concept of market, product design and production is changing. 
This is also related to flexible manufacturing and computer- 
integrated manufacturing. 
My final comment is related to the point that was raised by 
Mr. Nachev, concerning small or medium scale industry, espe- 
cially in a small country. I think that the life cycle 
theory as IIASA has studied it so far is more related to big 
companies and maybe to big countries. But there are special 
problems which are related to product-oriented small com- 
panies in a small country where the domestic market is suffi- 
cient for profitable production and organization which is 
oriented to international markets must be created. I think 
the problems with big companies, such as those in the steel 
industry, are very different. I hope that in that respect, 
the Finnish National TES program (maybe we can collaborate 
with the Bulgarian National TES program) can give some real 
contribution to the life cycle management concept. A small 
company with an original product, not necessarily a very new 
one, but one that means improvement in a mature industry, is 
always in an emerging atage. It muat create high quality 
products and marketing knowledge which is quite different 
from the production development. The atage of growth, as 
Mr. Nachev said yesterday, is a very important problem for a 
small technology-oriented company. How to create inside the 
life cycle international competition so that you are also 
competitive internationally is a very difficult problem and 
very interesting also from a managerial point of view. 
Goldberg: One problem we are facing is that in small countries 
managers disregard theory. Sweden has foreign trade theory, 
and the two Nobel Laureates in foreign trade theory are both 
of them Swedes. When I was attending business school, I was 
read a text on Foreign Trade and Foreign Trade Policy, which 
stated there is no natural possibility for a car industry in 
Sweden. About 20 years later, Volvo and Saab together were 
paying for the entire trade deficit which had accumulated 
because of increased oil prices. What this text was saying 
is there is not enough market for cars, not enough capital 
and not enough management. The founder of Volvo, however, 
organized the firm disregarding all three limitations and 
organized in a different way. 
Now to take the Volvo example a little bit further: the 
following year, the next General Director of Volvo went to 
the Finance Minister and the Minister of Foreign Trade, with 
the request to get the possibility to export $10 million, to 
build up a sales organization and service organization for 
Volvo in the United States. Both of them refused thinking 
it crazy to take cars from Sweden to the United States, the 
greatest producer of cars. But Volvo's idea was if they did 
not compete in the tougheat market, they would be out in the 
long run. 
One of the reasons Ford and General Motors were doing badly 
with their foreign subsidiaries was they did not permit Ford 
or Ope1 to sell their cars on the American market, competing 
with their own makes in the American market. They had to 
change this, and one of the reasons, I think, Ford surpassed 
General Motors in profits for the first time since 1927 was 
that Ford was the first one to permit foreign-make Ford cars 
to be exported to the United States, in order to get the 
foreign subsidiaries to compete on the American market, 
which still is the toughest. 
So what I would say is we may find it difficult to give a 
theoretical answer to pushing not only the S-1 curve to the 
left, but also the S-2  curve to the left, but practical mana- 
gers may find the ways. But it is the manager we should be 
studying, not the theory. We have to have the theory in 
mind, but a good manager will invent a new kind of behavior. 
Hauatein: In Ranta's paper, he thought the diffusion of FMS and 
CIM concepts has been rather slow, and in fact the flexibi- 
lity of FMS has not always been as great as expected. That 
is obviously true also for our FMS systems, but concerning 
the fact that the diffusion of FMS has been rather slow, I 
think beginning with 1983, there was a rapid growth phase 
coming under both scales. What do you think about this 
small correction to your thesis? 
Second, can we say that obviously the new flexible automa- 
tion technology will be important for mass production, for 
mature industries, or is it so that this flexible automation 
is also very important for such industries which are in the 
rapid growth phase from the standpoint of product innova- 
tion, and not only important for mass production of already 
existing products. 
Ranta: For the second question, I think that if we look at some 
applications from the USA, maybe also from Japan, we can 
conclude that mainly flexible manufacturing systems have 
been applied for mass production. But if we look at some 
European applications, we can see really that rapid growth 
markets and specialized products are more and more often 
producing with flexible automation. There are two kinds of 
possibilities that you come from mass production. You first 
have more freedom and can increase flexibility, and then 
after that you have your CAM design product, your custom 
product, and that means in fact more limitation. Maybe you 
must design the whole product concept again, use the group 
technology and modularity to give possibilities to utilize 
advanced products and technologies. 
That is one problem, for instance, for small and medium scale 
industries. So far I think that applications have mainly 
been on this side. This is also the case in Finland. The 
first flexible manufacturing systems are related more to 
mass production. You have a very specific product and make 
200,000 pieces for your FMS production. But nowadays this 
is gaining and that was also the reason for the first ques- 
tion, that one hypothesis has been that flexible manufac- 
turing is a tool for small and medium scale industries, but 
this has not been the case, not yet. That is why I think 
the diffusion has not been so rapid as we have been expect- 
ing. 
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